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"Everything has its turn in this chequered scene of things,
unless we prevent it from taking its turn by over-rigid
conditions, or drive men to despair or the most callous
effrontery, by erecting a standard of perfection, to which
no one can conform in reality!"
--William Hazlitt
"On Cant and Hypocrisy"
(1828)

-CHAPTER I

FOUNDATIONS:

THE ESSAY AND IMAGINATION

"Till I began to paint, or till I
became acquainted with the author
of The Ancient Mariner, .I could
neither write nor speak. He encouraged
me to write a book, which I did to
the original bent of my mind. 11
(1828: xvii, 312} 1

Hazlitt's An Essay on the Princieles of Human Action,·
published anonymously in 1805, is important in that, first,
it marks the beginning of the writing career of one of the
greatest English essayists of the nineteenth century; and,
second, it sheds revealing light upon the whole subsequent
course and content of that career.
Although largely ignored by contemporari~s,2 the
thoughts expressed in the Essay remained ·with Hazlitt for
the rest of his life; he restated his same argument in published works in 1819 and again in 1828.

And looking back

lAll references are to P.P. Howe's Centenary Edition
of Hazlitt's Complete Works (21 vols.; London: J.M. Dent
and Sons, Ltd., 1930-1934}.
2 Keats was an exception--he owned a copy of the Essay
(cf. The Keats Circle, ed. by H.E. Rollins [2nd edn., 2 vols.;
1

2

at his first book from a vantage point of twenty-three years
later, he could still write of it with pride:

"Yet, let me

say that that work contains an important metaphysical discovery, supported by a continuous and severe train of reasoning, nearly as subtle and original as anything in Hume or
Berkeley" (xvii, 312).
The purpose of the Essay is indicated by its subheading, "Being an Argument in favour of the Natural Disinterestedness of the Human Mind."

It was conceived as a philosophi-

cal refutation of key doctrines of what Hazlitt later called
"the modern school of philosophy."

Among the sins of this

Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965],
I, 254}, and his reading of it firmly impressed upon him
Hazlitt's ideas of "disinterestedness" (cf. W.J. Bate's
John Keats [Cambridge,- Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1963], 202, 216, 240, 254-259, 586).
Coleridge had various connections with the book.
After initially encouraging the young Hazlitt to wri.te it (xi,
4; xvii, 312} he remained silent when a copy was sent to him
at the Lakes (Lamb records the delivery; cf. Lucas's edition
of his Letters [3 vols.; London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. &
Methuen & co. Ltd., 1935], I, 420). Only years later did he
acknowledge that it demonstrated "great ability and originality" (cf. On the constitution of Church and State • • . Lay
Sermons • • • [Henry Nelson Coleridge, ed.; London: William
Pickering, 1839], 380n; see also xi, 3, in Hazlitt's Works:
"Even Mr. Coleridge held his piece for twelve years, and then
put it into a note to his Second Lay-Sermon, that this was a
work of great acuteness and originality"). Note, though, that
Hazlitt received this belated praise very bitterly (xi, 4).
Herschel Baker, in William Hazlitt (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962),
asserts that, according to DeQuincey, Coleridge claimed to

-3

school of thought, based largely on Hobbes, 3 were its assertions that "all our ideas are derived from external objects
by means of sense alone'';

that "the sense of pleasure and

pain is the sole spring of action, and self-interest the
source of all our affections";

and that "the mind acts from

a mechanical or physical necessity, over which it has no controul, and consequently is ·not a moral or accountable agent"
(ii, 144-145).

Such assertions eroded the philosophical base

have suggested everything "important" in the book {p. 141).
I think that this should be clarified, especially in regard
to the first reference that Baker offers in his footnote.
DeQuincey wrote:
"Amongst the philosophical works of Hazlitt, I do not observe that Mr. Gilfillan is aware of two that are likely
to be specially interesting. One is an examination of
David Hartley, at least as to his law of association.
Thirty years ago, I looked into it slightly; but my reverence for Hartley offended me with its tone; and afterwards, hearing that Coleridge challenged for his own most
of what was important in the thoughts, I lost all interest in the essay • • • • It forms part of the volume which
contains the Essay .2.!! Human Action."
(Cf. DeQuincey's Collected Writings [14 vols.; Edinburgh:
Adam and.Charles Black, 1889-1890), XI, 351f.)
Coleridge
was obviously referring, here, to Some Remarks .2.!! the Systems
of Hartley and Helvetius, which was appended to the Essay in
the 1805 volume, and not to the Essay itself. DeQuincey does
say elsewhere, however, that Coleridge "used to assert" that
the Essay itself was "derived entirely" from him (III, 82).
But here DeQuincey may be confusing the Essay with the appended Remarks, especially since Coleridge did indeed elsewhere refer to the Essay as a work of "originality."
3

see W.P. Albrecht's Hazlitt and the Creative Imagination (Lawrence:
The University of Kansas Press, 1965),
1-21, for a review of this tradition.

--4

'for the existence of morai action;

it was to restore this

base that Hazlitt derived his argument.
The key points of his reasoning are:
1) That the human mind is not motivated by present physical objects at all; rather, it is motivated only by ideas
of future objects:
The objects in which the mind is interested may be
either past or present, or future.
These last alone
can be the objects of rational or voluntary pursuit;
for neither the past, nor the present can be altered
for the better, or worse by any efforts of the will.
It is only from the interest excited in him by future
objects that man becomes a moral agent . • • •
(i I

1)

All voluntary action, that is all action proceeding
from a will, or effort of the mind to produce a certain event .must relate to the future, or to those
things, the existence of which is problematical, [and]
undetermined . • • • We are never interested in things
themselves which are the real, ultimate, practical objects of volition: the feelings of desire, aversion,
&c. connected with voluntary action are always excited
by the ideas of those -things before they exist.
(i. 8)
2) That the imagination is the means by which these
future objects act upon the mind:
The imagination, by means of which alone I can anticipate future objects, or be interested in them, must
carry me out of myself • • •

(i, 1)
But that which is future, which does not yet exist
can excite no interest in itself, nor act upon the
mind in any way but by means of the imagination.
(i I

8)

5

3) That "self is a concept which can be thought of
only in relation to one's past and present being,
not to one's future being:
However nearly allied, however similar I may be
to my future self, whatever other relation I may
bear to that self, so long as there is not this
intercommunity of thoughts and feelings, so long
as there is an absolute separation, an insurmountable barrier fixed between the present, and
the future, so that I neither am, nor can possibly
be affected at present by what I am to feel hereafter, I am not to any moral or practical purpose
the same being.
(i

I

10-11)

I saw plainly that the consciousness of my own
feelings which is made the foun<;lation of my con"tinued interest in them could not extend to what
had never been, and might never be, that my. identity with myself must be confined to the connection of my past and present being,. • . .
(i I

4 7)

4) That f.uttire objects cannot mechanically interest
one's

pres~nt

self:

The question is whether • . • [a child's] future
impressions affect him as much ahd impel him to
action with the same mechanical force as if they
were actually present. This is so far from being
true that his future impressions do not exert the
smallest influence over his actions, they do not
affect him mechanically in any degree.
(i

I

30)

It is absurd to suppose that the feelings which I
am to have hereafter should excite certain correspondent impressions, or presentiments of themselves before they exist, or act mechanically upon
my mind by a secret sympathy.
(i, 39)

6

5) That, therefore, all contemplation of future
objects is done selflessly; and that, since one is
motivated only by contemplation of future objects,
one is therefore motivated selflessly (i.e., without
self-interest):
It is plain • • . that there is no communication
between my future interests, and the motives by
which my present conduct must be governed. . . •
I cannot therefore have a principle of active
self-interest arising out of the immediate connection between my present and future self, for no
such connection exists, or is possible.
(i' 48)
With this argument Hazlitt believed that he had
pulled down the key pillars of the Hobbesian school of ·
ethics; he thought that, since he had proven the act of
choice to be not necessarily selfish, the possibility of
free moral decision was thus demonstrated to exist.

In

his words, "we are not obliged at last to establish generosity and virtue 'lean pensioners' on self-interest"
{i, 17).

The keystone in the structure of his argument is
his concept of the imagination.
role played by this faculty is

An appreciation of the
esse~tial

not only to com-

prehend the complexities of the Essay itself, but also to
grasp the essential elements of Hazlitt's thought through-

7

out his later writings.

It is helpful, first, to see the

imagination as contrasted to the understanding. Since the
essayist used these terms throughout his career, and since
we shall be concerned with that whole career, I believe that
an examination of his usual distinction of these faculties
will be useful.
The understanding is "a superintending faculty, which
alone perceives the relations of things, and enables us to
comp::r:_ehend their connexions, forms, and masses"

xx, 25).

(ii, 151;

It is the power of arranging .and combining the data

6f sense-perception into unified ideas. 4 .Ih 1812 Hazlitt refers to the understanding as "the cementing power of the mind"
(ii, 280).

And in 1814 he cites for an example the process

of forming an idea of a table, a chair, a blade of grass, or
a grain of sand!
Every one -of these includ~s a certain configuration,
hardness, colour, size, &c., i.e., impressions of different things, received by different senses, which must
be put together by the understanding bef6re they c~n be
referred to any particular object, or considered as one
idea.
(xx, 25)
Earlier in this same work ("Madame de Stael's Account of
German Philosophy") he says:
4 Much like the familiar "complex ideas" of Locke.
Cf. his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, xii.
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The only power of the sensitive faculty is to receive
blind, unconscious, unconnected impressions; the only
category of the understanding is to perceive the relations between these impressions, so as to connect them
consciously together, or to form ideas.
(xx, 20n)
The mind is naturally constituted to automatically combine
the data of the senses, to automatically mould it into
wholes.

Thus, in 1829, Hazl.itt writes that "the mould in

which truth must be cast • • . is born with us"; and that
-"Truth is, in a word, the shape which our·ideas take in the
moulds of the

und~rstanding~

just as the potter's clay de-

rives its figure (whether round or square) from the mould in
which· it is cast" (xx, 228).
Whereas the understanding arranges and combines physical impressions, the imagination, on a higher level, deals
with moral values; the important difference is the ethical
quality of imaginative ideas.

"The direct primary motive, or

impulse which determines the mind to the volition of any
thing must therefore in all cases depend on the idea of that
thing as conceived of by the imagination" (i, 8).

It is

through the imagination that the will is motivated--i.e., the
will acts in accordance with the values presented to it by
the imagination:

[My real interestJ is fundamentally, and in it's origin
and by it's very nature the creature

of

reflection, and

9

imagination, and whatever can be made the subject of
these, whether relating to ourselves or others, may
also be the object of an interest powerful enough to
become the motive of volition and action.
(i, 11)
In 1819, in A Letter to William Gifford, Hazlitt states that
it is the same faculty [a reasoning imagination] that
carries us out of ourselves as well as beyond the present moment, that pictures the thoughts, passions, and
feelings of others to us, and interests us in them, that
clothes the whole possible world with a borrowed reality, that breathes into all other forms the breath of
life, and endows our sympathies with vital warmth, and
diffuses the soul of morality throu~h all the relations
and sentiments of our social being.
(ix, 58)
The distinctive moral aspect of imaginative perception is
again stressed in 1825:·
What the proportion between the good and evil will really
be found in any of the supposed cases Ce.g., wars, atrocities, fires, murders], may be a question to_ the understanding; but to the imagination and the heart, that is,
to the natural feelings of mankind, it admits of none!
(xi I 11)
And the connection of imagination and morality is.asserted
again in 1827:
Indignation, contempt of the base and grovelling, makes
the philosopher no less than the poet; and it is the
power of looking beyond self [i.e., imagination) that
enables each to inculcate moral truth and nobleness of
sentiment, the one by general concepts, the other by
individual example.
(xvii, 297)

5My italics, here as elsewhere throughout the dissertation.
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This distinction between the imagination and the
understanding is one that Hazlitt usually abides by.

How-

ever, it must be pointed out that he is frequently inconsistent or imprecise in his use of these (and other) terms.
For example, he may equate understanding with reason

6

at

one time (ii, 166), and with ideas at another (xx, 24), and
with free will itself at still another (xx, 61).

More im-

portant, he may occasionally confuse the understanding with
the imagination, as he does at one point in "On Liberty and
Necessity" in 1812:

"The l::>ody is said to be free when it

has the power to obey the direction of the will:

so the

will may be said to be free when it has the power to obey
the dictates of the understanding (i.e. , the imagination] 11
·(ii, 255).

The reality of this imprecision or carelessness

cannot be ignored by Hazlitt. scholars,. nor has it been; 7

6Reason, for Hazlitt, is a systematic analytical
power. Ashe says in "On Locke's Essay":
"This property of the understanding, by which certain
judgments naturally follow certain perceptions, and are
followed by other judgments, is the faculty of reason,
or order and proportion in the mind, and is indeed nothing but the understanding acting by rule or necessity."
( 1812: i'i, 166)
In the Essay on the Principles of Human Action itself he says
that reason is "the faculty by which we reflect upon and compare our ideas" (i, 19n). See John ·Bullitt, "Hazlitt and the
Romantic Conception o.f the Imagination," Philological Quarter1.Y, XXIV ( 1945) , p. 344.
7 Elisabeth Schneider, for example, notes the matter

11

my own response to the problem is to take with a grain
of salt any of Hazlitt's individual statements on topics
which are of habitual interest to him, for any one statement can often be directly contradicted by another somewhere else in the voluminous writings.

I think that it is

safer to follow patterns of ideas--when a pattern of similar
statements is found throughout the Hazlitt canon, one may
feel justified in placing emphasis on ah individual instance
of it.

If a statement is not verified by belonging to the

context of a consistent pattern of like statements; one must
feel less safe with it in dealing with this particular writer.

I am therefore especially concerned myself with delin-

·eating.the patterns of the essayist's thought, the· repeated
manifestations of similar ideas.throughout his writings.
Again, for example, I think that the present distinction between his 'ideas on the understanding and the imagination is
generally valid--it is not without pitfalls and exceptions;
but, on the whole, most of the revelant writings conform to
this pattern.

of imprecise diction in her study The Aesthetics of William
Hazlitt ·(Philadelp~ia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1933), p. 99.

-
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Once it is understood that moral values are connected with imagination in Hazlitt's philosophy, it must also be
seen that Hazlitt's ideas on the precise nature of this connection fall into two additional and opposite patterns.

Ap-

parently he did not recognize (or, perhaps, wish to recognize) the inconsistency which exists in the Essay; what is
important to realize, though, is that his later writings on
the imagination, and therefore on values in human life in
general, proceed in two opposite directions, each following
closely one side of the inconsistency first noticeable in
the Essay.
The last sentence of the Essay refers to "the imag-ination, which is naturally

affe~ted

in a certain manner by

the prospect of good or evil"; it is the ''certain manner"
in which imagination is linked with good or evil (i.e.,
moral values) which creates the problem of the argument. On
the whole, Hazlitt wishes to prove that the imagination

~-

ceives good or evil in ideas of objects, and that the good
or evil perceived is independent of the mind, and of selfinterest.

But he leaves a loophole open which allows for

the possibility that the imagination can also create values
-

.

in the ideas it forms; that values come not from mental
objects seen by the imagination, but, on the contrary, come

p
13

from the mind of the individual himself and are invested
in such objects rather than received from them.
A closer look at Hazlitt's argument is necessary
here.

The case that he wishes to prove is that the mind

perceives good or evil which exists, he says, in ideas of
objects, and which does not exist beforehand in the person
who creates those ideas of objects.

First of all, he has

this to say about the value properties of objects themselves- (rather than the value properties of ideas of those
objects):
It is plain there must be something in the nature of
objects themselves which of itself-determines the mind
to consider them as desirable or the contrary previously to any reference of them to ourselves. They are not
converted into good or evil·by being impressed on our
minds, but they affect our minds in a certain manner
because they are essentially good or evil.
(i I

18)

Feelings of pleasure or pain are entirely coordinate with
the good or evil which exists in external objects; to speak
·of p-leasure or pain is thus to refer to inherent propert_ies
of external objects, not to peculiar receptive properties of
individual minds:
I think that • . • the idea of personal pleasure or
pain can only affect the mind as a distinct idea of
that which is in itself the object of desire, or aversion.
(i, 5)

14
The subtle transition that Hazlitt makes in his argument is
that ideas of objects have exactly the same inherent proper·ties that the objects themselves have; the

~

essential

properties to create pleasure or pain reside in both objects
themselves and in imaginative ideas of those objects.

This

is apparent in a reply the essayist makes to a possible objection:
This notion [to suppose that the imagination does not
exert a direct influence over human action] could not
have gained ground as an article of philosophical faith
but from a perverse restriction of the use of the word
idea to abstract ideas, or external forms, A§. if the ~
sential quality in the feelings of pleasure, or pain,
must entirely evaporate in passing through the imagination; and, again, from associating the work imagination
with merely fictitious situations and events, that is,
such as never will have a real existence, and as it is
supposed never will, and which consequently do not admit
of action.
(i, 23)
It is thus denied that the imagination represents only external forms of objects; Hazlitt's contention (here, at
least) is that it also represents the essential properties
of objects.

Imaginative ideas, he continues, are not mere

powerless fictions; they have all the motivating force of
actual objects, the "essential quality" of which does not
evaporate in passing through the imagination.

This point

is made again in "Some Remarks on the Systems .of Hartley

and Helvetius," which he published in the same volume with
the Essay in 1805:

p
15
But it seems to me a much more rational way to suppose
that [an] idea does not lose it's efficacy by being combined with different circumstances, that it retains the
same general nature ~ ~ original impression, that it
therefore gives a new and immediate impulse to the mind,
and that it's tendency to produce action is not entirely
owing to the association between the original impression,
and a particular action, which it mechanically excites
over again. First, because the connection between the
impression and action was not accidental but necessary,
and therefore the connection between the idea and action
is not to be attributed to association, but to the general nature of the human mind EY. which similar effects
follow from similar causes.
( i I 80)
The mind is thus affected by ideas just as it is affected by
impressions of actual objects.

And good and evil, pleasure

and pain.,--in short, moral values, or those properties which
motivate choice--reside inherently in objects (and in ideas
of objects) and are perceived there by the mind.

The self,

in acts of moral choice, is thus affected by forces essentially not of its own creation, for the essences of ideas
are derived from external objects and not from internal acts
of imaginative creation.

Volue lies in objects themselves,

and therefore the same value is automatically present in
ideas of objects:
This implies that the object, in which I am supposed
to be interested without being sensible of it, is in
itself interesting to me, that it is an object in which
I can and must necessarily be interested, the moment it
is known to me:
• • To go farther than this, and say
that the mind as the representative of truth is or
ought to be interested in things ~ they ~ really and
truly interesting in themselves, without any reference

p
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to the manner in which they immediately affect the
individual, is to destroy at once the foundation of
every principle of selfishness, . ~ • .
(i, 31)
In short, the self perceives rather than creates value in
its own ideas.
This is a difficult position to hold, and Hazlitt
occasionally realizes it.

For if motivating ideas of future

objects are entirely divorced from present and past external
objects (as he insists they are), then this implies either
of two things:

a) that future objects actually exist by them-

selves somewhere, in a kind of Platonic world of their own
which is not dependent for its existence on creation by a
human mind; and that imagination simply perceives these independently-existing objects in this external world; or, b)
that future objects are in reality simply ideas which are entirely created by the mind. 8

But if they are the latter, then

everything about these ideas--including their properties of
moral value--is created by the self of.the individual.
8

These ideas themselves, then, would exist in the
present. This points up a weakness in Hazlitt's argument:
since the mind is actually dealing with present phantoms
of future objects, the self--which Hazlitt says does exist
in the present, though not in the future--cari indeed be connected with these present ideas, and so modify them with
self-interest. Hazlitt does not seem to be aware of this
loophole; however, he is aware of another {as I will point
out in the ensuing discussion), that ideas of future objects
are created rather than perceived.

17
Nowhere does Hazlitt prove, or attempt to prove,
that future objects exist by themselves, independently of
the mind.

To the contrary, his argument develops along the

line that imagination creates ideas of future objects.

In

so arguing, however, he realizes that imagination is not
necessarily bound to accord with the reality of the external
world:
It is the very nature of the imagination to change the
order in which things have been impressed on the senses,
and to connect the same properties with different objects,
and different properties.with the same objects; to combine our original impressions in all possible forms, and
to modify those impressions themselves to 2_ very great
degree.
(i, 26)
But if it is asserted that the imagination can indeed modify
impressions, then the

loop~ole

is left open that such a mod--

ifying imagination can, in particular, change the value properties of objects.

And Hazlitt tacitly recognizes this pos-

sibility even as he tries to assert the contrary.

For example,

he denies that the "essential quality" of objects "must entirely evaporate in passing through the imagination."

In

denying only the most extreme case (that such properties must
entirely evaporate) he implies that at times the essential
(moral) quality £EI! entirely evaporate.

All he is asserting

in effect, is that an object's inherent properties of value
do not necessarily vanish in an imaginative representation of

p
18
the object; by implication, though, it is therefore possible that they can be lost.

Again, he objects to those

who exclusively limit the word "imagination" to an association with "merely fictitious" objects (i.e., those with
no essential tie to external reality}; he does not deny
that imagination can deal with such "untied" objects--he
simply argues that it does. not always do so.
Similarly, he says that "the mind as the representative of truth is or ought to be interested in things
as they are really and truly interesting in themselves."
The words "or ought to be" are a characteristic weakening
of the argument; they allow for the possibility that the
mind need not be interested in things

11

in themselves" with-

out reference to self-interest.
Hazlitt deals directly with the problem of imaginative objects untied to essential realities in another passage:
It does not surely by any means follow because the real~
ity of future objects can only be judged of by the mind,
that therefore it has no power of distinguishing between
the probable consequences of things, and what can never
happen; that it is to take every impulse of will or
fancy for truth; or because future objects cannot act
upon the mind from without, that therefore our ideas cannot have any reference to, or properly represent those
objects, or anything external to the mind, but must consist entirely in the conscious contemplation of themselves.
(i, 28)

µ
19
I

have italicized the words which indicate the extremity of

the case Hazlitt argues for--he does not deny that the imagination can create objects free from external referents.

In-

deed, in this passage he assumes that it in fact does just
this; his assertion here is simply that it does not always
have to.

Also, the fact that the statement begins with the

emotionally argumentative word "surely" indicates again that
Hazlitt cannot logically close the loophole that imagination
can indeed create objects whose essential value property is
dependent solely on the self and not on external reality.9
He is thus occasionally conscious that the mind can
create values as well as perceive them.

And though at times

he simply admits or assumes this, at other times he presents
a different,

"compromise" solution to the dilemna.

For ex-

ample, in considering a starving man's action to obtain food,
he admits that apparently the man is motivated solely by
selfish interest.

But he explains the situation like this:

9 Roy Cain, in "David Hume and Adam Smith as Sources
of the Concept of Sympathy in Hazlitt," Paeers on English
Language and Literature, I, 2 (Spring, 1965), 133-140, argues
that Hazlitt derives his argument almost entirely from Hurne
and Smith, and that, therefore, "little claim can be made
for originality in ethics, metaphysics, or psychology in the
Essay" (p. 140). However, in leaving open the loophole which
allows for a dual function of the imagination, and especially
in fully expanding this loophole in his later writings,
Hazlitt's work shows a corresponding dual emphasis different
from the single focus on "sympathy" which so greatly concerned
his predecessors.
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the influence of appetite over our volitions may be accounted for consistently enough with the foregoing hypothesis from the natural effects of a particularly iri table state of bodily feeling, rendering the idea of
that which will heighten and gratify it's susceptibility of pleasurable feeling, or remove-some painful
feeling proportionably vivid, and the object of a more
vehement desire than can be excited by the same idea,
when the body is supposed to be in a state of indiffer-·
ence, or only ordinary susceptibility to that particular
kind of gratification. Thus the imaginary desire is
sharpened by constantly receiving fresh supplies of
pungency from the irritation of bodily feeling.
(i I

44)

Thus the desirability of, say, food is still an inherent property of food itself; a starving man's mind does not create
value in it.

Rather. (according to this passage) his imagina-

tion simply perceives its essential value ~ vividly.
Seemingly, then, the imagination still functions in an essentially self less manner in some instances when it apparently functions selfishly.

But two points must be noted:

1) since Hazlitt elsewhere admits that the imagination .££!.!!
function selfishly

10 (. .

. h

. . 1

i.e., wit out essentia

.

ties to ex-

ternal reality), this argument explains away only some in-

lOI use the word "selfishly" in a particular sense,
merely as the opposite of "selflessly." I do not mean to
imply undesirable moral characteristics when I use the term;
I simply wish to indicate the operation of one of the two
types of imagination found in Hazlitt's writings, i.e., that
which impqses the filter of self in the .process of perception
("selfish" imagination) as opposed to that which removes it
("selfless" imagination). Perhaps the words "individual" or
"personal" would be synonymous with this restricted use-of
"selfish"; however, since the latter. term most readily underscores the contrast I wish to make use of, I hope the reader
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stances of selfish action;

2) since even in this instance

the self of the starving man determines the relative proportion of values perceived in external objects (e.g., he
may perceive more value in obtaining food and less value in
the act of stealing it from another man, when in other circumstances he would do the reverse) his action is still
ultimately motivated by selfishness--that is, the relative
weight of perceived external values is determined according
to personal standards not dependent on external objects.
Thus, try as he might, ·Hazlitt cannot and does not ultimately close the loophole.
In the final analysis, then, the Essay ..£!! the Principles of Human Action allows that imagination can work in two
essentially different

w~ys.

On the one hand, it may function

impersonally by perceiving values inherently in ideas of external objects.

On the other hand, it may function selfish-

ly, in either of two ways:

it may create values entirely

from internal resources of the mind and· invest them in objects and ideas, thereby "coloring" the objects of perception
with personal values untied to external realities; or it may
simply order or shape perceived values in personally deter-

will accept my continued use of the term in this special
sense. I will therefore refrain from placing _the word (or
its derivatives, e.g., "selfishness") in quotation marks.

pt
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mined hierarchies, structuring perception according to
forms which are independent of external checks.11

11 Passion is an element sometimes distinguished
from imagination in the process of determining moral truth.
w1lether the imagination perceives values or creates them,
morality does not come "home" to an individual, Hazlitt believed, until such values are vitalized by human feelings.
See, for example, "On Reason and Imagination":
11
So with respect to moral truth (as distinct from mathematical), whether a thing is good or evil, depends on
the quantity of passion, of feeling, of pleasure and
pain connected with it, and with which we must be made
acquainted in order to come to a sound conclusion, and
not in the inquiry~ whether it is round or square.
Passion, in short, is the essence, the chief ingredient
in moral truth; and the warmth of passion is sure to
kindle the light of imagination on the objects around
it."
(1826: xii, 46)
Note, though, that it is just the manner in which passion,
or the feelings of pleasure and pain, is "connected" with.
moral truth that is left ambiguous. Is the "warmth of passion11 an affective property of objects themselves (cf. pp.
13-16 above)? or is it a personal creation . (cf. pp. 16:-19)?.

CHAPTER II

THE GENERIC TYPES OF PERCEPTION

"I hardly ever set about a paragraph
or a criticism, but there was an
undercurrent of thought, or some
generic distinction on which the whole
turned. Having got my clue, I had
no difficulty in stringing pearls upon it."
{1828: xvii, 312)

Throughout his critical practice Hazlitt was more
concerned with how men perceived their world than with what
they saw; he considered the object or content of a man's perception to be of secondary value to his method of perception
itself.

This attention to the way men see probably developed

from Hazlitt's own early training as a painter; and his later
writings on art reflect this training.

For example, in the

essay "On Criticism" from 1822 he writes:

"But the.power of

execution [in an art work], the manner of seeing nature is
one thing, and may be so superlative (if you are only able to
judge of it) as to countervail every disadvantage of subject"
(viii, 219-220) . 1

Similarly, he writes in 1824 that "If a

1 Note, too, Hazlitt's sharp distinction between an
object (st. James's Palace) and our perception of that object
23
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picture is admirable in its kind, we do not give ourselves
much trouble about the subject" (x, 22).

Hazlitt saw paint-

ings as embodiments of "kinds" of perception; the way the
artist approached the subject produced the interest of the
work.

So it was, too, with literary art works; for example,

the essayist speaks thus of Walton's The Compleat Angler in
1823:
Some books have a personal character. We are attached
to the work for the sake of the author. Thus we read.
Walton's Angler as we should converse with an agreeable
old man, not for what he says, so much as for his manner of saying it, and the pleasure he takes in his subject.
(ix,· 182)
He had something similar in mind in 1830 when he published
his own conversations with that other interesting--though
perhaps less agreeable--old man, James Northcote.

In his

original introductory note to the Conversations, he says that
in trying to reconstruct Northcote's words, "My object was to
catch the tone and manner, rather than to repeat the exact
impressions, or even opinions" (xi, 350n).

What fascinated

Hazlitt was how the old painter saw and organized his world,
as revealed in his manner· of speaking and painting; Hazlitt
himself admits that "I have forgotten, mistaken, mis-stated,

in "Madame de Stael's Account of German Philosophy" (1814:
xx, 33) .
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altered, [or] transposed a number of things," so obviously
the content of the conversations is of less importance than
their revelation of Northcote's "manner."
Again in 1830, at the end of his life, Hazlitt offers
an extended meditation on the value of the means by which
men seek truth:
The pleasure of the chase, or the benefit derived from
it, is not to be estimated by the value of the same af"
ter it is caught, so much as by the difficulty of starting it and the exercise afforded to the body and the
excitement of the animal spirits in hunting it down:
and so it is in the exercises of the mind and the pursuit of truth, which are chiefly valuable (perhaps) less
for their results when discovered, than for their affording continual scope and employment to the mind in
its endeavors to reach the fancied goal, without its
being ever {or but seldom} able to attain it. 2 Regard
the end, is an ancient saying, and a good one, if it
does not mean that we are to forget the beginning and
the middle. By insisting on the ultimate value of things
when all is over, we may acquire the character of grave
men, but not of wise ones. Passe pour cela. If we would
set up such a sort of fixed and final standard of moral
truth and worth, we had better try to construct life over
again, so as to make it a punctum stans, and not a thing
in progress; for as it is, every end, before it can be
realized, implies a previous imagination, a warm interest
in, and an active pursuit of, itself, all which are integral and vital parts of human existence, and it is a begging of the question to say that an end is only of value
in itself, and not as it draws out the living resources,

2see viii, 234 {1822):
"It is not then the value of
the object, but the time and pains bestowed upon it that
determines the sense and degree of our loss"; and xi, -277
(1829):
"We set a value on things as they have cost us
dear." cf., too, -"On the Love of Life" (1817: iv, 1-4).
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and satisfies the original capacities of human nature.
(xx, 307) 3
Insofar as any end draws out "the original capacities of
hllman nature"--one major capacity being "a previous imagination"--it is valuable.

The use of imagination is thus

asserted to be an important thing in itself; for the objects which draw out imagination are said to be, in a sense,
only means used to produce a possibly greater end, which is·
imaginative perception itself.
Hazlitt usually distinguishes two opposite "manners"
of such imaginative perception, and these are in line with
the bifurcation noticeable in the Essay on the Principles
of Human Action, that imagination may be either selfless or
3 Hazlitt '.s concern for the operation of the mind more
than for the objects of perception is also evident in the
Preface to his obscure English Grammar of 1809:
"It is common to suppose that the parts of speech, of
different sorts of words, relate to different sorts of
things or ideas; and that it was to express this difference in the subject-matter of discourse, that one
class of words was appropriated to one class of things,
and another to another. We have endeavored to show on
the contrary, that the grammatical distinctions of words
do not relate to the nature of the things or ideas spoken of, but to ~ manner of speaking of them, i ·~·, to
the particular point of view in which ~ have occasion
to consider them, or combine them with others in the
same discourse."
(ii, 6-7)
Note also his definition of a substantive, two paragraphs later:
"It is not the name of a thing really subsist- ing.by itself (according to the old definition),·but of a
thing considered as subsisti.ng by itself."

,,
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selfish:

it may entirely abstract self from the process of

perception of the world, or it may impose self as a medium
through which reality is filtered.

Obviously, then, how

men see--which is what interests Hazlitt--is a function of
imagination.
The essayist uses both sides of his theory of imagination throughout his career.

When, in the Lectures on

English Philosophy from 1812, he refers to his power to "go
out of myself entirely" (ii, 239) he is utilizing his idea
of the selfless imagination.

In 1816 he makes further use

of it in picturing the minds of children, who are "perpetually going out of themselves" (xvi, 67).

In the following

year he states that "Art shows us nature, divested of the
medium of our prejudices" (iv, 74), i.e., that art embodies
selfless perception.

In 1823 he criticizes women for lack-

ing the ability to see the world selflessly:
as little imagination as they have reason.
egotists.

"Women have
They are pure

They cannot go out of themselves" (ix, 213).

Three years later he analyzes the process of reading according to his accustomed theory:
in reading we always take the right side, and .make the
case properly our own. Our imaginations are sufficiently excited, we have nothing to do with the matter
but as a pure creation of the mind, and we therefore
yield to the natural, unwarped impressions of good and
evil. Our own passions, interests, and prejudices are
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out of the question, . • • • or in an abstracted point
of view, we judge fairly and conscientiously, for conscience is nothing but the abstract idea of right and
wrong.
(xii, 136n-13 7n)
"Abstract," of course, here means "separated from concrete
existence"--specifically, separated from one's self.

In

1828, again, the essayist refers to "Imagination, which owes
no allegiance to self-interest" (xx, 168).

Clearly, the

concept of the selfless imagination remained with Hazlitt
throughout his life.4
But so did his concept of the selfish imagination.
In 1812 he writes of poets:

"They feign the beautiful and

grand out of their own minds, and imagine all things to be,
not what they are, but what they ought to be" (iv, 152).
'I'his type of imagination can create objects--and values 5 --untied to external realities; it can also modify, mold, and
arrange external objects by investments of personal energies.
Thus, in 1816, he writes:

"For the imagination is that

power which represents objects, not as they are, but as they
4 see also xv111, 122 (1817); here, objects in
Vandyke's paintings ·are said to be presented to the eye without passing through any "medium." Similar statements about
perception free from filters are found at iv, 74 (1817) and
xii, 245 (1826).
5 aazlitt believed.that the mind can perceive or create aesthetic values ju-st as it-d0es ethical values.
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are moulded according to our fancies and feelings"

(xvi, 63)

--i.e., imagination (here) does not "repose entirely on
nature" (cf. iv. 162): rather, it reposes on the particular
ways in which the individual modifies nature.

The same

point is made again in "On Poe,try in General" in 1818:

"the

imagination is that faculty which represents objects, not as
they are in themselves, but as they are moulded by other
thoughts and feelings into an infinite variety of shapes and
combinations of power" (v, 4).

The "shapes" and "combina-

tions" referred to are entirely creations of the poet himself~·

such personal modifications prevent external objects

from being perceived "as they are in themselves."

Hazlitt

again utilizes this theory of imagination in The Spirit of
the Age (1825), in which he writes:

"We are not, then, so

much to inquire what certain things are abstractedly or in
themselves, as how they affect the mind, and to approve or
condemn them accordingly" (xi, 9).

To insist that the way

in which the mind perceives objects is a vital part of moral
determinations is to all<M for variations among different
individual minds.

If morality hinges not on "objects them-

selves" but on the perception of such objects by individual
minds, then, in saying this, Hazlitt is asserting that the
s~lf

of the perce.iver is indeed a vital part of the process

of reckoning values..

He emphasizes just this point a few

F
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sentences later:

II

. • so moral truth must present itself

under a certain aspect and from a certain point of view, in
order to produce its full and proper effect upon the mind."
V.1hen he insists that "point of view" is essential in determining moral truth, he thereby calls for the presence of an
individual personality in the process.

And three years

later, in 1828, he makes a similar point:
• . . the understanding takes a tincture from outward
impulses and circumstances, and is led [by imagination,
probably] to dwell on those suggestions which favour,
and to blind itself to the objections which impugn, the
side to which it previously and morally inclines.
(xvii, 310)
Morality is thus determined "previously" to the reception of
"outward impulses and circumstances"; the mind funnels data
from the external world into previously determined molds of
value.

And if such molds exist before the reception of ex-

ternal data, then obviously the self alone must have created
them. 6
6 rt is also possible, of course, that the· self may
simply be accepting the ready-made molds of value provided
by social conventions. In this case, the process is similar--the mind still funnels external data into molds of
value which are previously determined.
On the matter of filters being present in perception,
see xi, 198 (1826):
"I mentioned that I thought Sir Joshua
more like Rembrandt than either Titian or Vandyke: he enveloped objects in the same brilliant haze of a previous mental
conception." Note also the essayist's descriptions of
Wordsworth and Rembrandt, particularly his interest in the
"mediums" they ~:reate through which they view nature, e.g.,
xix, 19 (1814); iv, 121 {1817), viii, 43-44, 224 (1821).
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Hazlitt thus held his dual theory of imagination
throughout his life--and he held both sides of it simultaneously.

In 1822, for example, he praised the "manners"

of Vandyke and Leigh Hunt for exactly opposite reasons:
[Vandyke] was purely natural, and neither selected
from nor added any thing from his own mind.
(viii, 318)
I prefer H---'s conversation almost to any other
person's, because, with a familiar range of subjects,
he colours with a'totally new and sparkling light,
reflected from his own character.
{viii, 202)
This discrepancy in critical standards, based on his differing conceptions of imagination, did not bother Hazlitt;
he simply employed whichever theory of imagination he needed when he wrote of particular men.

But I will return later

to the question of the relationship and relative importance
of the two types of imagination.

Hazlitt's description of Turner's work (1817: iv, 76n) may
also, in a sense, be included in this group; the comment
here is that this painter's pictures are "too much abstractions of aerial perspectives, and representations not so
properly of the objects of nature as of the medium through
which they are seen. They are the triumph of the knowledge
of the artist, and of the power of the pencil over the barrenness of the subject." Elisabeth Schneider, in her excellent review of Hazlitt scholarship in The English Romantic
Poets and Essayists {New York: New York University Press,
1966), pp. 98-99, says that "Hazlitt was surely using the
term 'medium' to mean the air or atmosphere, not, as Bullitt
[PQ, XXIV,, 345nJ reads it, the technical 'medium' of line
and color." Perhaps I may be allowed to confuse the matter
further with still another opinion: I take "medium," here,
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II
Hazlitt's use of his two conceptions of imagination
in his criticisms of particular individuals is worth noting
in that it points to further patterns of thought in his
writings:

other qualities of perception come to be linked

with the selfish or the selfless imaginative manners, and
certain terms and images are characteristically used in
descriptions of artists who exemplify one or the other of
the generic types of perception.
"Intensity" ·is one of the additional qualities that
is usually found in writers or artists who exemplify the
selfish imagination.

Writing in 1817, for example, Hazlitt

says of Rousseau, whom he

ad~ired

greatly:

"His ideas dif-

fered from those of other men only in their force and intensity" (iv, 89): and, later in the same passage, he writes
that Rousseau was marked by "intense feeling."

In 1818 he

points out "the intensity" of impression characteristic of

to refer to Turner's own "mental set," conditioned by his
familiarity with "the technical language and difficulties
of his art" (iv, 76). It is through this personal filter
of training that he sees his subject: and his painting embodies this individual way of seeing things. In other words,
the "medium" is the configuration of Turner's own mind, a:n.d
we see more of it in the painting than we do of external
nature (cf. xviii, 95 (1815];
" Artists too often chuse
their subjects, not to exhibit ·the charms of nature, but to
display their· own skill in making something of the most bar~
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Dante (v, 17); in the same work (Lectures on the English
Poets) he states that "The characteristic of Chaucer is
intensity"

(v, 46).

In The Spirit of the Age (1825) he

says that "Intensity is the great and prominent distinction of Lord Byron's writings" (xi, 72); and of Wordsworth
he writes:
He has described • • • objects in a way and with an intensity of feeling that no one else had done before him,
and has given a new view or aspect of nature. He is in
this sen_se the most original poet now living, and the
one whose writings could the least be spared: for they
have no substitute elsewhere.
. 89) 7
(xi,
Hazlitt frequently uses images of heat, fire, and
furnaces to help convey the impression of the intensity of
such writers; a further related image which he uses is that
of molding, casting, or impressing objects, as in the heat
of a forge.

This figure serves the further purpose of

lin~-

ing the quality of intensity to the selfish imagination-i.e., the self of the artist is the molding or casting agent,
and therefore the finished product is highly dependent upon
the purposes and intentions of that self.

The "heat--mould-

ren subjects"). I believe Hazlitt is simply suggesting that
the selfish or filtering imagination, rather than the selfless, is .operative.
7 see also iv, 38; v, 379; vi, 120;.ix,
45, 273; xii, 269~ 304; xvi, 18, 41-42,
xvii, 169; xviii, 33, 114, 116, 123.
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ing" image sequence is used, for example, to describe
Rousseau:

"The dazzling blaze of his reputation was kinHis

dled by the same fire that fed upon his vitals.

speculations are the obvious exaggerations of a mind, giving loose to habitual imp:1l3es, and moulding all nature
its

~wn

purposes" (iv, 89).

same fashion:

.!:£

Dante's mind operates in this

"His genius is not a sparkling flame, but

the sullen heat of

~

furnace."

There is an ''identity of

interest" in his conception that
moulds every object to its own purposes.
• The immediate objects he presents to the mind are not much in
themselves, they want grandeur, beauty, and order; but
they become every thing by the force of the character
he impresses upon them. His _mi£9. lends its ~ power
to the objects whic~ it contemplates, instead of borrowing it from them.
(v I

17)

In The Spirit of the Age Godwin is spoken of in similar
terms:
the chains with whic~ he rivets our attention are forged
out of his ~ thoughts, link by link, blow for blow
with glowing enthusias~: we see the genuine ore melted
in the furnace of fervid feeling, and moulded into stately and ideal forms.
(xi, 25)
Byron receives a similar description in the same work:
Instead of taking his impressions from without, in entire
and almo.st unimpaired masses, he moulds them according_ :to
his own te-,nperament, and he€=!.:!=.~ the materials of his imagination in the furnace of his passions.--Lord Byron's
verse glows like a flame, consuming everything in its way.
(xi, 69}
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Hazlitt even uses the same diction when he speaks of poetry
in general in the essay entitled "Sir Walter Scott":
It must be owned, there is a power in true poetry that
lifts the mind from the ground of reality to a higher
sphere, that penetrates the inert, scattered, incoherent
materials presented to it, and by a force and inspiration of its ~· melts and moulds them into sublimity
and beauty.
(xi, 59)
A further quality that Hazlitt often links with the
selfish imagination and intensity of feeling is narrowness in
the scope of vision. · Men who focus their awareness in a narrow range of attention thereby concentrate all of their personal energies, and such concentration nourishes intensity of
feeling.

The idea of "narrow focus" being important for ar-

tistic achievement and, indeed, for happiness itself, is one
that Hazlitt held throughout his career.

In 1814, for example,

he writes that "There is a certain pedantry, a given division
of labor, and almost exclusive attention to some one object,
which is necessary in Art, as in all the works of man" (xviii,
4ln).

Three years later, in "On Pedantry," he says:

Any one settled pursuit, together with the ordinary alternations of leisure, exercise, and amusement, and the natural feelings and relations of society, is quite enough to
take up the whole of our thoughts, time, and affections_;
and any thing beyond this will, generally speaking, only
tend to dissipate and distract the mind.
(iv, 85-86)
In 1821, too, Hazlitt points out that the "requisite" for suecess is the want of "any idea but those.of custom and interest
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on the narrowest scale" (viii, 103); and he says in 1823 that
"it is not necessary for one man to possess more than one
quality in the highest perfection" (xi, 180).

The positive

aspect of narrowed focus is repeated two years later in The
Spirit of the Age:

"It is best to choose and act up to some

one leading character, as it is best to have some settled profession or regular pursuit in life" (xi, 147)1 similar thoughts
are found throughout the essay "On the Qualifications Necessary to Success in Life" in 1826 (xii, 195-209).

And such

ideas remained unchanged at the end of the essayist's life in
1830:

"Nature is not one thing, but a variety of things, con-

sidered under different points of view; and he who seizes
forcibly and happily on any one of them, does enough for fame"
(xi, 229).8
When speaking of the narrowed focus of writers or
artists who also exemplify the selfish imagination, Hazlitt
often uses images to convey the idea of the funnelled nature
of their perception.
channel.

One such image is that of a river or

Such is exemplified by his statement on Wordsworth,

that "The current of his feelings is deep, but narrow" (xi,
94}.

Elsewhere the essayist makes the -same point by way of

8 see also v, 71, 376, 379; vi, 123; vii, 79; ix, 175,
218, 220, 243; xi, 229, 278, 317 i xii, 312; xvi, 139, 188,
402, 404, 408; xvii, 33, 167-168, 264, 332; xix, 83-84; xx,
92, 135, 297, 299, 391.
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negation, saying that "Mr. Wordsworth is the last man to
'look abroad into universality'" (viii, 44).

So it is with

"(The interest in him] is like the course of a

Chaucer:

river, strong, and full, and increasing.

In Shakespeare,

on the contrary, it is like the sea, • • . " (v, 52); the
river, when contrasted to the sea, clearly points out
Chaucer's narrowness of scope, the channelled quality of
mind he shares with Wordsworth.

Godwin is similar; Hazlitt

speaks of him as having "valves belong-ing to his mind" (xi,
37) that have a channelling effect upon his energies.
Rousseau, too, has this focused quality:

Hazlitt speaks of

the "acuteness of his observation" and of his "keen penetration" (iv, 89), the terms suggesting the narrowness and sharpness of a

s~alpel.

Another set of words used frequently in connection with
artists of the Wordsworthian type (including such people as
Byron, Rousseau, Godwin, and Dante) is a color group:
terms "colour," "tincture," and "dye."

the

Hazlitt uses these

terms to indicate an idea like the one suggested by "mould"
and "cast," that the artist transforms his perceptions of
an object through-an investment of personal energy.

He

either shapes or colors what he sees according to characteristics of his own mind. 9

Speaking of one form of genius,

9see above, Chapter I, pp. 21-22.
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Hazlitt writes:
Genius in ordinary is a more obstinate and less versatile
thing [than that of Shakespeare]. It is sufficiently ~
elusive and self-willed, quaint and peculiar. It does
some one thing by virtue of doing nothing else: it excels
in some one pursuit by being blind to all excellence but
its own. It is just the reverse of the cameleon; for it
does not borrow, but lend its colour to all about it."
(viii, 42-43)
And in the essay on Byron in The Spirit of the Age, he refers
to "The colouring of Lord Byron's style" as being "rich and
dipped in Tyrian dyes" (xi, 72).
"the colours of

imagina~ion

So, too., Wordsworth lends

to impressions" {iv, 92}.

Another term that Hazlitt habitually uses in talking
of these people is ''egotism" (or "egotist").

Again, it is in

reference to that quality of the self being impressed on all
that it perceives.

Things gain their importance only in

reference to such a self, only when they have been "moulded"
/

or "coloured" by the individual

arti~t.

Thus he says of

I
Wordsworth:

"he, too, like Rembrandt, has a faculty of making

something out of nothing, that is, out of himself, by the
medium through which he sees and with which he clothes the
barrenest subject"--again, Hazlitt is more concerned with the
way one sees rather than with what one sees.
says:

continuing, he

"[Wordsworth] is the greatest, that is, the most orig-

inal poet of the present day" solely "because he is the
greatest egotist" (viii, 44).

Wordsworth.perceives things
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through the medium of egotism, of himself; what he sees is
therefore colored by his own personality.
ilar:

Rousseau is sim-

he had "excessive egotism, which filled all objects

with himself, and would have occupied the universe with his
smallest interest 11 (iv, 89).

Of Godwin Hazlitt says:

"He

is blind, deaf, insensible to all but the trump of Fame"
(xi, 36); and this ties up intimately with what he says in
"On Posthumous Fame":

"To feel a strong desire that others

should think highly of us, it is, in general, necessary that
we should think highly of ourselves.

There is something of

egotism, and even pedantry, in this sentiment" (iv, 23).
Godwin is, therefore, an egotist for wanting to be famous.
It is interesting to note, too, that "egotism" and "pedantry"
are very closely linked in Hazlitt's mind.

They are not really

the same thing--pedantry can be said to combine the qualities
of intensity of feeling and narrowness of scope; egotism is the
quality of adding personal "colour" to one's perceptions.
These three distinct qualities often go together (though they
do not have to--a point I shall return to)--those who are "exelusive" are very often "self-willed" and "intense," too, in
Hazlitt's mind.
In addition to linking the qualities of narrow focus
and intensity to the selfish imagination, Hazlitt also links
their opposite counterparts to the selfless imagination:

the

p
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qualities of the second generic type of perception which he
values so highly are a broad or universal range of awareness,
serenity or ease of feeling, and the absence of all filters
or pre-set structures in one's perception.

Some of the exem-

plars of this type of vision are Shakespeare, Scott, Coleridge, and Jeffrey.

10

.
And here again Hazlitt habitually uses

the same diction in his assessments of different artists.
In 1817, for example, he writes that Shakespeare was
"the most universal genius that ever lived" (iv, 238);
earlier in the same year he had noted that· "The power
[Shakespeare] delights to show is not intense but discursive"
(iv, 79)--i.e., covering a wide field of subjects rather than
focusing on one pursuit.

A year later, in "On Shakespeare

and Milton," he states that "The striking peculiarity of
Shakespeare's mind was its generic quality . • • so that it
contained a universe of thought and feeling within itself,
and had no one peculiar bias, or exclusive excellence more

lOFigures such as Bacon, Steele, Knowles, and Thomson
are also in this group (cf. vi, 327-328; iv, 8; xi, 184; v,
87-88) but Hazlitt devotes less attention to them. I should
also mention at this point that there are frequently some contradictions in Hazlitt's descriptions of people who habitually
interest him {e.g., Coleridge is sometimes said to have a
structured or egotistical mind, molding perceptions according
to abstract theories). But I will return to the matter of
such inconsistencies in Chapters III and VI.
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than another" (v, 47).

In 1823,too, he praises the Bard's

"infinite variety" {ix, 204).
'!he term "universal" is also applied to Scott in the
same way it is to Shakespeare--indeed, Hazlitt uses the same
quotation,

"born uni versa~ he_ir to all humanity," to refer

to both men (1821:

viii, 42; 1825:

xi, 69).

And in The

Spirit of the Age he writes that the "scope" of Scott's
writing is "wide" {xi, 63), even going so far as to say that
"His works {taken together) are almost like a new edition of
human nature" {xi, 30).
is

~·ready

In 1830, too, he notes that Scott

to converse on all subjects alike" {xi, 274).

Coleridge is another person who "walks abroad in the
majesty of an universal understanding''; he is a person "of
the greatest capacity" {xi, 30).

Like Shakespeare, he has

"discursive reason" {xi, 34); and in his poetry he "drank of
the spirit of the universe" {xi, 33).

"He lends himself to

all impressions alike," Hazlitt says:

"he gives up his mind

and liberty of thought to none.

He is a general lover of art

and science, and wedded to no one in particular" {xi, 29).
Similarly, Jeffrey shows a "great range of knowledge" and
"discursiveness of reason" (xi, 130-131) • 11
11See also iv,
.
'
64,
151; v, 52, 54, 55; vi, 327-328;
vii, 142, 314; viii, 29, 52; x, 303; xi, 47,- 190,-275; xii,
123; xvi, 53, 59; xvii, 92, 189f., 328; xviii, 81, 113; xx,
157.
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Another quality of genius of the Shakespearean type
is a complete lack of tension; exemplars of this type of mind
are the opposite of "intense" people of the Wordsworthian
type.

Thus, in "On Posthumous Fame" Hazlitt writes that "men
I

of the greatest genius produce their works with too much facility (and, as it were, spontaneously) to require the love
of fame as a stimulus to their exertions" (1817:

iv, 24).

Such men are completely at ease--they lack the burning fires
Of egotism.
onstrates:

Scott is like this, as a contrast to Byron dem"Lord Byron's verse glows like a flame, consuming

everything in its way; Sir Walter Scott's glides like a river,
clear, gentle, harmless'' (1825: xi, 69-70) .

12

Shakespeare;.

too, has this serene quality--Hazlitt speaks of "the natural
ease and indifference of his temper" (1818:

v, 56) and of

"the greatest ease and unconsciousness of effort" in his work
(1830:

xi, 248). 13

Being "indifferent" to factions or nar-

row ways of seeing things is a description frequently applied
to Shakespeare; the term usually functions on two levels,
12

The river image as used here for Scott suggests
ease of flow--the concern in this context is not for its "narrow" as opposed to "broad" characteristics. See also xi, 131,
where the stream image is used to suggest Jeffrey's "copiousness .and facility"; and xii, 121, where Hazlitt uses it to
speak of his own style.
l3Note that Hazlitt is talking about Shakespeare himself, not about his created characters, e.g., Lear or Othello,
whom he sees as entirely separate "people." Cf. v, 50.
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suggesting both ease of mind and lack of constrictions in
one's perceptions.

The use of the word "indifference" is

a kind of description by negation--in this case it is a way
of saying that Shakespeare lacks the passionately self-willed
involvement with a subject that people like Byron or
Rousseau demonstrate.

Coleridge is similarly indifferent;

we have already seen that he is a "general" lover of art and
science, "and wedded to no one in particular."

His "ease"

is also suggested in another reference, that he "drank of
the spirit of the universe, and wandered at eve by fairy
stream or fountain" (xi, 33).

To "wander" is to move about

without any set direction in mind--to be utterly free to go
anywhere without being channelled to a fixed course; and a
certain leisureliness is also connoted.

Jeffrey, too, ex-

hibits "unpretending carelessness and simplicity"; and his
style shows great "rapidity," "facility," "flow," and "ease"
(xi, 134, 130-132).

And the same ease that Hazlitt sees in

such writers is also evident elsewhere--the essayist admires
it in such diverse subjects as the Indian Jugglers (viii, 78,
80, 87), the Elgin marbles (xvi, 353), and Mrs. Siddons'
.
( xviii,
. . . 278) • 14
acting
14see also iv, .53; v, 88; vi, 163; v111, 283, 316;
ix, 237-241; x, 44, 61, 67; xi, 47, 60, 134, 248, 248n; xii,
92, 329; xvi, 12, 49, 188, 318; xviii, 81, 113; xx, 153, 243.
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Those who have both universality of awareness and
ease of feeling usually exemplify the selfless imagination-they do not tamper with the objects or relations they perceive; they impose no coloring or structuring of their own.
Thus, Hqzlitt says that Shakespeare was one
who did not tamper with nature or warp her to his own
purposes; who 'knew all qualities with a learned spirit,'
instead of judging them by his own predilections; and
was rather 'a pipe for the Muse's finger to play what
stop she pleased, ' than anxious to set up any character
or pretensions of his own.
(1821: viii, 42)
Such a mind serves as a transparent medium through which
nature appears directly.

Indeed, Hazlitt uses the terms

"clear" and "transparent" {as opposed to "coloured," "tinetured,

11

etc.) in talking of Scott's qualities.

We have al-

ready seen in passing that Scott's verse "glides like a
river, clear, gentle, harmless"; the contrast to Lord Byron
{in the essay on Byron from The Spirit of the Age) states
the idea more explicitly:
The colouring of Lord Byron's style, however rich and
dipped in Tyrian dyes, is nevertheless opaque, is in
itself an object of delight and wonder: Sir Walter
Scott's is perfectly transparent~ In studying the one,
you seem to gaze at the figures cut in stained glass,
which excludes the view beyond, and where the pure light
of heaven is only a means of setting off the gorgeousness of art: in reading the other, you look through a
noble window at the clear and varied landscape without.
(xi, 72)
It is worth noting, furtherj that in the first quotation

,
45

above on Scott, "clear" is linked to "gentle" and "harmless"; in the second, "clear" is linked with

11

varied --the
11

three qualities of clarity (or lack of perceptual filters),
tranquility, and universality are often closely linked in
Hazlitt's mind, just as their opposing qualities are often
connected in the opposite type of perception.
Coleridge, too, as we might expect, is selfless;
referring to him as one of those "Persons of the greatest
capacity," Hazlitt says of this group:

"surveying themselves

from the highest point of view, amidst the infinite variety
of the universe, their own share in it seems trifling, and
scarce worth a thought" (1825:

xi, 30).

Such selflessness

prevents him from imposing structures upon his perceptions-he "can act only on spontaneous impulses without object or
method" (xi, 36).

Structures of any sort are bad in this way

of seeing--anything that molds or casts one's perceptions is
to be avoided, just as "colouring" is to be shunned.

Thus

Shakespeare is praised because in his dialogues "Nothing is
made out by formal inference or analogy, -by climax and antithesis:

all comes, or seems to come, immediately from

nature" (1818:

v, 50) • 15

The literary devices of climax,

anthithesis, etc., are seen·as confining structures or molds

15rn qua.lifying this assertion by adding "or seems
to come," Hazlitt is probably mindful of the operation of
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of thought--and are therefore considered to be undesirable
in this perspective.

Indeed, one of Hazlitt's objections

to Dr. Johnson is precisely the fact that he has such structures in his criticism:
mould, in a set form:

"All his ideas were cast in a given
they were made out by rule and system,

by climax, inference, and antithesis:--Shakespeare's were
the reverse" (1817:

iv, 175).

Hazlitt often speaks of minds of the Shakespearean
type as being free from "bigotry" or "bias,

11

the condition

of having a fixed way of seeing things or of screening out
certain possibilities of perception.

Thus Shakespeare's

mind "contained a universe of thought and feeling within itself, and had no one peculiar bias, or exclusive excellence
more than another" (v, 47); so, too, the Bard "had none of
the bigotry of his age"
11

(v~

56).

Similarly, Jeffrey is

neither a bigot nor an enthusiast," and "He is not wedded

to any dogma" (xi, 130), whereas people like Dante and Milton
are--they share a "spirit of partisanship" (v, 66).
Much value therefore lies in certain men of genius
imposing no personal colors or structures upon their visions

/the understanding as opposed to the imagination. Thus Shakespeare's mind can indeed arrange the physical data of sense
perception according to the "moulds" of his understanding
while--more importantly--he refrains from clouding perceived
values by imaginative tampering. See above, Chapter I, pp.
7-9.

,
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of the outside world.

Indeed, not only do they impose

nothing of their own, but they actually tear off old perspectives.

Thus, speaking of Scott's novels and romances,

Hazlitt says:
The grand secret of the author's success in these
latter productions is that he has completely got rid
of the trammels of authorship; and torn off at one
rent . . • all the ornaments of fine writing and worn
out sentimentality. All is fresh, as from the hand
of nature.
(xi, 61)
Such work is particularly significant to

a reader

because

it serves the function of stripping him of his set ways of
seeing things, of his own prejudices, biases, and egotis"tical perspectives:
[Scottl draws aside the curtain, and the veil of egotisml& is rent • . • he expands and lightens reflection, and takes away that tightness at the breast which
arises from thinking or wishing to think that there is
nothing in the world out of a man's self!~-in this point
of view, the Author of Waverley is one of the greatest
teachers of morality that ever lived,17 by emancipating
l~The "veil" or "curtain" image is one that Hazlitt
frequently uses to indicate constricted perception or colored
awareness. See iv, 74; v, 10; vi, 176; viii, 6; xi, 54, 71;
xii, 122, 129; xvi,. ·53; xvii, 314.

l7For the same reasons, Shakespeare is "not only one
of the greatest poets, but one of the greatest moralists we
have" (xii, 245). Note, however, that Hazlitt's view of the
~oral aspect of art is part of a larger critical concern.
Even though he is often classically oriented in his criticism
(approaching art as an imitation or embodiment of external
values in nature), he is, from another point of view, romantic
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the mind from petty, narrow, and bigoted prejudices.
(xi, 71-72) 18
The diction is of course significant:

"egotism," "tight-

ness," "narrow," "bigoted," and "prejudiced" are characteristically opposed to such terms as "expands," "lightens,"
and "emancipating."

It is also interesting that Hazlitt

specifies "In this point of view," which indicates his conscious awareness of the other point of view, that based on
the selfish imagination.

in that his major concern is actually one step removed--i.e.,
he approaches art as the perception of ~ individual which
allows for (.£!: prevents) imitation of nature. Using Abrams'
scheme from The Mirror and the Lamp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 6-7, I would say that Hazlitt's primary
emphasis in his artistic theory is placed upon the role of the
artist. Thus, he saw even Shakespeare's plays as, in a sense,
expressions of a unique personality--this personality, however,
was one of utter selflessness and "transparency." A lesser emphasis {i.e., iess often expressed, but strong when it is
verbalized) is placed on the (moral) effect of art on an audience--i. e., the method of perception which art creates in
a reade.r or viewer. Differing weights of importance are placed
on the external universe--at one time it is the objective
source of perceived values; at another, it is not objective
but plastic or neutral and receptive of personal investments
of value. At still other times it occupies a middle ground;
as Abrams notes (p. 52), Hazlitt sometimes combines the
"mirror" with a "l~p.
He is simply inconsistent on this
point.
Regarding the last element in Abrams' scheme, Hazlitt
was never much concerned with the formalities of art works
themselves. He "typically applies his criticism, not to the
analysis of design, ordonnance, and the inter-relations of
parts, but to the representation in words of the aesthetic
qualities and feeling-tones of a work of art" (p. 135).
11

18see also xii, 320, where Scott is said to have "a
perfect indifference to self."
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Shakespeare, Scott, and men of their type are impertant because they restore us to nature; they make our vision
fresh again, as if we were seeing the world for the first
time.

This is the type of vision Hazlitt admires so much in

his essay "Romeo and Juliet"--the vision of as yet uncorrupted youth:
What is it that in youth sheds a dewy light round the
evening star? That makes the daisy look so.bright?
That perfumes the hyacinth? That embalms the first kiss
of love? It is the delight of novelty, and the seeing
no end to the pleasure that we fondly believe i~ still
in store for us.
( 181 7:
iv, 2 5 0)
"Novelty" suggests that no habitual or set ways of perception
have yet developed; "seeing no end" is tantamount to saying
"seeing no constrictions or barriers," which is the important
quality of being free and open to the universal range of all
possible experience. · Hazlitt admires this same type of fresh
vision in his description of Adam and Eve (from

Paradise~),

who were literally seeing the world for the first time:
In them hung trembling all our hopes and fears. They were
as yet alone in the world, in the eye of nature, wondering
at their new being, full of enjoyment . • . • All things
seem to acquire fresh sweetness, and to be clothed in beauty in their sight.
( 1818: v, 6 7)
"In their sight" suggests that the way they see, more specifically than what they see, is what Hazlitt considers to be important.

And the several superlatives ("all," "full," "all")
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suggest that, as yet, no limitations of any kind have become
attached to their way of seeing.
People with such fresh vision are the opposite of
"egotists," "egotism" being the term used in connection with
writers of the Wordsworthian type.

Shakespeare_ is thus not

an egotist--a point which Hazlitt makes in several different
essays (e.g., iv, 23-24; v, 47; xi, 92).

so it is with

Scott, too, by whom "the veil of egotism is rent"

(xi, 71}.

And Hazlitt also carefully specifies that "Mr.· Coleridge talks
of himself, without being an egotist, for in him the individual is always merged in the abstract and general"

(xi, 31).

The term is therefore another which signals a sharp division
between the two types of perception Hazlitt is delineating.
The concept is also often expressed as in "On Shakespeare and
Milton"; here, referring to Shakespeare, Hazlitt writes that
"by an art like that of the ventriloquist, he throws his imagination out of himself" (v, 50).

Those who see with such

vision "lose" themselves, or "go out" of themselves

19

--they

leave behind the habitual structures _the self must normally
have in order to function in the everyday world.
19 see also i, 39; ii, 239; ix, 213; xvi, 67, 91-92;
xvii, 338.
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III
Hazlitt thus distinguished two general types of perception, and he used the various elements involved as standards of value throughout his writing career.

It was probably

these opposites that he had in mind when, looking back on his
writings of twenty-three years, he wrote the comment used as
the epigram for this chapter:
I hardly ever set about a paragraph or a criticism, but
there was an undercurrent of thought, or some generic
distinction on which the whole turned. Having got my
clue, I had no difficulty stringing pearls upon it.
(xvii, 312)
It is interesting that Hazlitt perceived essentially
the same "undercurrent of thought" in so many different objects at so many points in his career.

Though he would flesh

out the oppositions he perceived in many different and unique
ways, he habitually and consciously made use of the same
skeletal structures of thought.

In 1814, for example, he writes:

Poetry may be properly divided into two classes: the
poetry of imagination and the poetry of sentiment. The
one consists in the power of calling up images of the
most pleasing or striking kind; the other depends on the
strength of interest which it excites in given objects.
The one may be said to arise out of the faculties of
memory and invention, conversant with the world of ~
ternal nature; the other from the fund of our moral
sensibility.
(xix, 18)
Though he uses the word "imagination" here in an unusually re-
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stricted sense, he is, nevertheless, still using the opposition first noticeable in the
Human

Actio~:

Es~ Q!2

the Principles of

one can either perceive value which resides

in external objects, or one can personally create it. and invest it in such objects.

A similar distinction underlies

his comments on the classical and the romantic styles of
art--the former describes things "as they are interesting in
themselves"; the latter, things as they are made interesting
by personal associations (1816:

xvi, 63).

Using "imagina-

tion" in another restricted sense, he writes in 1820 that
"The two principles of imitation and imagination, indeed,
are not only distinct, but almost opposite" (vi, 350) .20
Two years earlier he had again used his opposite qualities,
saying that Wordsworth "is the reverse of Walter Scott in his
defects and excellences.

He has nearly all that the other

wants, and wants all that the other possesses" (v, 156); similarly, Wordsworth and Shakespeare are "the antipodes of each
other"

(1824:

(vi, 2llf.),

xvi, 253).
Sh~cespeare,

Contrasts of Marlowe and Heywood
Beaumont and Fletcher (vi, 250),

Paine and Cobbett (viii, 51-52), Titian and Domenichino (x,

20The qualification of "almost" may again indicate
Hazlitt's belief that even in strict "imitation" there is
always some "moulding" done by the understanding. See footnote 15, above.
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328), Mackintosh and Coleridge (xi, 100), Raphael and Guido
(xii, 284), Mme. Pasta and Mlle. Mars (xii, 324f.), Moore and
Byron (xvi, 4llf.), Kernble's conception of Hamlet vs. Hazlitt's (xviii, 199), Scott and Rizzio (xviii, 350), Pope and
the poets of nature (xx, 90f.) and countless others 21 bring
out one or more oppositions of the selfish vs. the selfless
imagination, broadness vs. narrowness of scope, and intensity
vs. ease of feeling.

While it is true that Hazlitt placed great emphasis
on his generic contrasts, it is also true that he always further specified his analyses to distinguish individuals within
the broad classifications.

His specific criticisms are just

that--they are each unique.

But since below the generic

level they do not tend to repeat themselves from one essay to
the next, it is beyond the scope of this study to pursue hundreds of such individual criticisms in detail.

A few examples,

though, will indicate some of the differences between generically similar people.
Godwin and Wordsworth, for instance, are both intense
men, "egotists" of narrow focus; but on a more specific level
they are very different.

Godwin appealed to men's reason a-

lone, ignoring human imperfections and passions in his moral
21 Note xi, 277-278, and xvi, 402, in_ particular.
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system--"he raised the standard of morality above the reach
of humanity" and gave "no quarter to the amiable weaknesses
of our nature, nor [did] he stoop to avail himself of the supplementary aids of an imperfect virtue" (xi, 18-19).

In ad-

vocating the "omnipotence of reason" he assumed "but one class,.
of ideas or motives, the highest and least attainable possible" (xix, 304).

Despite the impracticality of his moral-

ity, though, Hazlitt. greatly admired Godwin's ideas, directed
as-they were to the ends of human liberty and poiitical reform.

Godwin made a major contribution to human thought, Haz-

litt believed, in that by straining reason to its limits as a
motivating force for moral action, he thereby "pointed out the
limit or line of separation, between what is practicable and
what is barely conceivable."

By "imposing impossible tasks on

the naked strength of the will, he has discovered how far it
is or is not in our power to dispense with the illusions of
sense, to resist the calls of affection, to emancipate ourselves from the force of habit."

Godwin's discovery of the

borders of such possibility was a great accomplishment, Hazlitt believed, because it ultimately enabled others to place
"the Gothic structure of human virtue on an humbler, but a
wider and safer foundation than it had hitherto occupied in
the volumes and systems of the learned" (xi, 23-24).
Hazlitt recognized that reason by

its~lf

could not
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much affect men:

"the levers with which we must work out

our regeneration are not the cobwebs of the brain," he wrote
in 1824, "but the warm, palpitating fibres of the human
heart" (xvi, 268}. 22

He found a correspondent awareness in

Wordsworth, wh,p "communicated interest and dignity to. the
primal movements of the heart of man"--"no one," he says,
"has displayed the same pathos in treating of the simplest
feelings of the heart" (xi, 89, 8B} . 23

Wordsworth's concern

for the simple but fundamental passions thus clearly separates him from Godwin.

But, while Hazlitt praises words-

worth's pursuit of his "new avenue to the human heart" (viii,
45) in his poetry, he repeatedly.berates the poet for his
later reactionary political views.

In this respect, too,

Wordsworth is the opposite of Godwin, who was, to Hazlitt's
dismay, left behind by the times as his liberal supporters
22 see also xii, 324 (1826):
"When we appeal to a
man's reason against his inclinations, we speak a language
without meaning# and which he will not understand."
23Godwin "does not stoop to avail himself of the supplementary aids of an imperfect virtue,." says Hazlitt (above}.
Quoting Northcote (xi, 211), he writes:
"Nature is satisfied with imperfect.instruments. Instead
of snarling at every thing that differs from us we had
better take Shakespeare's advice, and try to find 'Tongues
in the trees, books in the running brooks,/Sermons in
stones, and good in every thing.'"
This is what Wordsworth does--the same quotation from As You
Like It is applied to him in "On Genius and common Sense"
(viii, 44).
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went on to become Tories.24
Coleridge, as another instance, is different in
various respects from Scott or Shakespeare--most notably in
that his universal range of awareness tended to work against
him:
The fault of Mr. Coleridge is, that he comes to no conclusion. He is a man of that universality of genius
that his mind hangs suspended between poetry and prose,
truth and falsehood, and an infinity of other things,
and from an excess of capacity, he does little or
nothing.
(xix, 32)
Hazlitt recognized that Coleridge had the same qualities of
mind as Shakespeare; indeed, he said of Coleridge in 1818 that
"he is the only 'person I ever knew who answered to the idea
of a man of genius" {v, 167).

He could also see, though, that

Coleridge's particular character made him too weak to effectively utilize his great gifts.

"The man of perhaps the

greatest ability now living" (xii, 198) could not produce results like the other geniuses of his type; Coleridge wasted
his gifts by "swallowing doses of oblivion" (xi, 34).

Never ....

.theless, Hazlitt ultimately tended to judge him kindly, despite his ineffectuality.

"Mr. Coleridge's works," he says

in The Spirit of the Age, "injure instead of conveying a just
24 other examples of distinctions within this class of
writers may be found iri comparisons of Wordsworth and Rousseau
(iv, 92) and Wordsworth and Byron {xix, 36).
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idea of the man, for he himself is certainly in the first
class of general intellect" (xi, 35).
Shakespeare and Scott, as another instance, are also
distinct figures in Hazlitt's thought.

They share the quali-

ties of the selfless imagination, ease of manner, and great
range or variety of scope;

25

however, they have an important

difference, which Hazlitt spells out in "Sir Walter Scott,
Racine, and Shakespear" (xii, 336-346).

In this essay he

objects to the implied assertions of "a French lady" that
Scott "imitates nature in the same way" as Shakespeare; the
point he makes is that the dramatist presents nature more fully and deeply.

Shakespeare identifies with the "instinctive

law of our nature"; he seizes on "the ruling passion" of his
subject, and "evolves all the rest from it."

He

s~pathizes

with and enters into the internal processes of nature without
falsifying or distorting them; he then organically extends
the operation of these principles within his subjects.
characters thus act from internal motivations.

His

Shakespeare

is thus "a half-worker with nature"; he simply sets in motion
the principles of nature which he finds all about him.

He

25 Scott resemh.les Shakespeare in that "he thinks of
his characters and never of himself, and pours out his works
with such unconscious ease and prodigality of resources that
he thinks nothing of them and is even greater than his own
fame" (This from the end of "Sir Walter Scott, Racine, and
Shakespear": xii, 346).
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does not change, alter, modify, or impose his own personal
character upon his subjects; rather, he discovers the individual internal processes of each, enters selflessly into
them, and impels the operation of these principles from the
inside.

Scott, on the other hand, simply presents the ex-

ternal aspects of his subjects:

"He lays an embargo on 'all

appliances and means to boot,' on history, tradition, local
scenery, costume and manners, and makes his characters.
chiefly up of these"--he "transcribes" rather than enters
into his material.

Like Shakespeare, he does not distort his

material by imposing his own personal characteristics and
values upon it;

Scott's "matter-:-of-fact imagination" though,

is content to present subjects from a distance.

He can tell

us of nature and the world, but he does not show us like
Shakespeare:

"The genius of Shakespear is dramatic, that of

Scott narrative or descriptive."
to a

t~uly

"Whenever Sir Walter comes

dramatic situation, he declines it or fails"--

Scott can only record his material, not impel it.

Hazlitt's

conceptions of these two writers are thus quite distinct:
"Sir Walter Scott gives us the external imagery or machinery
or passion; Shakespear the soul"; "The one gives us what we
can see and hear; the other what we are."

And the difference

is vital to an understanding of the essayist's immense love
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of Shakespeare.

Hazlitt often links the three qualities of selfish
imagination, narrowness of scope, and intensity of feeling
·together, just as he often links the three opposite qualities with each other.

When he talks of any one quality

specifically, then, he often means to imply the presence of
one or both of its usual concomitants.

He writes, for ex-

ample, of the close interrelationship of Scott's qualities:
There are two things I admire in Sir Walter~ his capacity and his simplicity, which indeed I am apt to think
are much the same. The more ideas a man has of other
things, the less he is taken up with the idea of himself."
(1830: xi, 276)
Continuing, a few paragraphs later, he writes:
So, in general, writers of the greatest imagination and
range of ideas, and who might be said to have all nature
obedient to their call, seem to have been most careless
of their fame and regardless of their works.
They treat
their productions not as children, but as 'bastards of
their art;' wherea~ those who are more confined in their
scope of intellect and wedded to some one theory or predominant fancy, have been found to feel a prop.ortionable
fondness for the off spring of their brain, and have thus
excited a deeper interest in it in the minds of others.
we set a value on things as they have cost us dear: the
very limitation of our faculties or exclusiveness of our
feelings compels us to concentrate all our enthusiasm on
a favorable subject; and strange as it may sound, in order
to inspire a perfect sympathy in others or to form a school,
men must themselves be egotists! Milton has had fewer
readers and admirers, but I suspect more devoted and bigotted ones, than ever Shakespeare had:
Sir Walter Scott has
attracted more universal attention than any other writer
of our time, but you may speak against him with less dan-
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ger of making personal enemies than if you attack Lord
Byron.
The passage indicates Hazlitt's own understanding of the
dynamics by which his six generic qualities tend to be found
in two opposite sets.
They are not always so linked, however.

He says that

Milton, for example, has an intense, forceful quality (iv, 38;
v, 58, 61), and that he also imposes his own perspectives
upon his material:

"So Milton has borrowed more than almost

any other writer; but he has uniformly stamped a character of
his own upon it" (xx, 301; see also v, 230).

However, as the

first clause of this quotation suggests, the essayist does
not characterize Milton's range of awareness as narrow,
we might expect.

whic~

Rather, it is extensive--a point emphasized

by a contrast to Pope:

"Milton has winged his daring flight

from heaven to earth, through Chaos and old Night • . Pope's
muse never wandered with safety, but from his library to his
grotto, or from his grotto into his library back again" (xix,
83).

Milton, then, does not '(here) exemplify the usual com-

bination of qualities.
Neither, for that matter, does Pope.

His world of

concern is narrow (above; see also v, 71; xix, 84), and he
imposes his own characteristics upon what he sees (v, 80).
But Pope is not an "intense" or forceful poet--his manner
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is marked by "ease" rather than "enthusiasm" (v, 71; xix,
84; xx, 92).

It is wise therefore not to consider Hazlitt's

use of oppositions as the simple workings of a mechanical
system, for he sometimes fluidly com.bines the generic qualities in a variety of ways.

CHAPTER III

THE CONTRADICTIONS

"It is said, I know., that truth is
~; but to this I cannot subscribe,
for it appears to me that truth is many.
There are as many truths as there
are things and causes of action and
contradictory principles at
work in society."
(1807: vii, 308)

Hazlitt often uses his characteristic oppositions of
thought to create balance and tension in essays; sometimes,
however, he also creates inconsistencies and contradictions.
Commentators such as Paul Elmer More have noted "the innumerable contradictions that occur in his work. 111

These discrep-

ancies are, however, not totally haphazard and unpredictable;
there is an internal pattern to them.

First of all, they usu-

ally involve a limited number of ideas--Hazlitt does not contradict himself on just any topic; when he does do so, the
situations almost always involve his use of the same few generic qualities of perception we have already distinguished.
And second, when such inconsistencies do occur, he is
1

Shelburne Essays (2nd series; New York and London:
G.P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker Press, 1909), p. 75.
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usually doing one of two things:

he may be discerning qual-

ities in a particular subject opposite to those which he usually sees in it; or he may be seeing negative value in a
particular quality which elsewhere he sees as positive--and
by extension of this, he may rank one whole type of perception above the other at one point, and, at another, reverse
his idea of their relative values.
In Scott, for example, Hazlitt saw contradictory qualities of mind exemplified.

Scott's novels and romances demon-

strated the workings of an imagination not taken up with itself, its concern being rather with presenting an undistorted
view of the whole range of human experience.

But, in contrast

to these literary productions, his politicai life demonstrated
just the•opposite qualities; and in The Spirit of the Age Hazlitt hit with deadly force at the bigotry, prejudice, and narrow-mindedness that made the novelist a stumbling block in
the road to social reform:
If there were a writer, who 'born for the universe'-'--Narrow'd his mind,
And to party gave up what was meant for mankind--'
who, from the height of his genius looking abroad into nature, and scanning the recesses of the human heart, 'winked
and shut his apprehension up' to every thought or purpose
that tended to the future good of mankind-- • • • who, amiable, frank, friendly, manly in private life, was seized
with the dotage of age and the fury of a woman, the instant
politics were concerned--who reserved all his candor and
comprehensiveness of view for history, and vented his lit-
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tleness, pique, resentment, bigotry, and intolerance on
his contemporaries-- • . . who, the moment his own interest or the prejudices of others interfered, seemed to
forget all that was due to the pride of intellect, to
the sense of manhood-- • . . who being (by common consent), the finest, the most humane and accomplished
writer of his age, associated himself with and encouraged
the lowest panders of a venal press; • . . showing no remorse, no relenting or compassion towards the victims of
the nefarious and organized system of party-proscription,
carried on under the mark of literary criticism and fair
discussion, insulting the misfortunes of some, and trampling on the early grave of others-~
'Who would not grieve is such a man there be?
Who would not weep if Atticus were he?'
{xi, 67-68) 2
Like Scott, Coleridge, too, is sometimes criticized
for showing a "bigotted and exclusive ... spirit (xii, 101-102);
however, Hazlitt sees these faults in his poetry as well as
in his politics.

His verse is sometimes said to be marred by

its passing through filters of "trancendental theories" and
"scholastic speculations" (xi, 30; xviii, 309); it is thus
not true to nature and external realities.

And in a Plain

Speaker essay Coleridge is criticized for having more concern

2see also x, 254-255, where Scott is referred to as
an "understrapper of greatness and of titles, himself since
titled, the scale of whose intellect can be equalled by nothing but the pitifulness and rancour of his prejudices."
While it is true that Hazlitt occasionally discerns prejudices in Scott's novels, these, somewhat paradoxically, have
the effect of giving fresh sight to contemporary readers-i .e., Scott "goes back to old prejudices and superstitions
as a relief to the modern reade~·· (xi, 76). As Hazlitt says
elsewhere in The Spirit of th~ Age, "Antiquity after a time
has the grace of novelty" (xi, 178).
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for himself than for his subject:
to his own mind.

"he owes everything

His object is to invent; he scorns to

imitate" (xii, 15).

This, of course, brands him as one

who derives value from his own mind rather than from outside objects.

The blocks and filters in his perception

are assailed elsewhere, too; in a letter to The Examiner
in 1817, Hazlitt accuses Coleridge and Southey of tying
down men's consciences in "rusty fetters"; the sharp ad
hominem attack also cites a "disgusting display of egotism" on Coleridge's part (xix, 197-198).

There are, then,

contradictions to the portrait of the man given in The
Spirit of the Age; one gets the impression, however, that
the Spirit portrait is Hazlitt's most mature assessment.
·while the vitriolic attacks of 1816 and 1817, motivated by
political hatred and spilling over into literary criticism,
may portray Coleridge as a narrow-minded bigot, Hazlitt's
later, more seasoned judgment of the man makes him out to
be greater than thiso

In 1825, the essayist concentrates

on the positive, Shakespearean qualities of his mind; he
even separates him from the apostasy of the rest of the
Lake School, saying that Coleridge "did not enter with them"
into the safe world of political pensions and laureateships,
that he stayed behind, "pitching his tent upon the barren
waste without, and having no abiding place nor city of
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refuge" (xi, 38) .
While Hazlitt's views on Coleridge show his discernment of opposite qualities in one subject, they also
point out another type of inconsistency--that qualities
which he admires on some occasions are the very ones which
he criticizes on others.

Thus, for example, he admires

those who "look abroad into universality" and criticizes
those whose minds are too narrow to do so.3

But, as we

have seen, he frequently takes the opposite stance as well,
pointing out the disadvantages of a broad range of awareness and the benefits of focusing one's attention on a
single pursuit:

"A multiplicity of objects unsettles the

mind, and destroys not only all enthusiasm, but all sincerity of attachment and constancy of pursuit" (iv, 84).4
And we have also seen that Hazlitt sometimes criticizes
Coleridge from this point of view, showing that the advantage of his type of genius may also be its weakness.

5

Even Shakespeare does not escape criticism on this account:
The universality of his genius was, perhaps, a disadvantage to his single works; the variety of his
resources~ sometimes diverting him from applying them
to the most effectual purposes • • . • If he had been
3
4

5

See viii, 44; xi, 16 i xii, 123; xviii, 304; xx, 157.
See above, Chapter II, pp. 35f.
See above, Chapter II, p. 56.
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only half what he was, he would perhaps have appeared greater.
(v, 55-56) 6
The passage continues, criticizing the playwright for his
"ease~;

here, his lack of intensity is seen as a fault

rather than as a virtue:
The natural ease and indifference of his temper made
him sometimes less scrupulous than he might have been.
He is relaxed and careless in critical places . • . •
His very facility of production would make him set
less value on his own excellences, and not care to
distinguish nicely between what he did well or ill. 7
Wordsworth's qualities, too, may be either virtues or defects, depending on one's point of view:

"his strength

lies in his weakness" (xi, 94) is a comment that implies
Hazlitt's own practice of shifting between opposite and
contradictory viewpoints.
Hazlitt has opposite views on even such a matter
as prejudice--prejudice being the imposition of personal
filters in perception that prevent the mind from seeing
the world as it is "in itself."

His attacks on bigotry

are too numerous to need citation; however, it should be
noted that he sometimes praises exactly what he so often
condemns:

"To take away the force of habit and prejudice

6Repeated at xvi, 92n.
7 see also iv, 225:
"perhaps Shakespear was too
volatile and heedless." There follows a negative reference to his "careless force."
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entirely, is to strike at the root of our personal existence,

11

he says in The Round Table (iv, 84), in the

very year (1817) he so savagely attacks the Lake poets.
He makes another such statement, for example, in 1823:
"No wise man can have a contempt for the prejudices of
others; and he should even stand in a certain awe of his
own, as if they were aged parents and monitors.
in the end prove wiser than he" (ix, 189)

They may

.a

A classic example of Hazlitt's inconsistency may
be found in his different comparisons of Sir Walter Scott
and William Godwin; he has this to say of the two in the
essay "William Godwin" in The Spirit of_ the Age (1825):
It is the beauty and the charm of Mr. Godwin's descriptions that the reader identifies himself with
the author, and the secret of this is, that the author has identified himself with his personages.
Indeed, he has created them. They are the proper
issue of his brain, lawfully begot, not foundlings,
nor the 'bastards of his art.·' He is not an indifferent, callous spectator of the scenes which he himself portrays, but without seeming to feel them.
There is no look of patch-work and plagiarism, the
beggarly copiousness of borrowed wealth; no tracerywork from worm-eaten manuscripts, from forgotten
chronicles, nor piecing out of vague traditions with
gaudy staring transparency, in which you cannot distinguish the daubing of the painter from the light
that shines through the flimsy colours and gives them
brilliancy. Here all is clearly made out with strokes
of the pencil, by fair, not factitious means. Our author [Godwin] takes a given subject from nature and

8For other examples see vii, 306; xvi, 332; xx,
97, 102.
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from books, and then fills it up with the ardent workings
of his own mind, with the teeming and audible pulses of
his own art. The effect is entire and satisfactory in
proportion. The work (so to speak) and the author are one.
We are not puzzled to decide upon their respective pretensions. In reading Mr. Godwin's novels, we know what share
of merit the author has in them. In reading the Scotch
Novels, we are perpetually embarrassed in asking ourselves
this question; and perhaps it is not altogether a false
modesty that prevents the editor from putting his name on
the title-page--he is (for any thing that we know to the
contrary) only a more voluminous sort of Allen-a-Dale. At
least, we may claim this advantage for the English author
[Godwin] that the chains with which he rivets our attention
are forged out of his own thoughts, link by link, blow for
blow, with glowing enthusiasm: we see the genuine ore
melted in the furnace of fervid feeling, and moulded into
stately and ideal forms; and this is so far better than
peeping into an old iron shop, or pilfering from a dealer
in marine stores!
(xi, 24-25)
Despite the rhetorical exaggeration in the passage which goes
to extremes in sacrificing Scott on the altar of Godwin's
praise, the underlying criteria of Hazlitt's distinction are
clear enough.

Godwin is favored here because of his inten-

sity of feeling and his imposition of his own forms and energies upon his work; he is not "indifferent" like Scott, and
in this instance he is therefore "far better."

Hazlitt crit-

icizes the Scotch novelist because his works lack the definite personal moldings that Godwin exhibits--Scott's

11

patch-

work 11 of "chronicles," "tradition," and "borrowed" wealth
shows that his concern is for his subject and not for himself.

And in this passage, such selfless imagination is an

undesirable quality.
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We get a different opinion of Scott in the essay
"On the English Novelists" from Hazlitt's Lectures on the
Comic Writers (1819); here, he says of Scott's work:
In knowledge, in variety, in facility, in truth of
painting, in costume and scenery, in freshness of subject and in untired interest, in glancing lights and
the graces of a style passing at will from grave to gay,
from lively to severe, at once romantic and familiar,
having utmost force of imitation and apparent freedom of
invention; these novels have the highest claims to admiration. What lack they yet? The author has all power
given him from without--he has not, perhaps, an equal
power from within. The intensity of the feeling is not
equal to the distinctness of the imagery. He sits like
a magician in his cell, and conjures up all shapes and
sights to the view • • • • In the midst of all this
phantasmagoria, the author himself never appears to take
part with his characters, to prompt our affection to the
good, or sharpen our antipathy to the bad. It is the
perfection of art to conceal art; and this is here done
so completely, that while it adds to our pleasure in the
work, it seems to take away from the merit of the author.
As he does not thrust himself forward in the foreground,
he loses the credit of the performance. The copies are
so true· to nature'· that they appear like tapestry figures
taken off by the pattern; the obvious patch-work of tradition and history. His characters are transplanted at
once from their native soil to the page which we are reading, without any traces of their having passed through the
hot-bed of the author's genius or vanity. He leaves them
as he found them; but this is doing wonders. The Laird
of Bradwardine, the idiot rhymer David Gellatly, Miss Rose
Bradwardine, • • . and Meg Merrilees, are at present 'familiar in our mouths as household names,• and whether
they are actual persons or creations of the poet's pen,
is an impertinent inquiry.
(vi, 128-129)
But it is this same impertinent inquiry that forms the basis
of his criticism of Scott in the essay "William Godwin."
There, Scott suffers, being criticized with the same diction
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that is here used to praise him.

The present passage con-

tinues into a consideration of Godwin; and in this essay both
men are praised, though, of course, on the basis of opposite
qualities.

As the essayist himself says in the next para-

graph:
Whoever else is, it is pretty clear that the author of
Caleb Williams and st. Leon is not the author of Waverley. Nothing can be more distinct or excellent in their
several ways than these two writers. If the one owes
almost every thing to external observation and traditional character, the other owes every thing to internal conception and contemplation of the possible workings of ·the
human mind. There is very little knowledge of the world,
little variety, neither an eye for the picturesque, nor a
talent for the humorous in Caleb Williams, for instance,
but you cannot doubt for a moment of the originality of
the work and the force of the conception. The impression
made upon the reader is the exact measure of the strength
of the author's genius.
(vi, 130)
There is yet another comparison of Godwin and 'Scott
in a third essay, entitled

11

Mr. Godwin,

Edinburgh Review in 1830.

Speaking of Godwin's novel

11

contributed to the

Cloudesly, Hazlitt writes:
The plot is borrowed from a real event that took.place
concerning a disputed succession in the middle of the
last century, and which gave birth not long after to a
novel of the title Annesley. We should like to meet
with a copy of this work, in order to see how a writer
of less genius [than Godwin] would get to the end of
his task, and carry the reader along with him without
the aid of those subtle researches and lofty declamations with which Mr. Godwin has supplied the place of
facts and circumstances. The published trial, we will
hazard a conjecture, has more 'mark and likelihood in
it. I
(xvi, 400-401)
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Hazlitt is critical of Godwin here--Godwin, he maintains, is
supplying "declamations" of his own in place of "facts and
circumstances"; he is covering over the external reality with
the workings of his own mind.
this is a negative quality.

And, in the present context,
(The reference to the author of

Annesley having "less genius" than Godwin is ironic, since
Godwin is being criticized in comparison with him.)

Hazlitt

then immediately continues by setting off Godwin's fault in
contrast to the excellence of another writer--Scott:
This is the beauty of Sir Walter Scott: he takes a legend or an _actual character as he finds it, while ot_her
writers think they have not performed their engagements
and acquitted themselves with applause, till they have
slobbered over the plain face of nature with paint and
varnish of their own. They conceive the truth is a
plagiarism, and the thing ~ it happened a forgery and
imposition on the public. They stand right before their
subject, and say, 'Nay, but hear me first.'
We know no
other merit in the Author of Waverley than that he is
never this opaqu~, obtrusive body, getting in the way and
eclipsing the sun of truth and nature, which shines with
broad universal light through the different works. If we
were to describe the secret of this author's success in
three words, we should say, that it consists in the absence of egotism.
The passage speaks _for itself.

It is especially interest-

ing, though, in that, when matched with the other Godwin-Scott
co~parisons,

it readily underscores Hazlitt's inconsistency in

the use of his polar values.

In one essay, Godwin is "far

better" and Scott is a source of perpetual embarrassment; in .
another, both authors are praised; in a third, Scott is
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praised highly and Godwin is heavily criticized.

And in

each instance the comparison of the two writers is made on
exactly the same grounds:

the opposite qualities of mind

they exhibit.9
Hazlitt was aware of such inconsistencies in his
writing, and in his polemical Letter to William Gifford
(1819) he defends himself by saying:
my love of paradox may, I think, be accounted for from
the necessity of counteracting the obstinacy of prejudice •. If I have been led to carry a remark too far,
it was because others would not allow it to have any
force at all. My object was to show the latent operation of some unsuspected principle, and I therefore
took only some one view of that particular subject. I
was chiefly anxious that the germ of thought should be
true and original; that I should put others in possession of what I meant, and then left it to find its
level in the operation of common sense, and to have its
excesses corrected by other causes. The principle will
be found true, even where the application is extravagant
or partial. I have not been wedded to my particular
speculations with the spirit of a partisan. I wrote for
instance an Essay on Pedantry, to qualify the extreme
contempt into which it has fallen, and to shew the necessary advantage of an absorption of the whole mind in some
favourite study, and I wrote an Essay on the Ignorance
of the Learned to lessen the undue admiration of Learning,
and shew that it is not everything.
(ix I 30)
"The latent operation of some unsuspected principle" is; like
9 Note, then, .the unintentional irony of a comment made

in 1824:
"Nothing provokes me more than these exclusive and invidious comparisons, which seek to raise.one man of genius
by setting down another, and which suppose that there is
nothing to admire in the greatest talents, unless they can
be made a foil to bring out weak points or nominal imperfections of some fancied rival."
(xvi, 295)
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the "generic distinction" upon which he strings pearls,10
a reference to this customary oppositions.
habi~ually

Hazlitt's mind

worked with the tensions of contrasting elements;

as he says in his Characteristics (1823), "There is a natural principle of antithesis in the human mind.

We seldom

grant one excellence but we hasten to make up for it by a
contrary defect, to keep the balance of criticism even" (ix,
180).

The reason for this habitual practice is precisely

his belief that there is indeed "a natural principle of
antithesis" in the human mind itself; specifically, there
is an antithesis in the operation of the faculty of imagination.

Hence, Hazlitt's famous dictum:

"Truth is not one,·

but many; and an observation may be true in itself that
contradicts another equally

t~ue,

according to the.point of

view from which we contemplate the subject" (ix, 228).

The

human mind is capable of shifting--and does shift--between
the selfless point of view and an infinite variety of filtered or individual points of view; but, for Hazlitt, as
long as the "warm, palpitating fibres of the purnan heart"
are involved--no matter what contradictions may result-then there, too, is truth.11
10 see above, Chapter II, p. 51.
llsee Chapter V!, below, for further discussion of
the overall relationship of Hazlitt's opposite types of per-
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ception.
For other statements in opposition to each other, see
also the following:
la) Favorable references to "intensity" or criticisms of
"ease":
i, 125; v, 85, 151, 379; viii, 30; ix, 240, 244; x,
45, 52, 273; xi, 131-132; xii, 269, 304; xvi, 18, 41-42, 92n,
403-404, 413, 415, 445; xvii, 8, 169; xviii, 33, 36, 114.
lb) Favorable references to "ease" or criticisms of "intensity": iv, 53; v, 88; vi, 163; viii, 78, 80, 87, 283, 316;
ix, 237~241; x, 44, 61, 67; xi, 60, 69, 131-132, 134, 248,
248n; xii, 92, 329; xvi, 12 1 49, 153, 188, 318, 353; xviii,
81, 113, 278; xx, 153, 243.
2a) Favorable teferences to narrow scope, or criticisms
of broad range of concern: i, 125; iv, 132; v, 71, 151, 181,
376, 379; vii, 117; viii, 79, 103; ix, 175, 180, 196, 218, 220,
243; x, 303; xi, 30, 97, 131-132, 147, 229, 278, 317; xii, 197199, 312; xvi, 188, 402, 404, 408; xvii, 8, 33, 167-168, 332f.;
xviii, 4ln, 304; xi~, 84, 209-210; xx, 92, 135.
2b) Favorable references to broad scope, or criticisms of
narrowness: i, 124; iv, 47-51, 64, 123, 151, 200, 238; v, 52,
54-55; vi, 65-66~ 150, 327, 328; vii, 142, 314; viii, 29, 33,
52, 59-69, 266n, 271; ix, 170, 195, 204; x, 130, 303; xi, 8,
16, 47, 116, 130-131, 190, 275; xii, 26, 10.1, 123, 164, 248;
xvi, 53, 59, 243, 371, 401; xvii, 25, 26, 92, 175,. 189f., 326,
328; xviii, 81, 113, 417; xix, 15, 288; xx, 157, 262, 270,:~321.
3a) Favorable references to structured, filtered, or selfish perception, or criticisms of unmodified or selfless perception: iv, 120, 152; v, 3; viii, 57-58, 176, 202; ix, 244;
x, 52; xi, 81, 154, 278; xvi, 41-43, 53, 101-102, 397-398, 402,
404; xvii, 8, 29, 33, 65, 332; xix, 10, 210; xx, 97, 102, 237.
3b) Favorable references to selfless perception, or criticisms of structured/filtered.awareness: i, 3, 7; iv, 5, 74;
vi, 92-93, 151; vii, 144, 228, 310; viii, 52, 76, 77, 169, 224,
266n, 269, 270; ix, 165, 195; x, 18, 89; xi, 48, 54, 115, 135;
xii, 32, 101, 352; xvi, 6, 89, 132-133, 339, 364; xvii, 103,
189f., 326; xviii, 36, 148; xix, 93,. 95-96; xx, 126, 157, 230,
316f.

r-,,
CHAPTER IV

ANALYSES OF INDIVIDUAL ESSAYS

" • . . for I seldom see my way
a page or even a sentence beforehand."
(1821: viii, 6)

A trying problem that many Hazlitt.scholars· have
faced is that of finding any kind of pattern in the writings
of a man who often wrote quickly and with little revision-indeed, Hazlitt himself said in his Table-Talk collection:
What abortions are these Essays! What errors, what illpaced transitions, what crooked reasons, what lame conclusions! How little is made out, and that little how
ill! • . • I have also time on my hands to correct my opinions, and polish my periods: but the one I cannot, arid
the other I will not do.
(viii, 79)
M. H. Abrams has said that Hazlitt's rapidity of composition
was possible "only because his essays are relatively planless"; 1 elsewhere he contr~sts Lamb's "delicately contrived
rhetoric and meticulously controlled organization" to Hazlitt's "hard-hitting plain style and seemingly casual order
of topics. 112

Ian Jack writes that "Interested as he is in

111 william Hazlitt," in Vol. II of The Norton Anthology of English Literature (2 vols.; New York: w. w.
Norton & co., Inc., 1962), p. 512.

2Ibid., p. 19.
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the essay as a form, he is more interested in the truth
which he is pursuing," and "At times he piles up statements
with an apparent lack of any evolution in the thought."3
One of the best treatments of the structure of Hazlitt's
writing has been contributed by W.P. Albrecht; but his exemplary analysis of "On the Fear of Death" is only three
pages long.4
To anyone acquainted with Hazlitt's varied essays
i_t is obvious that there is no simple solution to the
structural questions involved.

In general it may be said

that he frequently utilized the tensions of contrasts of
ideas and of shifting points of view; he was also, as
Herschel Baker puts it, "a master of association"5 in giving his mind free reign to wander about--and often away
from--his topics, or in letting his moods grow in layers of
accretion about a central nugget of experience.

The prob-

lems of structure in Hazlitt's work are quite diverse, and,
extreme individual that the man was, his mind would never
lend itself to such rhetorical conventions as those of Dr.
311 Hazlitt,

11

in English Literature: 1815-1832, Vol.
X of The Oxford History of English Literature, ed. by F~P.
Wilson and Bonamy Dobr~e (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963),
pp. 273, 277.
4 Hazlitt and the Creative Imagination, pp. 163-169.
5 william Hazlitt, p. 393.
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Johnson; indeed, Hazlitt would probably bridle at any hint
of predictability in his spontaneous responses to the varied
world he lived in. 6
However, I think that some further progress can be
made in our knowledge of Hazlitt's structures--though it will
never, of course, be a complete solution--if more attention
is given to the particular oppositions already delineated.
So steeped in them was his way of thinking that Hazlitt sometimes hung large sections of

essays-~and

occasionally entire

compositions--on the interplay or balance of the same few
elements we.have been concerned to trace.

Particular analysis

of several essays will make the point more clear.

I

"On Going a Journey" (1822:
vided into five paragraphs.

viii, 181-189) 1 is di-

For most of the essay the au-

6 see, for example, viii, 285:
"Now I hate my style
to be known; as I hate all idiosyncracy."
1 'I'his essay was a favorite of Robert Louis Stevenson,
who quotes from it repeatedly in his own "Walking Tours." At
one point he refers to it with the accolade, "On Going .E Jou·rney, which is so good that there should be a tax levied on all
who have not read it." Later in the same essay he quotes part
of the passage in which Hazlitt recollects his twentieth birthday; Stevenson then adds:
"I should wish to quote more, for
though we are mighty fine fellows nowadays, we cannot write
like Hazlitt" (Works [26 vols., Author's edition; New York:
Charles Scribner's sons, 1895~1901], XIII, 153, 157).
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thor treats of how a journey allows him to see the world
with great serenity and with no constrictions or hindrances-essentially as Shakespeare would see it.

But as the essay

moves on, Hazlitt also begins to assert the value of a focused and concentrated perspective, in which one's own habitual patterns of thought are to be valued rather than discarded.

The piece ends in a balance of the opposites, with

both of the polar ways of approaching life being accepted
as necessary and desirable.
The first paragraph is quite brief.

"One of the

pleasantest. things in the world," the essayist begins, "is
going a journey; but I like to go by myself.

I can enjoy

society in a room; but out of doors, nature is company
enough for me."

There is a contrast immediately estab-

lished here between "society," linked with the confi"ning
structure of a room,_and "nature," linked with the boundless
expanse of the out-of-doors.

Already, then, we have a

strong suggestion that Hazlitt's mind is working with its·
characteristic polar concerns of confinement and focus of
awareness vs. a universal susceptibility; and we might suspect, therefore, that the other elements of the opposition
are also involved (the next paragraph will show clearly that
they are).

The essayist continues with a remark taken from

r
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~

cicero's De Officiis:
alone. 112

"I am then never less alone than when

Obviously this is an apparent contradiction; it

may be more intelligible, though, if we realize that in using
this particularly appropriate quotation Hazlitt is shifting
from one polar viewpoint to the other within the one sentence,
even as he did in his remark that Wordsworth's "strength lies
in his weakness."

The word "alone," always carrying the

notion of separation from something, is used from two different points of reference.

From one angle, Hazlitt is

standing within a structured pattern (society)--"alone" in
this case signifies separation from this habitual order of
men.

But when he is "alone" in this sense, he is "never

less alone" in the other.

This other sense derives from

a stance within nature, for in this context he is not separated from anything--he experiences what we shall call
Shakespearean or Paradisal vision, in which there are no
hindrances which distance him from the objects of his perception; he has complete "negative capability" and is one
with everything he sees.
2

Thus Hazlitt may indeed be alone

cf. De Officiis, III, i, 1, trans. by Walter Miller
in The Loeb Cl~sical Library, ed. by T.E. Page et al. (London:
William Heinemann Ltd; New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1928),
pp. 270, 271; and De Re Publi~~· I, xvii, 27, trans. by Clinton W. Keyes in The Loeb Classical Library_, ed. by T.E. Page
et al.
(London: William Heinemann Ltd; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 48, 49.
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and not alone at once, separated and not separated, if we
understand that two different angles of vision lie behind
the surface of his statement.
The second paragraph is quite lengthy; it has the
function of specifying and expanding the contrast of perspectives suggested in paragraph one.

In addition, it con-

tinues the emphasis on Shakespearean vision as being superior
to structured or confined ways of seeing things.

The para-

graph repeatedly states the essayist•. s desire for a feeling
of serenity, his craving for a large expanse to

~ove

about

in (physically and intellectually), and his wish to see
things freshly, without any habitual associations.

For ex-

ample, expressing his desire for serenity, he wishes "to
muse on indifferent matters 11 - - 11 indifferent 11 being an impertant word for him, as we have previously seen.

He "sings

for joy"; and "mine," he says, "is that undisturbed silence
which alone is perfect eloquence."

Quoting Shakespeare, he

writes, "'Leave, oh leave me to my repose!'"; and he gives
a passage from Fletcher's Faithful Shepherdess describing
Phoebe and Endymion:
. • . she convey'd him softly in a sleep
His temples bound with poppy
He says, further, of his own state:

"I want to see my vague

notions float like the down of the thistle before the breeze."
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Such concerns for emotional tranquility are endlessly repeated in the paragraph, sometimes shading so finely into
his other two desires that this one notion of serenity is
difficult to separate.
A similar situation holds true with his wish for a
broad, rather than confined, expanse in which to operate-the notion is always there, though usually mixed in and dovetailing with the other two elements which, for purposes of
analysis, we are distinguishing.

He says, for example:

"I

like more elbow-room, and fewer incumbrances"; and shortly
afterwards:

"It is because I want a little breathing space

to muse on indifferent matters .
from the town for a while."

. that I absent myself

And he wishes to walk and move

about down a "winding" road, i.e., one which allows for lateral motion.

He also says,

"I am for the synthetical method

on a journey, in preference to the analytical"; the former
term suggests a desire to take in a variety of objects in
his perception, the latter to focus on some one thing in particular.

The contrast of "broadness" vs. "narrowness" is

certainly present.
Several times he expresses the _further desire to be
free of all structures that usually exist within his perception--verbal and societal structures especially.

If Haz-
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litt is to put a feeling into words or try to describe a
subtle sensation, he must inevitably formalize this
due to the very nature of language.

thought~

Language does not exist

without structure and order; these "incumbrances" must inevitably accompany verbal expression.

And it is just such

pre-set patterns that Hazlitt wishes to avoid when he is in
the country:

"No one likes puns, alliterations, antitheses,

argument, and analysis better than I do; but I sometimes had
rather be without them."

Such structures of.thought are

anathema to a Shakespearean type of vision.

Indeed, in his

essay "On Shakespeare and Milton" he specifically }(raises the
dramatist for his lack of such structures:

"Nothing is made

out by formal inference and analogy, by climax and antithesis:
all comes, or

see~s

to come, immediately from nature" (v, 50).

Hazlitt may therefore ask, "Is not this wild rose sweet without
a comment?"

And he repeats the same idea in saying that "this

continual comparing of notes interferes with the involuntary
impression of things upon the mind, and hurts the sentiment."
We have already seen that writers such as Shakespeare
and Scott actually free their readers' minds from old ways1
it is therefore appropriate that Hazlitt can have such vision
"when I escape from the throng to do so."

The notion of "the

throng," society, or people in one's everyday world, is impor-
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f

tant in paragraph two because social relations also demand a

~·

ing of walking in the country in company with others he says:

.

''''

structure (as does language).

Hazlitt gives examples; speak-

I have heard it said that you may, when the moody fit
comes on, walk or ride on by yourself, and indulge your
reveries. But this looks like a breach of manners, a
neglect of others, and you are thinking all the time
that you ought to rejoin your party.
"Manners" is the key word--when in a social situation, one
must abide by such set patterns of action.
other difficulties, too:

But there are

"If you remark the scent ·of a bean--

field crossing the road, perhaps your fellow-traveller has
no smell.

If you point to a distant object, perhaps he is

short-sighted, and has to take out his glass to look at it."
In short, different people perceive things in different ways,
and if there is a discrepancy, one has to resort to a verbal,
analytical tack to account for it--but to do so distorts
one's own feelings.
litt, earlier, says:
say I.

It is not surprising, then, that Haz'"Out upon such half-faced fellowship,'

I like to be either entirely to myself, or entirely

at the disposal of others."

It is important, and character-

istic, that these two opposites of structured and nonstructured activity are not unified--Hazlitt must have one
or the other separately.
them.

He can balance, but not synthesize
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of serenity it creates, as we have already indicated.

But

there is another striking aspect to the passage:
Here be all new delights, cool streams, and wells,
Arbours o'ergrown with woodbine, caves and dells;
Choose where thou wilt, while I sit by and sing,
Or gather rushes to make many a ring
For thy long fingers; • . . •
The fact that the speaker tells his auditor to "Choose where
thou wilt" to sit would probably have appealed to Hazlitt, as
it points out the lack of any restrictions or "manners" in
setting~

this natural

A further point about paragraph two is the inconsistency of person throughout it--Hazlitt seems to arbitrarily
use

11

I,

11

11

sentences.

we,

11

"you," and "one" in expressing agency in his

This _may well be an unconscious dramatization of

the difficulty he had in capturing verbally the type of experience he wants to relate--something which he repeatedly
admits is difficult for him to do,. whereas he specifically
points out that for someone like Coleridge it is easy.

There

is a mixture of the personal with universal elements in his
choice of words--as if Hazlitt could not quite capture the
universality he experienced in all its purity, or as if he
felt the need to speak personally in order to communicate to
others what was really a non-personal and universal sensation.
If we take the inconsistencies collectively, we get the impression that the necessary but limiting forms of language
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are preventing him from perfectly communicating his feelings.
His own writing, then, unconsciously dramatizes his assertions.
The third paragraph, also quite lengthy, continues the
contrast of opposite viewpoints, with the same stress as to
which is the more valuable.

The opening, though, pays some-

thing of a compliment to Charles Lamb and his kind of perspective, which (here) is opposite to the Shakespearean type.
Lamb is the "best" company indoors, i.e., within the structure
of society; but he is therefore bad when one wishes to quit
such confinements.

Nevertheless, Hazlitt seems to suggest

(though the passage is ambiguous) that someone like Lamb may
still have value out of doors, as conversing with him in the
open air wi_ll set a "keener edge on appetite."

This is defi-

nitely a statement made from the stance of Hazlitt's Wordsworthian set of values, indicating as it does the positive
value of focusing on and intensifying one particular avenue
of response.

And "this sort of friendly altercation," here,

is a good thing, whereas "this continual comparing of notes"
from the previous paragraph was an activity to be shunned.
It is interesting to see, however, that Hazlitt switches back
to the opposite, non-Wordsworthian view very quickly, and
characteristically he contradicts himself in the process.
relevant passage is as follows:

The
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The open air improves this sort of conversation or
friendly altercation, by setting a keener edge on
appetite. Every mile of the road heightens the flavor of the viands ~ expect at the end of it. How
fine it is to enter some old town, walled and turreted, just at the approach of night-fall, or to
some straggling village, with the lights streaming
through the surrounding gloom; and then after inquiring for the best entertainment that the place
affords, to 'take one's ease at one's inn!'
These
eventful moments in our lives are in fact too precious, too full of solid, heart-felt happiness to be
frittered and dribbled away in imperfect sympathy.
!. would have them all to myself and drain them to the
last drop:
~ney will do to talk of or to write about
afterwards.
Apparently conversation with a friend (at the start of the
passage) is a contributing factor in heightening one's appetite and is therefore valuable.

There is, however, an ambi-

guity--is the "friend" or the "open air" responsible for setting the "keener edge" on appetite?

If the "open air" alone

is responsible for the increased expectation, why would conversation be mentioned in connection with it at all?
the human element is necessary here.

Evidently

But at the end of this

passage, Hazlitt renounces any social relationship and any use
of language in going to an inn--such things should come "afterwards," lest they distort the pure feelings of the moment.
Despite the ambiguity which is there, we are left with the
sense that the essayist has two opposite views on the value
of having conversation with a friend as he approaches dinner
in some roadside town.
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If there is to be any talk at all, Hazlitt would prefer it to be with a stranger--for a friend calls up the associations and responses that must be used in the world of the
town; and these are the very things, the very "manners" one
wishes to escape from.

"A stranger takes his hue and charac-

ter from the time and place; he is part of the furniture and
costume of an inn," he says; and a few sentences later he adds:
"But a friend reminds one of other things, rips up old grievances, and destroys the abstraction of a scene.

He comes in

ungraciously between us and our imaginary character"--as would
a filter.
He continues:

''Something is dropped in the course of

conversati.on that gives a hint of your profession and pursuits
• • • • You are no longer a citizen of the world:

but your

'unhoused free condition is put into circumscription and confine.'"

From this viewpoint it is obviously bad if such hints

of profession turn up in conversation.

This, incidentally, is

a direct contradiction to what the essayist says in his essay
"On Pedantry":

"It is a very bad sign (unless where it arises

from singular modesty) when you cannot tell a man's profession
from his conversation.

Such persons either feel no interest

in what concerns them most, or do not express what they feel"
(iv, 8ln).

As in the other cases mentioned, the existence of
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such a contradiction clearly indicates that Hazlitt's mind
is working with his opposite values.
Paragraph three continues to repeat ideas we have
encountered before.

One of the characteristics of Shake-

spearean vision is the complete lack of "egotism" and personal identity separate from the objects bf vision; the essayist now returns to this theme:
Oh! It is great to shake off the tranunels of the world
and of public opinion~-to lose our importunate, tormenting, everlasting personal identity in the elements
of nature, and become the creature of the moment, clear
of all ties • . . • One may take one's choice of all
characters in this romantic state of uncertainty as to
one's real pretensions, and become indefinitely respectable and negatively right-worshipful.
To lose his own identity and to become whatever character he
chooses is the capability Hazlitt desires--the "negative
capability," as Keats .called it.
i~

What the essayist wants here

precisely what he values so highly in Shakespeare in "On

Posthumous Fame":

"He seemed scarcely to have an individual

existence of his own, but to borrow that of others at will,
and to pass successively through 'every mode of untried being'"
{iv, 23).

Again, we might point out that Hazlitt's valuing of

negative capability here contradicts his stance in another essay, entitled {ironically!) "On consistency of Opinion," in
which he says:

"It is well not to go out of ourselves, and

to be contented to take up with what we are, for better for
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worse" (xvii, 33).
He moves on to talk about inns; his essential comment
is that "an inn restores us to the level of nature, and quits
scores with society!"

Thus, even though an inn is a place of

social assembly, it does not impose societal manners or structures upon one's perspective--rather, it frees one from just
such confinements.

At an ,inn, Paradisal or Shakespearean vi-

sion and not structured perception obtains; and this is what
is essential--again, the way one sees is what Hazlitt is interested in, not what one sees.

Hazlitt may therefore be ob-

serving men just like those he would see in London; but there
is a radical difference--at an inn, the way he perceives them
is not at all like the way he would see them in the city.
There, his perception is confined and directed by custom, personal habit, and prescribed manners; here, he sees everything
freshly, as if looking upon things for the first time.

It is

because of this newness of vision that Hazlitt says he has
"spent some enviable hours at inns."

For in looking at problems

with this new, non-habitual approach, he has had several genuine
insights that would not have .arisen in London.
ber of examples:

He lists a num-

he "found out the proof that likeness is not

a case of the association of ideas"; he "compared triumphantly"
Westall's drawings to the figure of a girl who ferried him
across the Severn.

And when he turns his attention to books
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"in this way" (i.e., with serenity, universal awareness, and
freshness of vision) the experience is exhilarating--he even
sits up half the night at an inn in Bridgewater reading sentimental novels.

The particular subjects of his insights aren't

really important--what he remembers is the joy he .felt from
his way of looking at them.

But the most memorable of all his

experiences of Paradisal or Shakespearean vision is that which
he had while walking to the Welsh inn at Llangollen on his
twentieth birthday.
Hazlitt relates this incident very carefully, choosing
several details which emphasize the freshness of the vision
he experienced.

First, the letter he reads from the New

Eloise is "St. Preux's description of his feelings as he first
caught

~

glimpse from the heights of the Jura of the Pays de

Vaud"; i.e., his reading matter is of someone who saw a striking natural scene for the very first time--with fresh vision,
untainted by habit.

Second, it is Hazlitt's own birthday,

probably suggestive to him of a new beginning, free from the
trammels of the past.

Third, he says:

"I had for the first

time come from a place in the neighborhood to visit this delightful spot [the Vale of Llangollen]"; he himself is seeing
a natural scene with no preconceived expectations, even as
St. Preux did.

Fourth, he says:

"The road to Llangollen turns

off between Chirk and Wrexham; and on passing a certain point,
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you come all at once upon the valley, which opens like an
amphitheatre • • • 11 ; 3 he thus emphasizes the surprise of the
incident, the unexpected nature of what happened--he therefore could not have had any set expectations.

Fifth, he

quotes lines from Coleridge's "Ode to the Departing Year~,4
to describe what he sees; and Coleridge, of course, is remarkable for his own freshness of perception.

Sixth, Hazlitt

himself relates that "a budding ash-tree dipped its tender
branches in the chiding stream"; he thereby emphasizes the
youth and newness of nature in the Spring, in harmony with
his own mental state.
state as one of great

And finally, he describes that mental
11

Hope 11 --and it is this quality, along

3Having visited this delightful spot myself, I can
personally. attest to the.accuracy of Hazlitt's description.
The road which turns off between Chirk and Wrexham is now
labelled the AS; the "certain point" is precisely at the
western boundary of the village of Froncysyllte (near a house
called "Argoed cottage"}, where, due to a bend in the road,
one does indeed come "all at once" upon the beautiful prospect
of Langollen Vale stretching in the distance.
4Note the association with Eden in the context of the
lines quoted from the -Ode:
--,
O Albion! O my mother Isle!
Thy valleys fair as Eden's bowers,
Glitter green with sunny showers;
Thy grassy uplands' gentle swells
Echo to the beat of flocks; . •
(The Com;elete. Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed.
by E.H. Coleridge [2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912],
I, 166.}
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with freshness, that Hazlitt says characterized the vision of

t

r
•.

Adam and Eve in Paradise:
In them hung trembling all our hopes and fears. They
were as yet alone in the world, in the eye of nature,
wondering at their new being, full of enjoyment • . • •
All things seem to acquire fresh sweetness, and to b~
clothes with fresh beauty in their sight.
{v, 67)

The great emotional power of the Llangollen vision thus derives
primarily from the way in which Hazlitt perceived nature, from
the qualities of his own type of vision.
But immediately after the relation of this incident,
his ·thoughts start to take a new turn, toward the idea that
"The beautiful is vanished, and returns not."

The great ex-

perience he had is now lost--the traces of it are now "broken
and defaced" and "a precipice of years separates me from what
I then was • • • • Not only I myself have changed--the world,
which was then new to me, has become old and incorrigible."
He says he will try to return "in thought" to his Paradisal
vision (indeed, the Dee is called "the river of Paradise" here),
but he is still faced with the fact that he has lost the type
of sight which would allow him back into Paradise. ·
Paragraph four is a digression, but a necessary one,
for in it Hazlitt attempts to find the reasons for his loss
of such vision.

The fact that the paragraph is digressive is

indicated immediately by the radical change in the texture of

95

the language--the end of paragraph three is personal, poetic,
and laced with images; paragraph four is suddenly abstract,
assertive, and analytical.

The essence of his argument here

is that men naturally tend to have limited vision and to relate everything they see to their own narrow selves, and.that
therefore such comedowns are, in general, inevitable.

Travel-

ling, he says, demonstrates this fact; in giving us new perspectives it makes us realize how narrow our normal vision is.
"We cannot enlarge our conceptions," he says, "we only shift
our point of view."

And "the map that we do not see before

us is a blank. .

the mind can form no larger idea of space

than the eye can take in at

a

single glance."

This same idea,

that men naturally tend to have a narrow scope of awareness,
is characteristically rephrased several times within this one
paragraph.

So, too, travel shows us that not only do we nat-·

urally have a narrow perspective, but that it is also a selfcentered one.

"In travelling through a wild barren country,"

Hazlitt writes, "I can form no idea of a woody and cultivated
one.

It appears to me that all the world must be barren, like

what· I see of it.

11

And shortly afterwards he says:

"We meas-

ure the universe by ourselves"--we naturally tend to fit
everything to the procrustean structures of our own minds.
This thought, that in everyday life our vision is the

r
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opposite of Paradisal, is not new to Hazlitt; it is quite
characteristic of his other writings.

In "On the Feeling

of Immortality in Youth" he makes a similar statement,.
although more bitter in tone, of the same idea:
soars by an effort to the grand and lofty:

"The mind

it is at home in

the grovelling, the disagreeable, and the little" (xvii, 199).
And in "On the Qualifications Necessary to success in Lifeu
he suggests that such vision is not only normal but, indeed,
necessary in the everyday world:
In common life, the narrowness of our ideas and appetites
is more favorable to the accomplishment of our designs,
by confining our attention and ambition to one simple object, than a greater enlargement of comprehension or susceptibility of taste.
(xii, 197)
And in the same essay he also says:
To do any one thing best, there should be an exclusiveness, a concentration, a bigotry, a blindness of attachment to that one object; so that the widest range of
knowledge and most diffusive subtlety of intellect will
not uniformly produce the most beneficial results.
The first part of this statement sounds very much like a comment he would make of Wordsworth.
It is important to note that Hazlitt's comments on
our everyday social practices are essentially like his comrnents on Wordsworth, Byron, Godwin, and the others of their
sort.

In "On Poetry in General" the essayist himself attests

to the general similarity of the types of perception involved.
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First of all, we must understand that in this essay he is
talking about Wordsworthian rather than Shakespearean poetry--e. g., he states that "Poetry is the high-wrought
enthusiasm of fancy and feeling.

As in describing natural

objects, it impregnates sensible impressions with the forms
of fancy

." {v, 4-5) and so on.

And he makes·compari-

sons of this type of poetry with everyday life:

"If poetry

is a dream," he says, "the business of life is much the same.
If it is a fiction, made up of what we wish things to be, and
fancy that they are, because we wish them so, then there is
no other or better reality" (v,: 3).
he says explicitly:

And in the next paragraph

"We shape things according to our wishes

and fancies, without poetry; but poetry is the most emphatical
language that can be found for these creations of the mind
'which ecstacy is very cunning in.'"

"Everyday" vision is

thus similar to Wordsworthian sight in that both involve the
imposition of our own shapes or structures upon the subjects
of perception; and, as we have seen, both involve narrowness
rather than broadness in

~he

scope of sensibility.

Hazlitt

does not really speak of intensity of feeling in connection
with "everyday" vision; on the other hand, though, even from
the contrast set up in "On Going a Journey" it is obvious
that such a way of seeing things lacks the serenity of Shake-
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spearean vision.

The second quotation from Hazlitt, above,

may give us the necessary insight we need here:

r

II

"but poetry

Evidently the major differ-

[•

!

ence between "everyday" vision and Wordsworthian sight is a
matter of degree--the former is just less intense than the
latter.

It is not an important difference that Wordsworth

generates his own structures to impose upon objects, and that
a more conventional person simply accepts the predetermined
structures of society and imposes them on what he sees.

The

conventional man of society, in accepting prevailing "manners,"
thereby makes such structures his own; thus he does impress
his own forms upon what he sees.

What he does is therefore

essentially like Wordsworth's practice, in that the resulting
perception is indeed filtered or modified.

"Everyday" vision

is thus essentially like Wordsworthian perception, being also
essentially opposed, then, to Shakespearean vision.
At the very end of the digression of paragraph four,
Hazlitt says he will now return "to the question r·have quitted above," i.e., in paragraph three.

At the end of this

third paragraph, he had.just come to the realization that he
now lacks Paradisal vision and that what is left to him is
the mere perspective of limitation.

In paragraph five he re-

turns to this topic, that at present his perceptions are narrowed, by verbal and societal structures.
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But in treating this topic he now takes a new tack,

t·

one which illustrates his characteristic inconsistency in

~

assigning preference to one set of values over the other.

~··

For where he saw limited vision as a negative thing at the
end of paragraph three, he now sees the same limitation as
a source of positive strength.

Travelling "in company with

a friend or party" now heightens his appreciation of "ruins,
aqueducts, and pictures," just as a companion before had set
a "keener edge" on appetite.

He now giv.es several examples

of instances in which limited or focused vision has produced
great pleasure for him.

He mentions discussing.Stonehenge,

and also "descanting 11 to a party on the sights at Oxford.
In both cases, the acts of verbalization and interaction with
other people are processes that are joyful rather than annoying, which he previously thought them to be.

So, too, he says

that when he travels among foreign lands he feels pleased to
have companions of his own--in essence he is saying that the
societal structure which is one's own culture can be thought
of as a refuge and a source of safety; from this viewpoint it
is much more than a confining and inhibiting cage.

"In such

situations, so opposite to all one's ordinary train of ideas,"
he says, "one seems a species by one's-self, a limb torn off
from society, unless one can meet with instant fellowship and
support."
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But at this point he again swings back to a memory
of Paradisal vision--in this essay, when one side of his
dialectic becomes too prominent, the other seems to be automatically called in to balance things off.

He therefore

remembers Calais at the time of the French Revolution, where
he "breathed the air of general humanity."

cultural differ-

ences were non-existent, as at this time all such structures
had vanished from men's vision; the sensation was truly that
of Paradise.

But now he says, "the whole is vanished like a

shade," even as his experience at Llangollen is now gone.
And the recognition that it is gone leads him into another
consideration of why such vision is transient--the movement
of his mind here is much the same as what we have just seen
in his digression to account for the loss of the Llangollen
experience.

And, indeed, he goes into something of a di-

gression here, too, for the dash that marks the start of his
explanation of this loss also signals a sharp break from the
·depressing direction in which his thoughts were turning.
Notice just how sharp this break is:
The whole is vanished like a shade. Pictures, heroes,
glory, freedom, all are fled:
nothing remains but the
Bourbons and the French people!--There is undoubtedly
a sensation in travelling into foreign parts that is to
be had nowhere else: but it is more pleasing at the
time than lasting • . . •
As he did before, after the descent from the Llangollen vision,
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he changes to the opposite perspective.

Now he says of his

Paradisal vision that it "does not piece into our daily modes
of life.

It is an animated but momentary hallucination"--

and "hallucination" i's a rather unfavorable word.
But the movement of the remaining. sentences is essentially to avoid going to an extreme in valuing one mode of
vision over the other--the scales of his mind seem to oscillate less violently up and down; he is moving to strike a
balance between the two elements of his dialectic.

Thus,

he 'corrects' the uncomplimentary overstatement of Paradisal
sight being an "hallucination" by saying that we are "perhaps
more enviable" individuals when we see in this way.

But he

also stresses that such vision does not really relate to our
everyday world.

This is essentially the same point he made

above, that in our normal lives we do best with limited sight.
Therefore while it is sometimes good to be "lost to ourselves"
or to "go out" of ourselves and our usual confinements--i.e.,
to have the negative capability of Shakespearean vision--it
is sometimes also good to stay in ourselves and our structures.
'

At the end of the essay Hazlitt finally strikes a balance between the two modes of vision that have been alternately going
up and down in his estimation:

on the one hand, it is good to

get away from "ties and objects that recall them," to be able
to see without any such constrictions.

On the other hand,
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"we can only be said to fulfill our destiny in the place that
gave us birth"--i.e., in the context.of the confinements or
structures of one's own country and everyday society.
final sentence of the essay is most important:

The

"I should on

this account like well enough to spend the whole of my life
in travelling abroad, if I could any where borrow another
life to spend afterwards at home!"

Note that Hazlitt does not

choose one alternative over the other, for both have value to
him.
"On Going a Journey" is thus, finally, a dramatization
of Hazlitt's famous belief that "truth is not one,

11

for the

movement of the essay concludes with his realization that a
mixture of opposite perspectives is the key to happiness.

II
Herschel Baker has said that "Mr. Kernble's Retirement 11 (1817:

v, 374-379) is "one of the peaks of English

drama criticism. 111

John Philip Kemble was, with Edmund Kean,

one of Hazlitt's favorite actors, the essayist having followed his career for nearly twenty years; and upon Kernble 1 s
finally leaving the stage in 1817, Hazlitt contributed to
The Times this assessment of his life's work.

Baker says

that it is "an accolade that would gladden any actor's heart";
1 · 11·
Wi iam Haz l'itt, p. 290 n.
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however, he is somewhat puzzled by the essay, for he also
writes that, apart from the "sentimental ties" involved,
"Hazlitt's attitude toward Kemble is hard to understand,
for he was a stiff and formal actor. 11 2

But it is precisely

Kemble's formality which makes the essayist's attitude easy
to understand, for in Kemble Hazlitt found an excellent exemplar of one of the sets of values he prized throughout his
life, that of intensity of feeling and narrowed scope of concern joined to formality of method.3

And most of the essay

is structured by his consideration of this one set of values
from alternating positive and negative viewpoints.
The first paragraph establishes the basic reason for
his admiration of Kemble; in it, the essayist gradually expands his consideration of the actor until it swells into a
statement of what was for HazLitt a vital truth:
Mr. Kemble took his leave of the stage on Monday
night, in the character of Coriolanus. • • • There is
something in these partings with old public favot:Lrites
exceedingly affecting • • • • Our associations of admiration and delight with theatrical performers, are

2Ibid., pp. 290, 289.
3

Joseph Donohue, Jr., in his authoritative study
Dramatic Character in the English Romantic Age (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), assesses
Kemble's style as '"neoclassic,' • . • formal in attitude
and measured in cadence • • • • Perhaps no style has ever
been so deliberate, so calculated, as his" (p. 245).
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I

~'

among our earliest recollections--among our last regrets . . . • The impression [of Kemble nearly twenty
years agol appears as distinct as if it were of yesterday. In fact, intellectual objects, in proportion
as they are lasting, may be said to shorten life.
Time has no effect upon them. The petty and the personal, that which appeals to our sense and our interests, is by degrees forgotten, and fades away into the
distant obscurity of the past. The grand and the ideal, that which appeals to the imagination, can only
perish with it, and remains with us, unimpaired in its
lofty abstraction, from youth to age; as, wherever we
go, we still see the same heavenly bodies shining over
our heads~
That which appeals to the imagination is what endures in life,
and Hazlitt admired Kemble precisely because he appealed to
the imagination..

Seeing him retire in the role of Coriolanus

was particularly moving because of the continuity it showed:
Coriolanus, the character in which he took his leave of
the stage, was one of the first in which we remember to
have seen him; and it was one in which we were not sorry
to part with him, for we wished to see him appear like
himself to the last.
Hazlitt did indeed have a "wish" as he went to the theatre on
that June night--and the importance of the wish is underscored
by his repetition of it:
tiring?

"Why then do we approve of his re-

Because we do not wish him to wait till it is neces-

sary for him to retire."

Hazlitt's hope that Kemble's final

performance would be as good as his first reflects more than
just "sentimental ties" to the past--it shows his desire to
believe that things of the imagination do in fact endure
through time.

The validity of one of his most cherished be-
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liefs was thus at stake.

When he could finally write, then,

that "On the last evening, he displayed the same excellence
and gave the same prominence to the very same passages, that
he used to do,
his hope:

11

Hazlitt had experienced the fulfillment of

Kemble's last performance proved the ultimate val-·

ue of imagination.

The feeling which thus permeates the,par-

agraph is one of satisfaction with the actor's performance
mingled with self-satisfaction at the confirmation of a cherished personal theory.
The first paragraph concludes with the citation of
particular incidents from the play--in the second example,
on the scene of reconciliation between Coriolanus and his
mother, the essayist notes that Kemble was a disappointment.
But he adds that "Perhaps this was not the fault of Mr.
Kemble, but of the stage itself."

The brief second paragraph

continues in the same line, noting the difficulty of any actor in trying to capture a Shakespearean character's depth
of sentiment. 4

The argument on Kemble's appropriateness for

4 This is perhaps an echo of a comment from 1815:
"the reader of the plays of Shakespear is almost always disappointed in seeing them acted; and, for our part, we should
never go to see them acted, if we could help it" (v, 222).
Charles Lamb held similar views that no production could match
the ideal performance provided by imagination (cf. "On the
Tragedies of ~hakespeare, considered with Reference to their
Fitness for Stage Representation" in The Works of Charles .and
Mary Lamb, ed. by E.V. Lucas [7 vols.; London: Methuen & co.,
1903-1905], I, 97-111). Coleridge, too, said he was always
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a particular part, however, needs a more solid basis if it is
to be developed.

In paragraphs three and four, then, Hazlitt

backtracks to consider the actor's general qualities as shown
by his entire career, which qualities make him fit or unfit
for certain roles.

He also concomitantly develops the theme

from paragraph one, that the actor's performances are indeed
things of the imagination.

And after the transitional third

paragraph, in the fourth he specifies which of the opposite
types of imagination he means.

From this point on, the struc-

ture of the essay is governed by Hazlitt's shifts of .viewpoint
around a central concern, that of Kemble's general qualities
as an actor and how they are advantageous or limiting to him.
Paragraph four begins with a classification of the
actor according to customary standards of value:
It has always appeared to us, that the range of characters in which Mr. Kemble more particularly shone, and
was superior to every other actor, were those which con-

disappointed by actual productions of Shakespeare's plays (cf.
Coleridge's Shakespearean Criticism, ed. by T.M Raysor [2
vols., Everyman's Library; London: Dent; New York: Dutton,
1960], II, 230, 57, 68}. Note, however, Donohue's distinction
(ibid., p. 285}:
"The fact that Lamb, Coleridge, and Hazlitt approach the
drama with this ideal in mind is an important indication
of the homogeneity of their critical writings. Their essential difference is simply that Lamb and Coleridge are
descriptive critics concerned with the ideal performance,
while Hazlitt is a judicial critic concerned with assessing the failure of most actors and most productions to
measure up to this same ideal."
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sisted in the development of some one solitary sentiment
or exclusive passion. From a want of rapidity of style,
of scope, and variety, he was often deficient in expressing the bustle and complication of different interest;
• • • but in giving the habitual workings of a predominant feeling, as in Penruddock, or The Stranger, in Coriolanus, Cato, and some others, where all the passions
move round a central point, and are governed by one
.master-key, he stood unrivalled.
Hazlitt's use ·of characteristic diction and phraseology--"solitary," "exclusive," "want of • . • scope, and variety,"

11

habit-

ual workings" (rather than "spontaneous impulses")--clearly
indicate that his mind is working within one of its usual
frameworks of reference; and his attitude, in this paragraph,
is that these Wordsworthian qualities of narrowness and personal structuring are a definite advantage to Kemble in·rnany.
parts.

And, as we might expect, Hazlitt also sees intensity

of passion connected with the actor's ••exclusive" and "habitual" mental activity; citing Kernble's performance of Coriolanus as a whole, for example, he says:
So in Coriolanus, he exhibited the ruling passion with
the same unbroken ftrmness, he preserved the same haughty
dignity of demeanour, the same energy of.will, and unbending sternness of temper throughout. He was swayed by a
single impulse. His tenaciousness of purpose was only irritated by opposition; he turned neither to the right nor
the left; the vehemence with which he moved forward increasing every instant, till it hurried him on to the catastrophe.
A similar intensity is then described in Kernble's portrayal
of Leontes.
cal:

Hazlitt's conclusion, in paragraph five, is typi-
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In such characters, Mr. Kemble had no occasion to call
to his aid either the resources of invention, or the
tricks of art: his success depended on the increasing
intensity with which he dwelt on a given feeling, or
enforced a passion that resisted all interference or
control.
Having listed some of the roles for which Kemble's
qualities were suited, he then shifts his viewpoint in paragraphs six, seven, and part of eight to consider roles for
which the actor's same approach was unsuitable.

Foremost of

these roles was that of Hamlet:
In Hamlet, on the contrary, Mr. Kemble in our judgment
unavoidably failed from a want of flexibility, of that
quick sensibility which yields to every motive, and is
borne away with every breath of fancy, which is distracted in the multiciplicity of its reflections, and lost in
the uncertainty of its resolutions.
No wonder that Hazlitt thought Kemble failed "unavoidably"-Hamlet has exactly the opposite generic type of mind.

Indeed,

as he is described here the melancholy Dane appears to be
another Coleridge! 5
5

The mismatch of Kemble and Hamlet is thus

See the essay "Mr. Coleridge" in The Spirit£! the

Age:
"(Coleridge] could f10t realize all he knew or thought, and
less could not fix hi·s desultory ambition.
• While he
should be occupied with a given pursuit, he is thinking
of a thousand other things; a thousand tastes, a thousand
objects tempt him, and distract his mind, which keeps open
house, and entertains all comers . • . . Mr. Coleridge's
bark, 'taught with the little nautilus to sail,' the sport
of every breath, dancing to every wave, 'Youth at its prow,
and Pleasure at its helm,' flutters its gaudy pennons in
the air, glitters in the sun, but we wait in vain to hear
of its arrival in the destined harbour."
{xi, 34, 36-37)

r
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complete; and this particular description of the situation
(Kemble playing the role "in one undeviating straight line,
which is • • . remote from the natural grace and indolent
susceptibility of the character") mirrors Hazlitt's comment
from Characters of Shakespear's Plays, that "Mr. Kemble unavoidably fails in this character from a want of ease and
variety" (iv, 237).
The actor's style was also unsuitable for King John
and Macbeth, as the next paragraphs make. clear.

In the for-

mer role, Hazlitt says, Kemble "seemed waiting for some complicated machinery to enable him to make his next movement,
instead of trusting to the true impulses of passion."

The

use of mechanical imagery is continued in another comment,
comparing the actor to an automaton:

"If an image could be

constructed by magic art to play King John, it would play
it in much the same manner that Mr. Kemble played it."

The

contrast is of course that between artful or contrived formality and unstructured, unprepared-for spontaneity.

The

two opposite types of imagination underlie Hazlitt's point

Interestingly enough, Coleridge too saw Hamlet as an image of
himself. A.C. Bradley has noted the point, saying that "he
dwarfs the sublime struggle of Hamlet into the image of his
own unhappy weakness" (Poetry for Poetry's Sake [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901], p. 14). See Coleridge's statements in
The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. by H.N.
Coleridge (4 vols.; London: William Pickering, 1836-1839),
II, 205-207. See also Inquiring Spirit, ed. by Kathleen
Coburn (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1951), p. 170.
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here--Kemble imposes the filter of "manners" on his performance; he is not open to direct contact with the natural
spirit of the character.
his Macbeth:

The same quality of style taints

He "maintained his ground too steadily • • •

instead of staggering and reeling under the appalling visions
of the preternatural world, and having his frame wrenched
from all the holds and resting places of his will."

His

attachment to "holds and resting places" prevents him from
being open to the truth of the situation; his Macbeth's response is therefore governed by habit rather than by direct
contact with the strange world around him.
Not all of Kemble's Macbeth is criticized, though;
he played some of the scenes so that they "smote upon the
heart, and remained there ever after."

Passion--a key element

in Hazlitt's aesthetics--can thus be conveyed even by a formal
or "pedantic" manner:

Kemble's "monotone did not fatigue, his

formality did not displease; because there was always sense
and meaning in what he did."
In this same {eighth) paragraph, there is a brief contrast of Kemble and Kean:

"[Kemble'sJ Richard III wanted that

tempest and whirlwind of the soul, that life and spirit, and
dazzling rapidity of motion, which fills the stage, and burns
in every part of it, when Mr. Kean performs this character ...
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Kean was an actor of greater "variety" than Kemble; 6 indeed,
elsewhere Hazlitt says of him that "He is almost the only actor who does not spoil Shakespeare" (xviii, 256)--which is
evidently a suggestion that Kean's qualities are in closer
accordance with Shakespeare's mind.

The comparison here, then,

apparently has something in it of the contrast of Hazlitt's
usual opposites.

But these are not developed--the rest of the

essayist's commentary on the two actors is concerned mainly
with their physical attributes, Kemble's "statue-like appearance" and Kean's "diminutiveness" and "want of dignity of

form~"

By this point in the paragraph, however, Hazlitt is again viewing Kemble in a positive light, and is again listing roles
that he played exceptionally well.

The role of Pierre, for

example, "accorded admirably with Mr. Kemble's natural manner."
Cato was another part well suited to the actor, calling as it
did for a studied display of artifice rather than for natural
spontaneity:

"It was a studied piece of classical costume--

a conscious exhibition of elegantly disposed drapery, that
was all:

yet, as a mere display of personal and artificial
6

This variety, though--like its opposite, "the development of some one solitary sentiment or exclusive passion"-has a negative side to it, too. Commenting on Kean's Richard
III in a Morning Chronicle column of 1814, Hazlitt says that
"we sometimes thought he failed, even from an exuberance of
talent, and dissipated the impression of the character by the
variety of his resources" (v, 181).
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grace, it was inimitable."7
The ninth paragraph shifts back to a consideration
of a role for which Kemble was not adequate.

Brutus, as de-

scribed by Hazlitt, is a character of great complexity and
is therefore unsuited for Kemble's style of intensely developing one passion.
The essay finishes with a summary of Hazlitt's major
points:
In short, we think the distinguishing excellence of his
acting may be summed up in one word--intensity; in the
seizing upon some one feeling or idea, in insisting upon
it, in never letting it go • • • • If he had not the unexpected bursts of nature and genius, he had all the regularity of art.
In portraying characters that called for the display of these
qualities, Hazlitt says, Kemble was "the most excellent actor
of his time."

And since these qualities were so important to

the essayist throughout his life, Hazlitt thus rendered Kemble
high praise indeed in seeing him as their prime exemplar on
the contemporary stage.

III
"On the Feeling of Immortality in Youth," from 1827
7Gilbert Austin, in Chironomia; or A Treatise £!!. ~
torical Delivery . • • (1806), p. 279, similarly compliments
Kemble for attaining "the perfection and the glory of art, so
finished, that every look is a commentary, every tone an illustration, every gesture a model for the statuary, and a study
for the painter" (quoted by Donohue, p. 250).
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{xvii, 189-199), is one of Hazlitt's more famous essays.

It,

too, shows extensive use of his customary concerns, most of
the essay basing the feeling of immortality on the experience
of selfless reliance on external objects for values, unconstricted openness to the range of all experience, and the
feeling of serenity, ease, and indolence.

But Hazlitt's over-

all concern with such qualities--and, to a lesser extent, with
their opposites--does not have a structural significance here
as in "On Going a Journey" or "Mr. Kemble's Retirement."

"On

Going a Journey" was structured by the alternate consideration
of opposite desirable qualities of perception; "Immortality"
makes much less use of these opposites, and its less fullydeveloped contrasts do not fall into structural blocks.

And

whereas "On Going a Journey" presented opposite sets of values,

"Mr. Kemble's Retirement" consistently used one set, but structured itself by alternating positive and negative views of it.
"Immortality," too, stays mainly within one set; but its al'""'.
terations of viewpoint are minor and do not fall into careful
balances.
There is a general movement in time through Hazlitt's
reflections in the course of the essay; the early paragraphs
{by far the longest) are concerned with generalized and personal memories of the feelings of youth.

The third-to-last

paragraph is a consideration of Hazlitt's present condition
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at the time of the writing; and the next paragraph is an anticipation of the future meeting with death.

However, beyond

this broad movement in time, there is little form to the essay.

"Immortality" does not readily lend itself to a section-

by-section breakdown.

It is more homogeneous than the other

essays considered so far.

Within the broad time framework it

moves not by steps of opposition and balance, but by repetitions
and accretions of similar statements around a central core of
ideas.

This core--Hazlitt's concern for what we have else-

where called "Paradisal vision"--acts more as a restraining
principle than as a structural device.

Like a kind of sub-

liminal tether or leash, it keeps Hazlitt's mind generally
within a certain circle of ideas.

It doesn't determine the

order or sequence of the essayist's wa,nderings, but it does
confine them within general limits.
To

pro~eed

with a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis

would involve much repetition without showing much progress
in a train of thought, for the development of this essay is
in deepening our consideration of the same ideas without
extending them into new conclusions.

Since there is little

movement (beyond the temporal drift) in the essay, a study
which presents an oyerview

~ather

than a sequential analysis

will therefore be more appropriate.
The "feeling of Eternity in youth" is the experience
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of Paradisal vision, like that of Adam and Eve in the Garden
(v, 67-68).

One of the characteristics of such sight is its

lack of limitation, its openness to all experience.

And Haz-

litt expresses this idea in characteristic phraseology, saying,
for example,

11

there is no line drawn, and we see no limit to

our hopes and wishes.

We make the coming age our own.--'The

vast, the unbounded prospect lies before us.'"

This thread

is spun throughout the essay in phrases such as "we see no
end" and "we set no bounds"; and there are many other expressions of "no obstacle" and
ence

11

11

no limit. 11

unrestricted opportunities,"

11

Young people experi-

plenitude of being," and

a "variety of feelings"; indeed, in one long passage Hazlitt
spells .out the variety and range of possibilities that life
offers to youth:
To see the golden sun and the azure sky, the outstretched
ocean, to walk upon the green earth, and to be lord of a
thousand creatures, to look down giddy precipices or over
distant flowery vales, to see the world spread out under
one's finger in a map, to bring the stars near, to view
the smallest insects in a microscope, to read history,
and witness the revolutions of empires and the succession
of generations, to hear of the glory of Sidon and Tyre,
of Babylon and Susa, as of a faded pageant, and to say
all these were, and are now nothin~, to think that we
exist in such a point of time, and'in such a corner of
space, to be at once spectators and a part of the moving
scene, to watch the return of the seasons, of spring and
autumn, to hear
--'The stockdove plain amid the forest deep,
That drowsy rustles to the sighing gale'-to traverse desert wildernesses, to listen to the midnight
choir, to visit lighted halls, or plunge into the dungeon's
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gloom, or sit in crowded theatres and see life itself
mocked, to feel heat and cold, pleasure and pain, right
and wrong, truth and falsehood, to study the works of
art and refine the sense of beauty to agony, to worship
fame and to dream of immortality, to have read Shakespear
and belong to the same species as Sir Isaac Newton . • . .
The customary idea is thus specified in many different ways.
Similarly, Hazlitt repeatedly returns to the idea that
the selfless imagination is a major factor in creating the
feeling of immortality in youth.

Such imagination, of course,

involves the loss of awareness of personal identity and the
reception of values from external ·objects and nature; a feeling of "abstraction" from self and of merging with the outside
world is experienced.

This idea of identification with exter-

nal objects is another thread woven throughout the essay:
~t

is the simplicity, and as it were abstractedness of
our feelings in youth, that {so to speak) identifies us
with nature • • • •
• • • objects press around us, filling the mind with their
magnitude and with the throng of desires that wait upon
them.

.

.

We know our existence only from external objects, and we
measure it by them. We can never be satfsfied with gazing;
and nature will still want us to look on and applaud.
• our step-mother Nature holds us up to see the rareeshow of the universe.
We take out a new lease of existence from the objects on
which we set our affections, and become abstracted, impassive, immortal in them.
Objects, on our first acquaintance with them, have that
singleness and integrity of impression that it seems as
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if nothing could destroy or obliterate them, so firmly
are they stamped and rivetted on the brain. We repose
on them with a sort of voluptuous indolence, in full
faith and boundless confidence.
Hazlitt also compares the feeling of immortality to that experienced "in setting out on a delightful journey"--i.e., like
the paradisal experience captured in "On Going a Journey."
And at another point, he cites as an example his own experience as a young man at the time of the French Revolution
("It was the dawn of a new era"), saying, "I felt for years,
and during the best part of my existence, heart-whole in that
cause, and triumphed in the triumphs over the enemies of man!"
The experience of selfless identification with the revolution
is stressed; it is important, too, that passion sealed in
Hazlitt's soul the truth of his perceived ideals.
The feeling of serenity is the third important thread
in the essay, Hazlitt speaking of reposing on objects in "voluptuous indolence" and of "idling away a great deal of time
in youth thinking we have enough and to spare.ti

This thread,

however, seems to be introduced almost as an afterthought, late
in the essay (near the start of the third paragraph); it seems
•
as if Hazlitt suddenly realized he had left out the third element of his usual theme and decided to correct the situation.
But once found, the thread is not lost--indeed, it is a consideration of this element of Paradisal vision that forms the
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conclusion of the work:
There are a few, superior, happy beings, who are born
with a temper exempt from every trifling annoyance.
This spirit sits serene and smiling in its native skies,
and a divine harmony (whether heard or not) plays around
them. This is to be at peace. Without this, it is in
vain to fly into deserts, or to build a hermitage on the
top of rocks, if regret and ill-hu~our follow us there:
and with this, it is needless to make the experiment.
The only true retirement is that of the heart; the only
true leisure is the repose of the passions. To such
persons it makes little difference whether they are young
or old; and they die as they have lived, with graceful
resignation.
Hazlitt's specification of this feeling with these particulars
(e.g., the vanity of flying into desert, building hermitages,
etc.) is unique to this essay, despite his repeated use of the
same general idea in many other works.

It thus exemplifies

his aesthetic theory--a point we shall return to.
Throughout the consideration of Paradisal vision there
is a contrapuntal thread that surfaces occasionally, showing
Hazlitt's awareness of an opposite type of vision.

The con-

trast is not structural in the essay; it is occasionally present, though, setting in relief the essayist's major points.
When the vision of youth is lost, there remains only limited
individual awareness; and Hazlitt's description of the state
is significant for its diction:
Time and experience . . • circumscribe the limits of our
expectations. It is only as the pageant of life passes
by and the masques turn their backs upon us, that we see
through the deception, or believe that the train will have
an end.

r
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Speaking of ends and limits and circumscriptions, along with
the negatively charged word "deception," established both an
opposite type of awareness and Hazlitt's attitude towards it.
The loss of the vision of youth also involves the loss
of the selfless imagination:

"It is not till we see the flow-

ers of Love, Hope, and Joy, withering around us, and our own
pleasures cut up by the roots," Hazlitt says, "that we bring
the moral home to ourselves."

"To ourselves," of course, sug-

gests the growth of self-consciousness which kills our early
attitudes.

And the passage of time tends also to stifle the

serenity of our early years:

"The ease, the jocund gaiety,

the unsuspecting security of youth are fled" with the coming
of experience.

Hazlitt's recognition of the impossibility of

always maintaining youthful vision is a characteristic of his
mature work; his treatment of the theme here is particularly
good, for, in

consid~ring

the negative side of man's progress

toward death, he does not stay solely with his frequentlyrepeated general ideas.

The "leash" that holds him to a cer-

tain area in considering Paradisal vision itself does not hold
him so tightly as he considers its loss.

For example, he

speaks personally--despite his use of the editorial "we"--of
desiring fame to provide a feeling of immortality to replace
that lost with youth.

Even so, though, he finally has too

r
~-
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much integrity to mislead himself into accepting a counterfeit substitute as an equal to the pure feeling with which
he began his own life. · Indeed, he concludes the essay with
the passage quoted above, showing his

admir~tion

for those

who have maintained their early capacities unimpaired.

The

underlying wish is that he, too, might re-achieve such vision-which, indeed, he will go on to do in "The Letter-Bell," at
the end of his life.
"Immortality" as a whole is an excellent example of
Hazlitt's use of his own aesthetic theory, as proposed, for
example, in the essay "On the Ideal" (1815:

xviii, 77-84).

Though this contribution to The Champion deals with pictorial
art, its principles apply by analogy to Hazlitt's ideas of
the writer's craft as well.

In it, Hazlitt challenges the

theory of Sir Joshua Reynolds that art is to present generalized forms abstracted from particulars; rather, he says, it
should refine gross human perception, which sees abstractions
and generalities, to see particular, concrete aspects of
nature.I

His comments on Hogarth's pictures might well ap-

ply, then, to his own writings:
They have evidently a common or general character, but
that general character is defined and modified by indi1 see xx, 33; also v, 204:
"It is the business of
poetry, and indeed of all works of imagination, to exhibit
the species through the individual. 11
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vidual peculiarities, which certainly do not take away
from the illusion or the effect any more than. they would
in nature.
The "general character" of situations is often, for Hazlitt,
the involvement of certain or all of the generic qualities
of perception.

Such qualities permeate "Immortality" even

as they do "On Going a Journey" and "Mr. Kemble's Retirement"-but Hazlitt always specifies these generalities with concrete
particulars which do not repeat themselves from one essay to
another.
"Immortality" thus stands as an excellent essay in
itself for its timeless consideration of the hope and feelings
of young people; and it also enables us to understand more
clearly Hazlitt's own practice of writing in accordance with
his own aesthetic theory.

IV
Hazlitt's essay on "The Letter-Bell" (xvii, 376-382)-one of the very last he wrote in his life--is one of his most
famous and most moving works, giving us as it does the final
views of a very perceptive man looking back on some of the
most satisfying experiences of his life.

His recollections

are mainly of states of mind which enabled him to be happy-to feel kinship with humanity and hope for the future, and
to experience satisfaction with his own personal achievements.
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All of his memories are clustered around the unifying sound
of the letter-bell; they are all "associations" ·which spring
to mind as he hears it pass.

And, not surprisingly, his re-

collections of past happiness--enabling him to look forward
with hope to the future, even as he lay dying--are firmly
grounded in the same sense of values that marks the work of
his entire life.
After the introduction, there are essentially five
recollections of mental states which, with various transitions
and digressions, make up the pattern of the essay; Hazlitt's
own paragraph divisions are largely irrelevant to the turns
of his thought.
He begins, typically, with an arresting statement
which he

wil~

expand and modify with various associations:

"Complaints are frequently made of the vanity and shortness
of human life, when, if we examine its smallest details, they.
present a world by themselves."

This opening is particularly

arresting as we read it today, since, knowing as we do that
its author died within a few days of writing it, it signals
a concern on Hazlitt's mind with the value of life as a whole-we may even wonder if Hazlitt recognized that this would be
his last chance to record his feelings on this most important
of subjects.
an analogy:

He works into his treatment of it by means of
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The most trifling objects, retraced with the eye of memory, assume the vividness, the delicacy, and the importance of insects seen through a magnifying glass. There
is no end of the brilliancy or the variety. The.habitual
feeling of the love of life may be compared to 'one entire
and perfect chrysolite,' which, if analysed, breaks into
a thousand shining fragments.
The wonder of life becomes all the more beautifui if its particulars are studied closely.

With the "eye of memory" as

his microscope, Hazlitt, then, immediately moves on to consider the letter-bell, which, like an insect, may seem insignificant to the casual perceiver, but which opens whole worlds
of wonder to the mind that studies it closely enough.l

And

already Hazlitt's tack suggests his customary concerns--he is
here exemplifying his oft-repeated idea that much value lies
in narrowing one's focus, ·as one does with a magnifying glass,
1 see his comment from "Outlines of Taste," published
posthumously:
"I have, in a former essay, ascertained one principle of
taste or excellence in the arts of imitation, where it
was shown that objects of sense are not as it were simple
and self-evident propositions, but admit of endless analysis and the most subtle investigation. We do not see nature with our eyes, but with our understandings and our
hearts. To suppose that we see the whole of any object,
merely by looking at it, is a vulgar error: we fancy that
we do, because we are, of course, conscious of no more
than we see in it, but this circle of our knowledge enlarg~s with further acquaintance and study, and we then
perceive that what we perhaps barely distinguished in the
gross, or regarded as a dull blank, is full of beauty,
meaning, and curious details. He sees most of nature who
understands its language best, or connects one thing with
the greatest number of other things."
(xx, 388)
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and intently pursuing the study of any one object.

Here, how-

ever, such a narrow study of the letter-bell leads him into
a universe of significance.

Such an alternation of opposites

is less conspicuous and more fluid than the balanced oppositions of "On Going a Journey."

In "The Letter-Bell" Hazlitt

sees a tremendous "variety" and a great "multiplicity of items"
even within one object.

He has said elsewhere that "Truth is

not one, but many"--in this instance, any "one" is seen to be
composed of "many. 11
The essay moves on into a recollected state of mind
based on two different experiences.

The first, quite short

in length, follows immediately from the introduction, with
no paragraph break:
As I write this, the Letter-Bell passes • • • . It strikes
upon the ear, it vibrates to the brain, it wakes me from
the dream of time, it flings me back upon my first entrance
into life, the period of my first coming up to town, when
all around was strange, uncertain, adverse--a hubbub of
confused noises, a chaos of shifting objects--. . • •
The example of his "first" entrance into life exemplifies the
state of mind that always accompanies "first vision" with Hazlitt--it shows unstructured perception without the aid of habit or custom to provide ready organization of experience.
is "strange," a "hubbub," "confused," and "chaos."

All

The feeling

is that which Hazlitt mentions in pointing out the negative
aspect of fresh sight in "On Going a Journey":

"In such situ-
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ations, so opposite to one's ordinary train of ideas, one
seems a species by one's-self, a limb torn off from society,
unless one can meet with instant fellowship and support" (viii,
188).

Immediately, though, he describes one of the pleasant

associations he connects with the letter-bell, that its sound
ties him to just the "fellowship and support" that he needs:
• • • this sound alone, startling me with the recollection
of a letter I had to send to the friends I had lately left,
brought me as it were to myself, made me feel that I had
links still connecting me with the universe, and gave the
hope and patience to persevere.
Note that he says the sound "brought me as it were to myself"-thereby implying that he had been "out of himself," a characteristic of unstructured perception.

The letter-bell thus af-

fords to him, here, the comfort of structured vision that enables him to organize his new experience according to personal,
habitual points of reference, and to see a frightening world
simply as an extension of a structured social pattern with
which he is already comfortable.
Immediately the letter-bell suggests a second recollection--this one, too, exemplifying unstructured perception,
now as a positive thing rather than as a cause of fear:
At that loud-tinkling, interrupted sound (now and then),
the long line of blue hills near the place where I was
brought up waves in the horizon, a golden sunset hovers
over them, the dwarf-oaks rustle their red leaves in the
evening breeze, and the road from ---- to ----, by which
I first. set out on my journey through life, stares me in

126

the face as plain, but from time and change not less
visionary and mysterious, than the pictures in the
Pilgrim's Progress. I should notice, that at this time
the light of the French Revolution circled my head like
a glory, though dabbled with drops of crimson gore: I
walked comfortable and cheerful by its side • . . .
This is another "first" journey--Hazlitt's walk with Coleridge from Wern to Shrewsbury was an experience which, like
that in the Vale of Llangollen in Wales, was marked by the
visionary qualities of openness to experience and complete
ease (i.e., Hazlitt being "comfortable and cheerful"); indeed, it was a combination of these two experiences which inspired him to pursue a literary career.2

This particular

walk is also marked by the Paradisal vision of the essayist's enrapturement with the French Revolution.
Clearly, Hazlitt's remembrance of his youthful vision
enables him to re-experience it even as he writes the essay-and the joy of recapturing the past is strengthened for him
by the events of the present, for even as he wrote Hazlitt
had lived to see the Revolution of the Three Days

~n

July of

1830, in which the Bourbon regime---which he detested, especially
after its restoration following Napoleon's fall--finally came
to an end.

This was the fulfillment of a drea-..n; indeed,

during a state of depression which he had recorded five years
2see "My First Acquaintance wit~ Poets" (xvii, 106f.),
and Baker's William Hazlitt, pp. 124f.
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earlier in "On the Fear of Death" he wrote:

"My public and

private hopes have been left a ruin, or remain only to mock
me.

I would wish them to be re-edified.

I should like to

see some prospect of good to mankind, such as my life began
with" (viii, 325).

The passing of the Bourbons was just such

a re-edification of his youthful hopes, a vindication of his
life, and a proof to him that he had been right all along.
Not uncharacteristically, Hazlitt's pride in maintaining the integrity of his own early political ideals calls to
his mind the loss of such ideals by the Lake poets.

He chides

Southey, hoping that the laureate will hail the age's second
triumph "in appropriate verse"; and he quotes lines from Wordsworth on the "radiance" of that poet's own early perception
and assails him for his loss of the "eyes of youth"--Hazlitt's
characteristic expression for the combination of unfiltered
perception, openness to the range of all possible experience,
and serenity. 3

His continues his self-righteous and indignant

attack on the Lake poets--an attack which springs from the
very core of his values--exulting in his own faith in liberty
and in his hatred of tyranny.

When he finally comes to Coler-

idge, however, he softens his reprimands, for Coleridge's mind,
3

See also v111, 29; xii, 296; xvi, 67, 398; xv111, 401,
for comments on the vision of youth--and, of course, see too
"On the Feeling of Immortality in Youth" (xvii, 189-199).
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he says, is "still vulnerable to truth" because it is not
"sordid or mechanical"--a recognition that his former
friend's mind was generically different from Wordsworth's
or Southey's.

Hazlitt could therefore still see hope that

the sage of Highgate might return to his "original liberty"
of thought.
The contrast of his own mind to the political apostates' naturally gives Hazlitt an immense feeling of selfsatisfaction and joy; so, too, does his third recollection
of the essay, which is another suggested to him by the letterbell:

"Or if the Letter-Bell does not lead me a dance in

the country, it fixes me in the thick of my town recollections, I know not how long ago."

The "town recollection" he

recounts dates from the period (1799 - ca. 1807) during which
he lived at his brother John's house in London and
hand as a pa_inter.

~ried

his

The· letter-bell, at that time, served as

"a kind of alarm to break off from my work when there happened to be company to dinner or when I was going to the play ...
The sound was thus something that served to link him to the
human community, even as it had reminded him before to send
a letter to distant friends.

There is more involved in the

"linkage" provided by the bell than simply this, however.
The present, third recollection and the fourth exemplify opposite types of happiness which alternated with each other at
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the sound of the postman's approach; and the fourth recollection is anticipated when Hazlitt says the alarm cause
him to "break off" from his work--a point I shall return to.
The essayist now recounts experiences centering around going
to the theatre--either his own attendance, which he valued
all the more because, in those days, it was not a common
occurence: or the preparations of a "Miss D--- 11 and her companion as they were about to leave for a play.
concern with the theatre in this memory

sugges~s

The whole
that Hazlitt

is again recalling an experience of seeing with "the eyes of
youth," for elsewhere (xviii, 401) he says that he always saw
with such eyes whenever he went to the theatre.

Even when

not going himself, though, he still caught the excitement:
Even the idea that anyone else in the house· was going,
was a sort of reflected enjoyment, and conjured up a
lively anticipation of the scene. •
And when the
Letter-Bell announced that the time was approaching, and
its last receding sound lingered on the ear, or was lost
in silence, how anxious and uneasy I became, lest she and
her companion should not be in time to get good places-lest the curtain should draw up before they arrived • • • •
He thus recalls his own ability to enter into the feelings of
others--to experience the "negative capability" of selfless
sympathy with those around him.

This third memory, then, is

like the first two in presenting an essentially similar state
of mind.

However, Hazlitt characteristically specifies the

general similarity by means of different particular examples.
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As we mentioned in connection with the "Immortality" essay,
this practice shows the.workings of his aesthetic theory in
his own writing.

The memory of those leaving for the thea-

tre is thus tied to, but also differentiated from, similar
recollections.
The third memory of "The Letter-Bell" is then followed by a digression:
The punctuating of time at that early period--every
thing that gives it an articulate voice--seems of the
utmost consequence; for we do not know what scenes in
the ideal world may run out of them: a world of interest may hang upon every instant, and we can hardly
sustain the weight of future years which are contained
im embryp in the most minute and inconsiderable passing
events. . • .
The passage represents Hazlitt's suddenly standing back from
his essay and stating what he has up to now been showing us-that any single incident in life may have the utmost consequence to it if considered properly.

The thought re-echoes

his introductory analogy of the insect under the microscope,
though, of course, the values Hazlitt finds in his memories
have more than the simple aesthetic values of the closelyexamined insect; they also have the moral qualities always
connected with imaginative sight.

In this essay, specifi-

cally, the letter-bell is often a tie which binds Hazlitt
to the human community.
He then cites an incident to specify his general
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statement--he speaks of his running after the postman with
a late letter, sending it off, and never regretting anything that he had written:
I am not like the person who, having sent off a letter·
to his mistress, who resided a hundred and twenty miles
in the country, and disapproving, on second thoughts,
of some expressions contained in it, took a post-chaise
and four to follow and intercept it the next morning.
Such an example may have seemed to Hazlitt a microcosm of
his life--the press of circumstances and the rush to send
off essays in hurried attempts to secure· money was indeed a
pattern of his professional existence.

And so, too, was his

honesty in all that he wrote, even in the hack work, so that,
on this score at least, he never did feel the need to retract
his writings.
He moves into his fourth memory next; there is again
no paragraph break, and little transition:
At other times, I have sat and watched the decaying
embers in a little back painting-room (just as the
wintry day declined), and brooded over the halffinished copy of a Rembrandt, or a landscape by
Vangoyen, placing it where it might catch a dim gleam
of light from the fire; while the Letter-Bell was the
only sound that drew my thoughts to the world without,
and reminded me that I had a task to perform in it.
This is a recollection of his solitary work as a painter; as
such, it gives the opposite side of his third memory, which
was introduced with the statement that the letter-bell "was
a kind of alarm to break off from my work when there happened
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to be company to dinner."
balance each other:

The third and fourth memories

the one ,expresses the happiness of

leaving the solitary world of painting to enter into the
broader, diversified world of human activity; the other recounts the joy of immersing one's self in an intense pursuit
of a single object--here, painting.

Hazlitt's happiness in

remembering his days as a painter springs from the fact that
he was "wholly in his art"; his task was that "on which all
his projects of ambition or pleasure were founded."

His

painting was a task of "'Entire affe,ction, '" even in its
"mechanical parts."

The feeling of intensity which he re-

members is that which he captures so well in his full essay
"On Pedantry" (1817:

iv, 80-88):

"The power of attaching

an interest to the most trifling or painful

pursui~s,

in

which our whole attentio·n and faculties are engaged, is one
of the greatest happinesses

o~

our nature."

It is interest-

ing, however, that this memory in "The Letter-Bell" apparently
involves the self less rather than the selfish imagination:
11

Certainly,

11

says Hazlitt, "painting gives one a strong in-

terest in nature and humanity 11 (i.e., .external objects which
draw one out of one's self).

This whole passage, then, in-

volving as it does the qualities of intensity, narrow focus,
and a selfless imagination, is a recollection of an experience
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of "gusto." 4
The letter-bell appears again near the end of this
fourth memory:

"I used sometimes to hurry through this

tmechanical] part of my occupation, while the Letter-Bell
(which was my dinner-bell) summoned me to the fraternal
board, where youth and hope 'Made good digestion wait on
appetite . .

I II

This statement repeats the introduction

t'o the third memory ("It was a kind of alarm to break off
from my work when there happened to be company to dinner");
now, however, we have become acquainted with both experiences which the bell ties together:

the intense absorption

in work before the sound, and the feeling of "youth and
hope" following it.

The letter-bell is thus a linking

device in another sense:

not only does it tie Hazlitt to

humanity--it also links in his mind the two generally opposite types of happiness he valued so highly, and serves as
a balance point between them.

The function of the bell in

the third and fourth memories is thus much like its function
in the first, where, too, its sound served as a transition
point between opposite qualities of perception.
The next, brief paragraph in the essay is used for
transition; it is also another example of Hazlitt's love of
4 see Chapter V, below, for a detailed discussion of
this term.
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contrasts:
The dustman's-bell, with its heavy, monotonous noise,
and the brisk, lively tinkle of the muffin-bell, have
something in them, but not much. They will bear dilating upon with the utmost license of inventive prose.
All things are not alike conductors to the imagination.
Other sorts of bells don't speak to Hazlitt's memory as immediately as does the letter-bell; it would require great
ingenuity and "utmost license" of prose for an essay to be
spun from them.

Why then does the letter-bell speak to the

writer so naturally when other bells don't?

The answer is

found in the next two paragraphs, comprising the fifth main
division of the essay.
"The postman's double knock at the door the next
morning is 'more germaine to the matter,'"

Hazlitt begins--

i.e., this knock, associated with the letter-bell, is a
better "conductor to the imagination" than is either the
dustman's-bell of the muffin-bell.

The reason it moves Haz-

litt so much is that, like the letter-bell itself, it signifies a greater tie to other people, and it more readily engages the feelings of the heart than do other everyday
sounds--such feelings, of course, being for Hazlitt an essential part of all truth and human value.

He captures the

"feeling" of the post well, near the start of paragraph
four:
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How that knock often goes to the heart! We distinguish
to a nicety the arrival of the Two-penny or th.e General
Post. The summons of the latter is louder and heavier
as bringing news from a greater distance, and as, the
longer it has been delayed, fraught with a deeper interest. We catch the sound of what is to be paid-eight-pence, nine-pence, a shilling--and our hopes generally rise with the postage. How we are provoked at
the delay in getting change--at the servant who does
not hear the door! Then if the postman passes, and we
do not hear the expected knock, what a pang is there!
It is like the silence of death--of hope!
Having established the feelings connected with the mails,
Hazlitt increases and broadens his consideration of such
passions in almost a geometrical progression, moving from
the feelings he associates with a single postman to those he
has while watching a single Mail-Coach {which he sees as "the
messenger of fate") to those which spring up as he views {in
memory) the very hub of the Mail-Coach network in the heart
of London.

"The finest sight in the metropolis is that of

the Mail-Coaches setting off from Picadilly." he says; and
a few sentences later:
Some persons think the sublimest object in nature is a
ship launched on the bottom of the ocean: but give me,
for my private satisfaction, the Mail-coaches that pour
down Piccadilly of an evening, tear up the pavement, and
devour the way before them to the Land.' s-End !
The mails, carrying as they do the deepest passions of mankind-they "bind or sever hearts for ever," he says--are most striking to Hazlitt in a situation which impresses upon him the immense diversity and multiplicity of such passion.

"Truth is
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not one, but many," and the concrete picture of the range
of human truths, vitalized by deep feelings, radiating out
from Piccadilly to bind the whole nation, is very moving
for him; indeed, he sees the mail depot as sacred, for he
,,

describes it in terms suggesting a ritual:

the horses

carry a "precious burden"; he says that "There is a peculiar secresy and despatch, significant and full of meaning,
in all the proceedings"; the passengers appear to be "borne
on through the air as in a winged chariot"; and the coaches
start off bearing "irrevocable scrolls."

The sight of the

Mail-Coaches leaving London was indeed the "sublimest object
in nature" for him because in it he found an excellent objective correlative for some of his deepest feelings.
The final paragraph of the essay is made up largely
of a quotation from Cowper's The Task, cited to represent
Hazlitt's own feelings on watching the Mail-Coaches.

The

lines express just what he wants, for Cowper emphasizes the
range and diversity of human truths carried in the mail; and
all of the various communications cited involve deep feelings.
The final comments of the essay, that "the picturesque
and dramatic do not keep pace with the useful and mechanical,"
are similar to statements which Hazlitt makes in "Why the
Arts are Not Progressive" {iv, 160; xviii, 5, 7)--that progress in science, technology, and "mechanical" arts tends to

137
lead men away from natural and elemental sources of inspiration.

The complaint is that society, which tends to im-

pose more and more structures and filters upon perception
with the passage of time, creates a world in itself apart
from nature, which can be seen only with fresh sight.

The

Mail-coach is thus less natural and poetic than the PostBoy, as it involves more technological progress away from
the natural state of man.

A-more extreme example is the

final one. Hazlitt cites:
The telegraphs that lately communicated the intelligence of the new revolution to all France within a
few hours, are a wonderful contrivance; but they are
less striking and appalling than the beacon-fires
(mentioned in Aeschylus), which, lighted from hill-top
to hill-top, announced the taking of Troy, and the
return of Agamemnon.
His last thought is thus on the Spirit of the Age and its
tendency to lose contact with basic sources of emotion.

It

is important to note,- though, that throughout "The LetterBell" Hazlitt has dramatized the possibility--exemplified
by his own life--of achieving not a rejection of filtered
perception, but a balancing of it by fresh sight even within
the conventions and social structures of the age.

Thus the

letter-bell ties the writer to his society and its conventional operations; but also, paradoxically, it frees him to
perceive basic sources of inspiration within and beyond these
conventions.
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As we have mentioned, Hazlitt died a few days after
'

he wrote this essay.

Perhaps it was the composition of this

masterful work--a meditation on what he saw as the basic elements of awareness that allow for human happiness--that enabled him finally to see his own life as having met his own
standards of excellence.

For he died content--his last

·words were, "well, I've had a good life.

11

After "The Letter-Bell," such a valediction comes as
no surprise.

CHAPTER V

"GUSTO"

"You cannot comprehend my
definition of gusto, which you
do not ascribe to any defect
in yourself."
( 1819 :
ix , 2 8)

The above reprimand to William Gifford is perhaps
more peevish than just, for few terms in Hazlitt's works
are as hard to pin down accurately as "gusto.

11

Paul Elmer

More says that "The word, now unfortunately falling into
desuetude, connotes the power of intense enjoyment based
on understanding."l

Elisabeth Schneider comments that

"Diderot writes of verve almost as often as Hazlitt does
of gusto, and they appear to mean much the same thing, that
is, intensity."2

W.P. Albrecht writes:

"To define 'truth

of character' and then reveal 'the soul of nature, ' ·a poet
or painter must have the emotional intensity that Hazlitt
calls 'gusto. 1113

Roy Park diverges somewhat from the em-

1 shelburne Essays, p. 74.
2The Aesthetics of William Hazlitt, p. 58.
3 Hazlitt and the Creative Imagination. p. 84.
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phasis on seeing gusto as "intensity" in saying that "In
~·

'

a very general way gusto may be said to be the expression
of [the] unique quality of objects and works of art.

The

work of art, or the dramatic performance of a role which
succeeds in expressing this characteristic excellence, has
gusto. 114

I think, however, that an even more accurate def-

inition of the term may be found if we approach it with a
knowledge of Hazlitt's patterns of opposite qualities.

When

understood in the context of related remarks elsewhere in
Hazlitt's Works, the brief essay "On Gusto" from The Round
Table collection (1817:

iv, 77-80) will be seen to contain

great complexity--and inconsistency.

As with other diffi-

culties in Hazlitt's writings--though especially with
11

gusto 11 --it is unwise to take any one of the essayist's

statements as the ultimate representation of his final opinion on the subject •. Rather, I think, the truth can best be
approximated by again taking an overview of the matter to
determine the large patterns of thought involved.
The first paragraph of "On Gusto" offers something
of a definition of the term, but I think this will be best
comprehended if we first consider some of Hazlitt's general
notions on art, and his comments on those artists whose
4

·
Haz i itt

d
.illl_

. . ..Q_
f t h e .Age, p. 146 •
t h e Spirit
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works exemplify gusto.

Indeed, after its initial paragraph,

"On Gusto" is composed entirely of such examples--examples
which, we must remember, are tied to other comments about
the same artists, in different essays.
One of Hazlitt's most important ideas about artistic excellence is that each great artist is a specialist:
The greatest artists that have ever appeared are those
who have been able to employ some one view or aspect of
nature, and no more. Thus Titian was famous for colouring; Raphael for drawing; Correggio for the gradations, Rembrandt for the extremes of light and shade.
The combined genius and powers of observation of all
the great artists in the world would not be sufficient
to convey the whole of what is contained in any one
object in nature.
(ix, 218)
What determines each artist's specialty is the conformation
of his individual mind:
how narrow is the sphere of human excellence, how distinct the line of pursuit which nature has marked out
even for those whom she has most favoured!
Thus in
painting Raphael ·excelled in drawing, Titian in colouring, Rembrandt in chiaro scuro. A small part of nature was revealed to each by a peculiar felicity of
conformation; and they would have made sad work of it,
if each had neglected his own advantages to go in search
of those of others, on the principle that genius is a
large general capacity, transferred, by will or accident,
to some particular channel."
(xvi, 188) 5
Apparently, then, every great artist has a specific capacity
to see one aspect of nature clearly, and no one can "trans5 see also viii, 47.
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fer 11 this capacity in order to see other aspects.

I
f

This

specialization is something that Hazlitt points out throughout his writings;6 it is also an important part of "On
Gusto," for here, too, he catalogues the fortes of the great
artists--and the gusto of each is found in a limited area
(e.g., "There is a gusto in the colouring of Titian.
Michael Angelo's forms are full of gusto").

Indeed, he also

says that Shakespeare's gusto is diminished precisely because of his universality:

"The infinite quantity of dra-

matic invention in Shakespeare takes from his gusto.

The

power he delights to show is not intense but discursive."
Narrowed scope is thus an essential ingredient in
gusto--at least most of the time; for Hazlitt occasionally
makes a statement that suggests the opposite.

For example,

in "On Gusto" itself he says:
Rubens had a great deal of gusto in his Fauns and
Satyrs, and in all that expresses motion, but in
nothing else. Rembrandt has it in everything; everything in his pictures has a tangible character. If
he puts a diamond in the ear of a burgomaster's wife,
it is of the first water; and his furs and stuffs are
proof against a Russian winter. Raphael's gusto was
only in expression • • • .
The gusto of Rubens and Raphael is thus limited, as it should
be; but Rembrandt's, here, seems to be unlimited, despite Haz6 see xvii, 4ln:
"There is a certain pedantry, a given
division of labour, an almost exclusive attention to some one
object, which is necessary in Art, as in all the works of man."
Cf. also iv, 151; vi, 149; xii, 291; xx, 297, 391.

143
litt's usual assertion that his excellence is confined to
the use of chiaroscuro.

Similarly, despite his statement

here that Raphael is limited, he elsewhere suggests the
contrary:
Raphael gave himself up to the diviner or lovelier
impulse that breathes its soul over the face of
things, being governed by a sense of reality and of
general truth. There is nothing exclusive or repulsive in Raphael; he is open to all impressions alike,
and seems to identify himself with whatever he saw
that arrested his attention or could interest
others • • • • Raphael was only a painter, but in that
one art he seemed to pour out all the treasures and
various excellence of nature, grandeur and scope of
design, exquisite finishing, force • • . •
(xvii, 148) 7
.What Hazlitt says about an artist in "On Gusto,

11

then, may

not accord with his description of the same artist in another essay.

And we cannot separate "On Gusto" from the

context of his other works--as we have seen to the contrary,
it is a safe rule that we can best make sense of the essayist's ambiguities precisely by placing them within this context.

It follows then that if the exemplars of gusto have

ambiguous or contradictory qualities, then Hazlitt's concept
of gusto--based on such exemplars--is also ambiguous.

Spe-

7This particular passage suggests that, in a broad
sense, Raphael is limited because he is "only a painter"
whereas Michelangelo is "painter, sculptor, architect." However, Hazlitt usually specifies very particular fortes of
artists even within the one discipline of painting--which he
does not do here.
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cifically, there is an inconsistency about the involvement
of narrowed range of awareness--in Raphael and Rembrandt
it is sometimes present, sometimes not; and Hazlitt says
that both of these artists have gusto.
Similarly, there is an ambiguity about which type
of imagination (selfless or selfish} is characteristic of
the "gusto" artists.

Most of Hazlitt's comments on them

indicate the presence of the selfless imagination (although,
of course, the artist's ability to perceive nature directly,
without filters or "mediums," is confined to.a particular
channel, like a prism that separates only one color of light
from the natural spectrum).

For example, Titian represents

nature accurately:
• • • the limbs of his female figures have a luxurious
softness and delicacy, which appears conscious of the
pleasure of the beholder. As the objects themselves in
nature would produce an impression on the sense, pistinct
from every other object, and having something divine in
it, whiq,h the heart owns and the imagination consecrates,
the objects in the picture preserve the same impression,
absolute, unimpaired, stamped with all the truth of
passion, the pride of the eye, and the charm of beauty.
Hazlitt elsewhere says the same thing of this artist, that he
gives the "exact resemblance of individual nature" (xii, 286)
and that he shares with Raphael the quality of unfiltered perception:

"Titian • . . saw the colour of skin at once, with-

out any intellectual film spread over it; Raphael painted the
actions and passions of men, without any indirect process, as
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he found them" (xii, 245).8
Hazlitt cites Raphael's selfless imagination on several occasions, saying that "Nature did not put him out.

He

was not too great a genius to copy what he saw" (x, 12): that
he

11

invented according to nature" (xii, 284); and that he ex-

hibited "intense feeling of what is beautiful and grand in
nature" (xviii, 114).

It is therefore most interesting that

Hazlitt more than once contrasts Raphael to Michelangelo, who
also is cited as an exemplar of gusto.
"The Vatican,

11

In an 1827 essay on

for example, he writes:

[Raphael] seems to identify himself with whatever he
saw that arrested his attention or could interest others.
Michael Angelo studied for himself, and raised objects
to the standards of his conception, by a formula or system: Raphael invented for others, and was guided only by
sympathy with them. Michael Angelo was painter, sculptor,
architect: but he might be said to make of each art a
shrine in which to build up the stately and gigantic stature of his own mind. . • • Michael Angelo, in a word,
stamped his own character on his works, or recast Nature
in a mould of his own, leaving out much that was excellent:
Raphael received his inspiration from without, and his
genius caught the lambent flame of grace, of truth, and
grandeur, which are reflected in his works with a light
clear, transparent and unfading.
(xvii, 148)

.

The contrast between the self less and the selfish imagination
is obvious, especially in its use of characteristic diction
{e.g., "mould,"

11

transparent," etc.)

In "On Gusto" Hazlitt

8 Another of the 11 gusto 11 artists, Correggio, is also
said to reflect 11 the pure light of nature on the canvas"
(xviii, 42) •
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does not speak of Michelangelo's imagination per se; he simply speaks of the artist's figures and of how they are "firm,
commanding, broad, and massy," showing "power" and "muscular
strength."

In this regard, though, a passage from the essay-

ist's 1817 Encyclopaedia Britannica article on "Fine Arts" is
revelant; after discussing Raphael, he again turns to Michelangelo:
There is more an appearance of abstract grandeur of form
in Michael Angelo. He has followed up, has enforced, and
expanded, as it were, a preconceived idea, till he sometimes seems to tread on the' verge of caricature. His
forms, however, are not middle, but extreme forms, massy,
gigantic, supernatural. They convey the idea of the
greatest size and strength in the figure, and in all the
parts of the figure. Every muscle is swollen and turgid.
This tendency to exaggeration would have been avoided, if
Michael Angelo had recurred more constantly to nature,
and had proceeded less on a scientific knowledge of the
structure of the human body; for science gives only the
positive form of the different parts, which the imagination may afterwards magnify, as it pleases, but it is
nature alone which combines them with perfect truth and
delicacy, in all the varities of motion and expression.
(xviii, 114-115)
The strength of Michelangelo's forms thus derives from "a
preconceived idea" or a scientific bias rather than from nature.

It is interesting, too, that the very next sentence in

the passage offers one of the Elgin marbles as a contrast to

•

Michelangelo:

"It is fortunate that we can refer, in illus-

tration of our doctrine, to the admirable fragments of the
Theseus at Lord Elgin• s, which shows the P.ossibili ty of unit-

r~.
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ing the grand and natural style in the highest degree."
Like Raphael's paintings, the Elgin marbles derive their
power directly from nature. 9

And they, too, are cited in

"On Gusto" as exemplifying that quality.

Thus Michelangelo,

who is contrasted to both Raphael and the Greek statues, represents the selfish rather than the self less imagination.
Rembrandt, too, has gusto; but again Hazlitt does
not speak directly of which type of imagination he represents.

And his comments elsewhere are contradictory.

For

example, in "On Genius and Common Sense" he writes:
If ever there was a man of genius, he [Rembrandt] was
one, in the proper sense of the term. He lived in and
revealed to others a world of his own, and might be
said to have invented a new view of nature. He did not
discover things out of nature, in fiction or fairy land,
or make a voyage to the moon 'to descry new lands, rivers,
or mountains in her spotty globe,' but saw things in nature that everyone had missed before him, and gave others
eyes to see them with. This .is the test and triumph of
originality, not to shew us what has never been, and what
we may therefore easily never have dreamt of, but to
point out to us what is before our eyes and under our
feet, though we have had no suspicion of its existence,
9 see also, for example, x, 168n:
"[The Elgin marbles) are the finest forms in the most
striking attitudes, and with every thing in its place,
proportion, and degree, uniting the ease, truth, force,
and delicacy of Nature. They shew nothing but the artist's thorough comprehension of, and entire docility to
that great teacher. There is no petit-maitreship, no
pedantry, no attempt at a display of science; or at
forcing the parts into an artificial symmetry, but it is
like cutting a human body out of a block of marble, and
leaving it to act for itself with all the same springs,
levers, and internal machinery."
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for want of sufficient strength of intuition, of
determined grasp of mind to seize and retain it.
(viii, 43)
Rembrandt's reliance on external nature for his art indicates
the presence of the selfless imagination; his capturing of
the truth of nature is also suggested in the essay "Is Genius conscious of Its Powers?" (xii, 120):

11

80 much do Rem-

brandt's pictures savour of the soul and body of reality,
that the thoughts seem identical with the objects."
On the other hand, though, many other of Hazlitt's
writings indicate that he thought Rembrandt had a filtering
or selfish imagination.

For example, the essay on the "Fine

Arts," after speaking of Vandyke ("The objects in his pietures • . • are presented to the eye without passing through
any indirect medium"), says this of Rembrandt:
If ever there was a man of genius in the art, it was
Rembrandt. He might be said to have created a medium
of his own, through which he saw all objects . • • •
He took any object, he cared not what, how mean soever
in form, colour, and expression, and from the light and
shade which he threw upon it, it came out gorgeous from
his hands . • • • His vision acquired a lynx-eyed sharpness from the artificial obscurity to which he had accustomed himself.
(xviii, 122)
References to the creation of a "medium" and to "artificial"
obscurity indicate a filtering imagination.

Hazlitt also

implies a contrast between Rembrandt and two "natural" artists in a comment to Northcote:

"I mentioned that I thought
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Sir Joshua more like Rembrandt than either Titian or Vandyke:
he enveloped objects in the same brilliant haze of a previous
mental conception" (xi, 198)--much as Michelangelo worked
from "a preconceived idea."

Similarly, in speaking of Words-

worth Hazlitt sometimes alludes to the similarity of his filtering and selfish imagination and Rembrandt's:
[Wordsworth's] poems bear a distinct resemblance to some
of Rembrandt's landscapes, who, more than any other painter, created the medium through which he saw nature.
(iv, 120-121; repeated xix, 19)
I am afraid I shall hardly write so satisfactory a character of Mr. Wordsworth, though he, too, like Rembrandt, has
a faculty of making something out of nothing, that is, out
of himself, by the medium through which he sees and with
which he clothes the barrenest subject.
(viii, 43-44)
The citation of Rembrandt as.an example of gusto, then, may
imply either a selfless or a selfish imagination--Hazlitt himself is inconsistent on the point.
There are other inconsistencies in Hazlitt's citation
of Rubens as an exemplar of ,gusto.

The "Fine Ar.ts" article

says:
Rubens is the prince of Flemish painters. Of all the
great painters, he is perhaps the most artificial.--the
one who· painted most from his own imagination,--and, what
was almost the inevitable consequence, the most of a mannerist.
(xviii, 120-121)
However, a few sentences later, Hazlitt apparently says that
Rubens presented at least one aspect of nature (flesh} with-

r

150
out any artificial distortions:

"He has given to his flesh

greater transparency and freshness than any other painter;
and this excellence he had from nature."

Does this unfiltered

portrayal of one aspect of nature, then, indicate that Rubens'
flesh shows gusto?

It seems as if it should--but in "On Gusto"

itself Hazlitt says:

"Rubens has a great deal of gusto in

his Fauns and Satyrs, and in all that expresses motion, but
in nothing else."

And he also contrasts Rubens' portrayal of

flesh {he "makes his flesh-colour like flowers") to Titian's
("Titian's is like flesh, and like nothing else")--and here
it is Titian and not Rubens whose flesh shows gusto.

Hazlitt's

thoughts on Rubens, then, are rather muddled regarding both
the type of imagination he shows, and in what "specialty" his
gusto appears.
But despite the ambiguity about which type of imagination is shown by the different artists cited as examples, Hazlitt's opening paragraph apparently indicates that the selfless
imagination is what he intends to imply:
Gusto in art is power or passion defining any object • • • •
there is hardly any object entirely devoid of expression,
without some character of power belonging to it, some precise association with pleasure or pain: and it is in
giving this truth of character from the truth of feeling
. that gusto consists.
Evidently the capturing of a quality belonging to external objects themselves is involved.

Even the "association with
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pleasure or pain" is something that Hazlitt saw (or tried to
see) as existing in objects themselves rather than in their
human viewer.10

If Hazlitt did indeed intend "gusto" to im-

ply an unfiltered view of a particular aspect of nature--obtained by the use of a channelled self less imagination--then
his use of Michelangelo and Rembrandt (not to mention Milton
and Pope) as examples is rather puzzling. 11
1

Let us assume, though, that he did intend to imply
the presence of that type of imagination which perceives nature directly and inunediately; there is still, then, a further
distinction to be made.

Those artists who exemplify gusto

must capture the internal principles of their subjects rather
then merely their superficial outward characteristics.

Thus,

for example, even though Vandyke is true to nature in his
paintings, 12 he presents only its surface:
Vandyke's flesh-colour, though it has great truth and
purity, wants gusto. It has not the internal character,
the living principle in it. It is a smooth surface, not
a warm, moving mass. It is painted without passion, with
indifference.
Claude's landscapes show a similar shortcoming:

lOsee above, Chapter I, p. 13.
11

See also xviii, 18, for a passage which indicates
that "nature" is not necessary for gusto:
"Though neither
the colouring nor the expression of this picture is natural,
there is a harmony and a gusto in both that pleases the eye
and reconciles the understanding to it."
·
12

see above, p. 148; also viii, 318.
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Claude's landscapes, perfect as they are, want gusto.
This is not easy to explain. They are perfect abstractions of the visible images of things; they speak the
visible language of nature truly. They resemble a mirror or a microscope. To the eye only they are more perfect than any other landscapes that ever were or will be
painted; they give more of nature, as cognisable by one
sense alone; but they lay an equal stress on all visible
impressions. They do not interpret one sense by another;
they do not distinguish the character of different objects as we are taught, and can only be taught, to distinguish them by their effect on the different senses.
That is, his eye wanted imagination: it did not strongly
sympathize with his other faculties. He saw the atmosphere, but he did not feel it.
There are different skeins that are important in this tangled
commentary.

Hazlitt says, for example, that the landscapes

"do not interpret one sense by another" and that Claude's eye
"did not strongly sympathize with his other faculties."

This

is an echo of a comment made in the second paragraph of the
essay, that "In a word, gusto in painting is where the impression made on one sense excites by affinity those of another."
It is a way of saying that the "internal principle" of objects
must be captured organically, that one quality of an object

.

cannot simply be me.chanically separated from others.

It im-

plies that the pulse of any one sense flows through all of the
others, too, and that therefore the presentation of any one
sensory aspect of an object--if captured organically--rnust irnply other sensory experiences in it, too.

Thus, for example,

Hazlitt says in an essay on "The Marquis of Stafford's Gallery"
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that Titian's coloring appeals to the senses of taste and
hearing as well as sight:

"Every where tone, not form, pre-

dominates--there is not a distinct line in the picture--but
a gusto, a rich taste of colour is left upon the eye as if
it were the palate, and the diapason of picturesque harmony
is full to overflowing" (x, 33).

Hazlitt's analysis of West's

Christ Rejected presents another passage which points out that
gusto implies organicism rather than mechanism:
We might.sum up our opinion in one word, by saying, that
there is in the present picture an absolute want of what
is called gusto throughout; nor can we describe our idea
of Mr. West's style in general better than by saying that
it is the reverse of Raphael's.
The dif.ference is this.
In Raphael, every muscle and nerve has intense feeling.
The same divine spirit breathes from every part; it either
agitates the inmost frame, or plays in gentle undulations
on the trembling surface . • • • the whole is bursting with
expression. But Mr. West makes no use whatever of the
movable frame of the countenance, the only language it
possesses • • • or if he does avail himself of this flexible machinery, it is only by rule and method. The effect
is not that which the soul of passion impresses on.it, and
which the soul of genius alone can seize; but such as might
be given to wooden puppets or pasteboard figures, pulled
by wires • • •
(xviii, 33)
The diction itself ( 11 breathes,

11

"bursting," vs. "pasteboard

figures") expresses the important contrast of portraying the
subject as animated by an internal living principle rather
than by mechanical external "wires."
·when Hazlitt is speaking of "gusto," he frequently
uses the terms "passion," "feeling," or "intensity" to con-
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note an artist's capturing of an organic internal principle
in an object.

These terms are always found close to his as-

sertions that an artist does or does not succeed in getting
below the surface of what he is trying to paint--indeed, so
closely are they associated with such assertions that these
terms often serve as "shorthand" references which by themselves connote that quality of capturing the internal life of
the object represented.

Thus, when Hazlitt says that Vandyke's

flesh color "has not the internal character, the living principle in it.

It is painted without passion, with indif-

ference," he is simply repeating the same idea.

Similarly,

when he writes that Claude "saw the atmosphere, but he did
not feel it," he is repeating the point he made a few sentences earlier, that this artist presents only the superficial,
"visible" aspect of nature, and not this aspect as it is organically related to all other sensible characteristics in nature.
Unlike Vandyke and Claude, Rembrandt {when he is said to have
a self less imagination) d_oes interpret one sense by another-and he therefore has the "intensity" of feeling that they lack:
It seems as if he had dug [his landscapes] out of nature.
Everything is so true, so real, so full of all the
feelings and associations which the eye can suggest
to the other senses, that we immediately take as strong
an affection to them as if they were our home--the very
place where we were brought up. No length of time could
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add to the intensity of the impression they convey.
13
{xviii, 123)
The term "intensity" thus often has a particular connotation in connection with "gusto."

However, it sometimes

seems to indicate simply the great energy of the artist, as
in a comment on Milton from "On Milton's Versification," also
from The Round Table:
gusto as any poet.

"Milton had as much of what is meant by

He forms the most intense conception of

things, and then embodies them by a single stroke of his pen.
Force of style is perhaps his first excellence" (iv, 38).

This

foreshadows Hazlitt's statements on the poet from the following
year (1818) in "On Shakespeare and Milton," that "He always
labours, and almost always succeeds.

He strives hard to say

the finest ·things in the world, and he does-say them . .
In Milton, there is always an appearance of effort:
speare, scarcely any" {v, 58).

in Shake-

Milton's "intensity" is thus

the emotion that surges from the concentrated, forceful power
of his own mind; and this is Hazlitt's usual usage of the term
in most contexts.
From all this, then, we might think that "intensity"
in one form or another is a necessary element of, gusto.

But

13see also x, 45, and especially x, 273, for other
similar uses of "intensity"--in these instances in connection
with Raphael's ability to capture the internal spirit of a
subject.
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here, too, there are contradictions, even as there were when
Hazlitt spoke of the elements of narrowed scope and the selfless imagination.

Thus, for example, in the "Life of Sir

Joshua Reynolds" (1820) he says:

"One great proof and beauty

of works of true genius, is the ease, simplicity, and freedom
from conscious effort which pervades them" (xvi, 188)--he then
goes on to specify the particular artists he means ("Thus in
painting, Raphael excelled in drawing, Titian in colouring,
Rembrandt in chiaroscuro"), indicating that the "ease" he
speaks of is a characteristic of the "gusto" artists.

And

"ease" and "freedom from conscious effort" are certainly not
a characteristic of someone like Milton as described in "On
Gusto" itself.

In another similar passage, though, .he again

specifies •:ease" rather than "intensity" as a characteristic
of the "gusto" artists; writing in "Is Genius conscious of
Its Powers" in 1826 he says:
The greatest power operates unseen, and executes its appointed task with as little ostentation as difficulty • .
• • It is only where our incapacity begins, that we begin
to feel the obstacles, and to set an undue value on our
triumph over ·them. Correggio, Michael Angelo, Rembrandt,
did what they did without premeditation or effort--their
works came from their minds a a natural birth.
(xii, 118)
"Gusto," then, is a very ambiguous term.

And the

problem of its definition is further complicated by Hazlitt's
occasional use of i t as a mere synonym for "enthusiasm," as
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in a comment from Table-Talk in 1821 about surgeon John Hunter:

11

He would have set about cutting up the carcase of a

whale with the same greatness of gusto that Michael Angelo
would have hewn a block of marble" (viii, 85).

The term again

means simply "enthusiasm" in the 1827 essay "Why Heroes of
Romances are Insipid,

when it is used in reference to one

11

of Godwin's characters:

11

The case is different in St. Leon.

The author's resuscitated hero there quaffs joy, love, and
immortality with a considerable gusto, and with appropriate
manifestations of triumph" (xviii, 253).

Such simple uses

of the term, however, are rare in the Works.
A consistent definition of

11

gusto 11 .simply cannot be

offered, for Hazlitt himself did not always use the term with
one meaning in· mind.

As we have seen even in. "On Gusto" it-

self there are statements and examples which do not match with
each other; and Hazlitt's thoughts on the subject are by no
means confined to this one essay--further inconsistencies turn
up as we trace "gusto" elsewhere.

It is clear, though, that

various of the essayist's usual oppositions are involved in
his usage of the word.

And one does get the sense that one

particular combination of elements is most often intended-though, again, this combination is by no means absolute.
statement from "On Genius and Common Sense" in 1821 comes

A
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closest to the mark; even though Hazlitt does not specifically
use the word "gusto" in it, I believe that he has the same
idea in mind when he writes:

"It is not then the acuteness of

organs or extent of capacity that constitutes rare genius or
produces the most exquisite models of art, but an intense sympathy with some

~

beauty or distinguishing characteristic

in nature" (viii, 49).

The latter part of this statement, with

its combination of these italicized elements--if we add the
qualification that "intense" connotes the capturing' of the
organic inner principle of the object being portrayed, rather
than its mere surface--gives us the best general definition of
·"gusto."

But we cannot dismiss the fact that important con-

tradictions can be found for every one of these key elements.
We must simply realize that Hazlitt was inconsistent in his
definition, exemplification, and usage of the word.

We can

take some comfort, though, in also recognizing that the various
contradictions fall into familiar patterns.

r
CHAPTER VI

THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE

"We must therefore work with the
instruments that are allotted
us; and no man can resist
the spirit of the age
in which he lives."
(1828: xiv~ 132)

The relative importance that Hazlitt attached to the
opposite types of

perception~-structured,

filtered, or ego-

tistical vs. immediate or selfless; narrowed or channelled
vs. universal and open; intense vs. tranquil--is not an easy
matter to determine; this question, though, is of great importance both to an understanding of Hazlitt's general thoughts
· on life and art and to an assessment of his conception of the
spirit o.f the age in which he. lived.

It is certainly true,

for instance, that running through his writings is a clear
thread of admiration for figures who can lose themselves entirely while being open to the subtlest influences of nature;
and such admiration is frequently emphasized by a contrasting
disapprobation for mannered, artificial, "abstract," or singleminded artists and thinkers.
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This thread is evident in such
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diverse contrasts as those of Shakespeare's plays vs. his sonnets (iv, 358), Addison vs. Steele (vii, 99), Shakespeare vs.
Beaumont and Fletcher (vi, 250), Mlle. Mars vs. Mme. Pasta
(xii, 324f.), Raphael vs. Guido (xii, 284), Byron vs. Scott
(xii, 319), and Scott vs. Rizzio (xviii, 350) to name but a
few.

One might be tempted to see Hazlitt's preferences as

simply one-sided along these lines, especially since there
are few contrasts when wide-ranging, selfless perception is
criticized in relation to its opposite.· And when

~riticisrn

of Shakespearean qualities is advanced, it is often concerned
mainly with the point that too great a range of concern dissipates a man's effectiveness; only by implication, often, is
the frequently concomitant quality of selflessness looked at
unfavorably.

Nor, on such occasions, does Hazlitt usually

criticize the selfless imagination with the vehemence he often reserves for the selfish.
Still it is unwise to say simply that Hazlitt advocated selfless perception as his ideal; the matter is more
complex than this.

As he wrote in 1828:

Everything has its turn in this chequered scene of things,
unless we prevent it from taking its turn by over-rigid
conditions, or drive men to despair or the most callous
effrontery, by erecting a standard of perfection, to which
no one can conform in reality!
(xvii, 347)
Hazlitt recognized the danger--and, indeed, the impossibility--
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of demanding perfection from "a creature like man, whose 'very
name is frailty,' and who is a compound of contradictions"
(xvi, 406); as in "On Going a Journey," he could not blind
himself to the fact that men naturally have limited, personally
filtered vision. 1

And he had a variety of attitudes towards

this reality of human nature--he by no means saw such limitation, or egotism, or filtered perception of nature, or "abstraction" as always an undesirable thing.
sometimes he saw it as engendering its own class of
excellence, inferior to that springing from an immediate openness to nature--but excellent nevertheless.

Thus, for example,

while he admires the truth to nature of Cervantes' QQE, Quixote,
he still sees value--though not as much--in the "mannerism"
of Le Sage's Gil Blas:

"Gil Blas is, next to Don Quixote, more

generally read and admired than any other novel--and, in one
sense, deservedly so:

for it is at the head of its class,

though that class is very different from, and inferior to the
other" (xvi, 10; also vi, 111-112).

Similarly, in "On the

Question of Whether Pope was a Poet" (xx, 89-92), Hazlitt views
Pope as a limited poet of "art" who is thus inferior to a universal "poet of nature" like Shakespeare; however, the essayist's main contention cannot be ignored:

"The question whether

1 viii, 187-188; see also above, Chapter IV, pp. 96-98.
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Pope was a poet, has hardly yet been settled, and is hardly
worth settling; for if he was not a great poet, he must have
been a great prose writer, that is, he was a great writer of
some sort."

And his idea here ties in with a comment from the

Lectures ..2Q the English Poets, that the "artificial" poets are
not far separated from the "natural":
Dryden and Pope are the great masters of the artificial
style of poetry in our language, as the poets of whom I
have already treated, Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, and
Milton, were of the natural; and though this artificial
style is generally and very justly acknowledged to be inferior to the other, yet those who stand at the head of
that class, ought, perhaps, to rank higher than those who
occupy an inferior place in a superior class. They have
a clear and independent claim upon our gratitude, as having produced a kind and degree of excellence which existed equally nowhere else. What has been done well by.
some later writers of the highest style of poetry, is
included in, and obscured by a greater degree of power
and genius in those before them: what has been done best
by poets of an entirely distinct turn of mind, stands by
itself, and tells for the whole amount. Young, for instance, Gray or Akenside, only follow in the train of
Milton and Shakespeare:
Pope and Dryden walk by their
side, though of an unequal stature, and are entitled to
a first place in the lists of fame. 2
(v, 68-69)

Hazlitt's admiration of non-Shakespearean poets is also evident in his comments on Wordsworth; though he is a poet of
"paradox~'"

and such writers rank at the bottom of Hazlitt's

2 Hazlitt's characterization here of Milton as a poet
of "nature" is atypical; cf. my ensuing discussion.
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famous scale of poetry (v, 82), 3 he still receives high praise
indeed (e.g., iv, 111-112, 115-116; v, 156; ix, 243; xi,

86~95;

xii, 104).
At other times, Hazlitt simply compares the opposite
types of perception without expressing any preference, implying
that equal value lies on either side.

Thu.s Milton, who covered

his poetry with "religious zeal" and who, like Dante, wrote
with "a spirit of partisanship," and who was in all respects
a "direct contrast" to Shakespeare (v, 56, 66) is given a
rank with Shakespeare as one of the greatest poets of the
language (v, 46).

Similarly, the essayist says that "We are

not going to give a preference" when he compares Moore and
Byron (xvi, 4llf.), who again exemplify the opposite generic
qualities.

And often he simply describes someone as the "re-

verse" of someone else, again without expressing preference-....
e. g., Wordsworth ''is the reverse of Walter Scott in his de3 1 think we must be careful about placing too much
emphasis on seeing this scale of poetry as a "constant" factor in Hazlitt's criticism; Hazlitt himself was not especially
consistent in his use of it. Thus, for example, while he says
that imaginative poetry of the time of Elizabeth ranks highest,
he elsewhere recognizes great variety within the periods before the Caroline age (the next step down on the scale), as
when he says, "the dramatic paradoxes of Beaumont and Fletcher
are, to all appearance, tinctured with an infusion of personal
vanity and laxity of principle" (vi, 250). This is a comment
which he could just as easily apply to Wordsworth or Byron.
Conversely, he says that Coleridge {who lived in the age of
paradox) showed "'that fine madness • . • which our first poets
had'" (viii, 183).

r

\
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fects and excellences.

He as all that the other wants, and

wants all that the other possesses" (v, 156).

The entire

essay "On Going a Journey"--widely recognized as one of Hazlitt's greatest--similarly concludes with a careful balance
of the opposites (viii, 181-189).
There are still other times when Hazlitt sees the narrow, egotistical, individual, or prejudiced viewpoint as a
better or more appropriate stance than its opposite.

Indeed,

he sometimes sees success in life as springing from these
qualities (e.g., xii, 197}, although the observation is often
mixed with irony.

In "On Pedantry," however, he positively

relishes the feeling of intensity that comes from narrowing
one's range of attention to a small circle (iv, 80-88}; indeed, in this essay he further says that "To take away the
force of habit and prejudice entirely, is to strike at the
root of our personal existence" (iv, 84).

Elsewhere he cas....;

tigates the politician Brougham for not appealing in his
speeches to a "substratum of prejudice" (xvii, 8), for the
orator consequently fails to move his audiences.

Hazlitt

again sees value in prejudice _(i.e., views whose value derives'
from personal sources or accepted systems rather than from
external nature or objective reality} in two of his greatest
heroes, Rousseau and Godwin, whose "egotism" inspired the
great ideals of individual liberty in the period of the French
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Revolution.

Furthermore, Hazlitt's biography of Napoleon,

his greatest hero, is a tribute to the monumental individualism of the man who, in the essayist's view, protected and
extended these ideals.

And, too, the author or the Essay .Q.!J.

the Principles of Human Action, which establishes a philo-sophical basis for selflessness, is als.o the author of the
"Project for a New Theory of Civil and Criminal Legislation,"
which theory is founded on a principle of

self~interest

(xix,

302-320) . 4
Hazlitt thus had a considerable range of attitudes
about the importance and value of selflessness, openness to
experience, and direct contact with nature as opposed to egotism, prejudice, artificiality, systematization, and abstraction--all of which involve filtered or structured perception
that substitutes personal values for those of external nature.
One cannot simply say that he liked one stance and disliked
the other--he saw positive value, and drawbacks, on both sides
of the coin.

It is true that his criticisms of filtered or

narrowed perception are greater in number, and more vehement,
than his criticisms of open selflessness; but the reason for

4one of its tenets, for example, is that "self-love
is a natural guarantee for our self-interest"; and its general conclusion is:
"It se~ms, then, that a system of just
and useful laws may be constructed nearly, if not wholly, on
the principle of the right of self-defence, or the security
for person, libery, and property" (xix, 303, 319).
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this is obvious.

Hazlitt was not an ivory-tower intellectual

but a front-rank critic in daily contact with the everyday
people and attitudes of his time: he was thus constantly exposed to ignorance, prejudice, and entrenched political conservatism which such journals as the Quarterly Review and
Blackwood's Magazine used as a basis for attacking not only
his aesthetics but his very person as well.

His milieu was

obviously more filled with narrow-mindedness and prejudice
than with selflessness.

To bring about a reasonable balance

Hazlitt obviously had to attack filtered perception and advocate its opposite much more than to do the reverse; due to
the circumstances, an imbalanced approach was necessary to
bring about a balance of truth.

And Hazlitt realized this.

In 1828, for example, speaking of his own "paradoxical"
writing he says:
All abstract reasoning is in extremes, or only takes up
one view of a question, or what is called the principle
of the thing: and if you want to give this popularity
and effect, you are in danger of running into extravagance and hyperbole. I have had to bring out some obscure distinction, or to combat some strong prejudice,
and in doing this with all my might, may have often overshot the mark. It is easy to correct the excess of truth
afterwards. I have been accused of inconsistency, for
writing an essay, for instance, on the Advantages of
Pedantry, and another, on the Ignorance of ~ Learned,
as if ignorance had not its comforts as well as knowledge.
(xvii, 312-313)
This, of course, is in accord with his comment from 1819:
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my love of paradox may, I think, be accounted for from
the necessity of counteracting the obstinacy of prejudice. If I have been led to carry a remark too far,
it was because others would not allow it to have any
force at all. My object was to shew the latent operation of some unsuspected principle, and I therefore
took only some one view of that particular subject.
·
(ix, 30) 5
A typical example of Hazlitt's taking "one view" of a subject
is his statement from "On the Spirit of Partisanship" (1821)
that "There is nothing more contemptible than party-spirit
in one point of view" {xvii, 35); it is obvious from his words
that, even while condemning his subject, he realizes that he
could take another viewpoint.
Hazlitt'~

personal "ideal" approach to life and art

was thus a mixture of perspectives, which, in toto, were corrective to each other.

Attractive as the open, innocent, or

"existential" stance was to him, he realized that this alone
does not constitute wisdom; rather, he saw it as a corrective
to other valid sources of wisdom which are also necessary,
and which are in turn corrective of the defects of openness.
He was a realist, fully cognizant that no conception of happiness was worthwhile which did not allow one to live in the
world of everyday realities.

Detached poetic ease is fine,

he thought; but since one must also earn his daily bread in
an imperfect world, one would do best not to neglect the sources
5 see above, Chapter III, p. 73.
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of happiness that this world, too, extends to the perceptive
man.

His mixture of perspectives thus allowed him to maximize

the potential for satisfaction within the ultimately inescapable parameters of everyday human life.
An example of Hazlitt's ideal mixture is found in his
description of Neufchatel in Notes of a Journey through France
and Italy (1826):
This kind of retreat, where there is nothing to surprise,
nothing to disgust, nothing to draw.the attention out of
itself, uniting the advantages of society and solitude,
of simplicity and elegance, and where the mind can indulge
in a sort of habitual and self-centered satisfaction, is
the only one which I should never feel a wish to quit.
The golden mean is, indeed, an exact description of the
mode of life I should like to lead--of the style I should
like to write • • • .
{x, 297)
Introversion vs. extroversion, simplicity vs. art--the elements
are found throughout.the essayist's works.

And Hazlitt saw

a similar golden mean in the person of Charles Lamb, his only
life-long close friend, of whom he says (in The Spirit of the
Age):

he "occupies that nice point between egotism and dis-

interested humanity" (xi, 180); Hazlitt's admiration for him
was thus very deep indeed. 6

6uazlitt believed at times that Lamb's imagination
filtered his perception, as in "On Going a Journey" (1822;
cf. above, Chapter IV, p. 87}; he also believed, at other
times, that it entirely removed the filters of self from his
outlook, as noted, for example, in a comment from "Character
of the Country People" on Lamb making himself an object of
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Seeing Hazlitt's ideal as one of mixed perspectives
needs particular emphasis at the present time because there
is apparently an incipient blind spot about this matter in
recent criticism.

W.P. Ablrecht, for example, writes that

"Politically as well as aesthetically, [Hazlitt] urges disinterestedness:

the sympathetic identification that is

needed for imaginative fulfillment. 117

I agree with this

statement, as far as it goes; but it is not the whole truth-the other side of the coin needs more emphasis.

Similarly,

Roy Park, who calls Hazlitt "the most outspoken and consistent English critic of abstraction in the early nineteenth
century, 11 8 writes that "For Hazlitt, the presence of the self
blurred the essential openness characteristic of his experiental or "pluralist' viewpoint, and man's capacity for experiencing morally the reality or significance of human life was
so much the more diminished."9

He also states that "The

artist, for Hazlitt, is characterized by an openness to the
whole of experience in all its complexity and variety as a

laughter:
" • • • the abstract idea of the jest of the
thing prevailing in his mind (as it always does) over the
sense of personal dignity" (1819: . xvii, 66-67).
?Hazlitt and the Creative Imagination, p. 148.
8Hazlitt and the Spirit of the Age, p. 77.
9rbid., p. 59.
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result of his greater sensitivity of feeling."10

Park's

perception of Hazlitt's admiration of Shakespearean qualities is clear enough; however, he does not clearly see the
positive value which Hazlitt attached to the other type of
artistic stance.

For example, after discussing Hazlitt's

views of Milton, Spenser, and Montaigne, he says that "tHazlitt'sJ criticism of Montaigne is important for a number of
reasons.

Its open hostility to abstraction is entirely

characteristic.

The deference shown to Spenser and Milton

in spite of their abstraction is thus exceptional. 1111

I hope

I have sufficiently shown by now that Hazlitt's opposition to
abstraction is not "entirely" characteristic, and that it is
certainly not consistent.

Furthermore, Park's statement con-

tains.a misleading implication--Hazlitt liked Milton not in
spite of his filtered perception but rather precisely because
of it.

Milton was not an "exception" to the rule; rather, he

simply accorded with another, opposite rule.12

Hazlitt did

lOibid., p. 109.
llibid., p. 173.
12In this regard it is ·interesting that Northcote
says, in Conversation the Tenth (1830: xi, 246), that "There
is a faculty that enlarges and beautifies objects, even beyond
nature. It is for this reason that we must, reluctantly perhaps, give the preference' to Milton over Shakespeare." Hazlitt does not disagree; indeed, it is possible that he is
using Northcote here as a mouthpiece for his own opinions, as
he does elsewhere in the conversations.
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not have merely one standard of excellence.

A blind spot

similar to that in Park's criticism is noticeable, too, in
Herschel Baker's failure to understand Hazlitt's admiration
of the "stiff and formal" John Kernble. 13

Again, these are

precisely the qualities that caused him to admire the actor.
This blind spot extends, too, into various assessments
of The .Spirit of the A9e itself.

G.D. Klingopulous, for ex-

ample, offers an overly simple commentary:
Few works of criticism illustrate as vividly as does The·
Spirit of the Age those extra-literary considerations
which should help to form a critic's awareness of his
own times. Hazlitt is concerned to show that rationalists such as Bentham and Godwin had much to learn about
induction from the intuitive poets. It was the poets
who were concrete, the rationalists who were abstract.14
There is an implication here that Hazlitt saw Godwin's rationalism as something which prevented him from making a vital contribution to the age; but this is not true.

W.P. Albrecht, in

his review of Park's book, also emphasizes only the negative
aspect of Hazlitt's thoughts on narrowness and filtered perception:

11

[Hazlittl relies on dramatic particulars to show

how narrow rationalism, transcendental systems, class prejudice, or other forms of 'egotism'--enforced by external pres-

13see above, Chapter IV, pp. 102-103.
14 11 The Spirit of the Age in Prose, 11 in A Guide to
English Literature, Vol. V: From Blake to Byron (London:
Cassell & Company, Ltd., 1962), p. 151.
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sures--blocked the imagination and prevented able men from fulfilling their powers. 11 15

Albrecht elsewhere says that "Haz-

litt, like Arnold, believed that his age and its representative men were the victims of abstraction 11 ; 16 and Park says
that this abstraction is "the greatest vice of the age. 111 7
I cannot disagree with such statements that note Hazlitt's
condemnation of abstraction; I can point out, however, that
the essayist's idea of the Spirit of the Age was more complex
than this, and that it involved a mixture of perspectives-which saw value on both sides--analogous to the
characterize his work as a whole.

~atterns

that

His criticisms of the

figures in Spirit imply two sets of standards, not one.

But

before we insist on any conclusions, let us look at the evidence within Hazlitt's great work itself.
How does Hazlitt himself define the Spirit of the Age?
Many references within the book do indeed see this Spirit as
one of undesirable abstraction, prejudice, and filtered perception.

In the essay on "William Godwin,

11

for example, Haz-

litt notes_ that "The Spirit of the Age was never more fully

15 11 Ralph M. Wardle, Hazlitt (Univ. of Nebraska, 1971}
and Roy Park, Hazlitt and the Spirit of the Age {Oxford, 1971):
A Review, 11 Wordsworth circle, III, 2 (Spring, 1972}, 109.
16 Hazlitt and the Creative Imagination, p. 61.
17Hazlitt and the Spirit of the Age, p. 202.
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shown than in its treatment of this writer--its love of paradox and change, its dastard submission to prejudice and to
the fas ion of the day" (xi, 16) •

In "Mr. Coleridge," he

characterizes the age as one of "besotted prejudice and loathsome power" (xi, 34).

He concludes his essay on Horne Tooke

with "a curious example of the Spirit of the Age," that Lindley Murray's Grammar, which he viewed as hopelessly conservative and traditional (even to the point of "blindness and obstinacy"), was in much greater demand than Tooke's Diversions
of Purley, which offered a "geniuine anatomy of our native
tongue" (xi, 56-57).

Because he was "not subject to prejudice,"

Tooke threw aside the "veil" of custom that covered language,
and "penetrated to the naked truth of things" (xi, 54)--but
this caused his work to be rejected by the "prejudice and partyspirit" of the age.

The undesirable abstraction of the times

is again implied in Hazlitt •·s critic ism of Byron, that he
"panders to the spirit of the age,

and

goes to the very edge

of extreme and licentious speculation" (xi, 76); as the essayist
explains a few sentences later:
In a word, we think that poetry moves best within the
circle of nature and received opinion:
speculative theory and subtle casuistry are forbidden ground to it."
But Lord Byron often wanders into this ground wantonly,
wilfully, and unwarrantably • • • • The strength of his
imagination leads him to indulge in fantastic opinions;
the elevation of his rank sets censure at defiance. He
becomes a pampered egotist.
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Byron thus covers over nature with his own egotistical "speculative theory."

Hazlitt points out the problem again in

the essay on "Mr. Canning," in which he says that the "Genius
of the Age" is one "in which words have obtained a mastery
over things" (xi, 157)--once more suggesting the dominance,
and undesirability, of mental structures which block the
direct perception of nature.18
If we follow this line alone, then, we might conclude
that Hazlitt viewed the Spirit of the Age as simply one of
abstraction, which he viewed as totally undesirable.
But there are also other remarks which indicate that
Hazlitt had another view of the age.

Sometimes he suggests

that the times were characterized by a surge of human awareness that broke through the prejudice.

The Spirit of the Age,

from this point of view, is one of a struggle to escape from
prejudice or artificiality, rather than one of submission to
it.

In "Mr. Coleridge," for example, Hazlitt says that "The

spirit of monarchy was at variance with the spirit of the age"
(xi, 37); thus,.the spirit here is not abstraction but rather
"the flame of liberty" struggling to overcome abstraction (as

18In a London Magazine essay of 1820, too, Hazlitt
makes a case that "a bias to abstraction is evidently, then,
the reigning spirit of the age" (xviii, 305) in order to explain why his contemporaries were producing no good dramatic
poetry.
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represented by monarchy).

A similar positive view of the ten-

dency of the age is noticeable in a criticism of Scott:

"it

is thus he administers charms and philtres to our love of
Legitimacy, makes us conceive a horror of· all reform,· civil,
political, or religious, and would fain put down the Spirit
of the Age" (xi, 66).

The views expressed in the opening

paragraphs of "Mr. Wordsworth" (xi, 86-87) also present the
age as marked by the surge of the "natural" as opposed to the
"artificial."

Here, Wordsworth is uncharacteristically de-

scribed as a poet whose eye is "ever.fixed on the face of
nature" rather than on himself; and the poet's concern for
nature is what Hazlitt means to imply when he says that "Mr.
Wordsworth's genius is a pure emanation of the Spirit of the
Age.

11

At the end of the same paragraph, and the beginning of

the next, he again shows that, here, he sees Wordsworth's
poetry as in accord with the movement of the age in

brea~ing

through filtered perception:
In a wordi his poetry is founded on setting up an opposition (and pushing it to the utmost length) between th~
natural and the artificial; between the spirit of humanity, and the spirit of fashion and of the world!
It is one of the innovations of the time. It partakes
of, and is carried along with the revolutionary movement
of the age; the political changes of the day were the
model on which he formed and conducted his poetical experiments.
In the essay on "Mr. Jeffrey," he says that the "talent" behind the Edinburgh Review is "characteristic of the Spirit of
!
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the Age" (xi, 127); and Jeffrey, its editor, "has a great
range of knowledge," "is neither a bigot nor an enthusiast,"
and "is not wedded to any dogma" (xi, 130).

And in opposition

to the Spirit of the Age is William Gifford's journal ("it
is the express object of the Quarterly Review to discountenance and extinguish that spirit, both in theory and practice")
which is marked by "prejudice" and servile acceptance of "authority" (xi, 127, 128) .
There is thus another line in the book which sees the
Spirit of the Age not as abstraction but rather as its opposite.

However, in either of these lines of opinion Hazlitt

still sees narrowed, structured, or filtered perception as a
vice.

We must therefore look more closely at his opinions

on this particular subject.
In the essay on "Lord Byron," he contrasts the opposite types of artists (the other being exemplified by Scott)
and concludes with a "decided preference given to Sir Walter
Scott over Lord Byron" (xi, 71-72).

He says of the former

that he "draws aside the curtain, and the veil of egotism is
rent •

• In this point of view, the Author of Waverley is

one of the greatest teachers of morality that ever lived, by
emancipating the mind from petty, narrow, and bigotted prejudices."

Note, though, that Hazlitt specifies "In this point
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of view," which shows his conscious awareness that he recognized, and could assume if he chose to, the opposite point
of view about Scott--which he in fact does in the essay on
"William Godwin" (xi, 24-25).

In this essay, Hazlitt's ranking

of the opposite types is reversed:

Godwin is praised for the

Byron-like characteristics of intensity, narrowness, and egotism while Scott is criticized in comparison for lacking these
qualities.19
The essay on "Mr. Brougham--Sir F. Burdett" furnishes
another example of Hazlitt implying a qualification on his
preference for unstructured over structured awareness.

In

his comparison of Irish vs. Scotch eloquence, he says that
"The first of these is entirely the offspring of impulse:
the last of mechanism" (xi, 134).

A page later, he concludes:

Upon the whole, we despair less of the first than of the
last, for the principle of life and motion is, after all,
the primary condition of all genius. The luxuriant wildness of the one may be disciplined, and its excesses sobered down into reason; but the dry and rigid formality
of the other can never burst the shell or husk of oratory.
Hazlitt's preference here is clear; however, his phraseology
("we despair less . • • ") indicates that he sees faults on
both sides.

It also indicates that "discipline" and "reason"--

19see above, Chapter III, pp. 68-69. Note also that
in this essay Godwin is cited for having "rendered an essential service to moral science" (xi, 23). One need not tear
aside a "ve:i,l" to be a moralist.
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implying formality--have positive aspects.
In the essay on Coleridge, as mentioned above, Hazlitt
characterizes the Spirit of the Age as a war between "the flame
of liberty" and "Legitimacy."

In the same passage {xi, 37)

he rephrases the opposition as one between "reason" and "power.

11

A similar opposition is used in the essay on Scott, where Scott,
the political tool of the cause of Legitimacy, is contrasted to
poets or philosophers, heroes or sages, inventors of arts
or sciences, patriots, benefactors of the human race, enlighteners and civilizers of the world, who have (so far)
reduced opinion to reason, and power to law, who are the
cause that we no longer burn witches and heretics at slow
fires, • • • •
{xi, 66-67)
"Reason" and "law,

11

implying the formality of logical and legal

structures, are thus very positive, healthy forces in the age.
Indeed, at another point in "Mr. Coleridge," Hazlitt opposes
"the yearnings of humanity and the dictates of reason 11 to
"besotted prejudice and loathsome power" (xi, 34) •. Not all
structured perception--such as

~eason--is

bad, therefore.

Indeed, in "On the Pleasure of Hating" from 1826 Hazlitt characterizes "the spirit of the age" itself as "the progress of
intellectual refinement, warring with our natural infirmities"
'

(xii, 128-129); and since he believed that only "mechanical"
arts were capable of "progress" and "refinement, 11 20 he is

20see, for example,
(iv, 160-164; xviii, 5-10.)

11

Why the Arts are Not Progressive 11
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referring here to the advancement of reason and law--which
he sees as eminently desirable.
"Mr. Coleridge" also contains an extended comparison
of that writer and William Godwin (xi, 35f.).

_These two men,

of course, exemplify the opposite generic qualities.

And

though Hazlitt does not specifically express a preference
here, one thing, at least, is clear:

Godwin's limited scope

enabled him to produce definite results; Coleridge's universal mind, however, lost its practical effectiveness by being
"the sport of every breath, dancing to every wave .• "

The "de-

cided preference" given to Scott over Byron is thus not found
in a similar comparison of their intellectual brethren.

In-

deed, in speaking of Scott himself elsewhere in The Spirit of
the Age, Hazlitt notes with telling irony (xi, 67-68) that
his enlarged scope of mind and openness to nature were completely ineffectual in shaping his own morality.
The essayist's admiration for minds "of the greatest
capacity" or "of the greatest genius" was thus not always
without serious qualification.

Coleridge needed limitation;

Scott could have profited from more reason.

Hazlitt realized

the danger of an unrealistically one-sided standard of perfection; he thus saw the need for a corrective mixture of
counter-balancing qualities even in two of the men who held
out the most promise for correcting the excesses of an overly
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prejudiced age.

It is true that the major emphasis in The

Spirit of the Age is on calling for more of their Shakespearean type of awareness to enlighten the age; indeed, Jeffrey,
who also manifests such perception, receives very little criticism.

And Hazlitt's highly laudatory sketch of Knowles, who

"instinctively obeys the impulses of natural feeling" (xi, 183),
closes the book, thus lending a strong final emphasis to the
essayist's call for his type of natural wisdom.

However, again,

Hazlitt's advocacy of this unfiltered perception and openness
to nature is made within a context; as he said in 1828, "We
must therefore work with the instruments that are allotted us;
and no man can resist the spirit of the age in which he lives"
(xiv, 132).

He thus calls for openness to nature as a cor-

rective to other types of perception which are also necessary.
Bentham, for example, is criticized in The Spirit_of the Age
for not taking account of and appealing to human prejudices
(xi, 8, 11).

And Godwin is praised because his intense, single-

minded pursuit of reason has made a definite contribution to
moral science (xi, 23); but he' is also criticized, like Bentham, for neglecting "the gross and narrow ties of sense,
custom, authority, private and local attachment'' (xi, 18-19).
Scott and Coleridge are criticized for defects already mentioned.

Mackintosh, like Coleridge, has so great a range of

l81

knowledge that his effectiveness is dissipated (xi, 97).

And

Hazlitt levels a similar criticism at Wilberforce:
By aiming at too much, he has spoiled all, and neutralised
what might have been an estimable character, distinguished
by signal services to mankind. A man must take his choice
not only between virtue and vice, but between different
virtues. Otherwise, he will not gain his own approbation,
or secure the respect of others. The graces and accomplishments of private life mar the man of business and the
statesman • . • . It is best to choose and act up to some
leading character, as it is best to have some settled profession or regular pursuit in life.
(xi, 147)
This criticism is particularly significant because of the generalizations which Hazlitt draws from the specific example of
one man: and the generalizations show that he saw limitation
as a necessary and desirable virtue.

He again sees positive

value in partisanship in the essay on "Mr. Canning," when,
in criticizing this member of Parliament, he says, "A wise
man would have some settled opinion, a good man would wish
well to some cause, a modest man would be afraid to act without feeling sure of his ground, or to show an utter disregard
for right or wrong" (xi, 154) •

21

He levels a similar criticism

against Cobbett, in an essay which he added to the Paris and
second English editions of Spirit:

"He changes his opinions as

21 This, incidentally, forms a very strong contrast to
Keats's famous formulation of negative capability, a condition
in which. "man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries,
doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason"-Letters of John Keats, 1814-1821, ed. by H.E. Rollins (2 vols.;
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), II,
193.
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he does his friends, and much on the same account.

He has

no comfort in fixed principles" (viii, 55);22 again, the
desirability of fixed or structured thought is implied.

In

a passage which is most significant Hazlitt also finds positive "strength" in Wordsworth's "weakness":
The current of his feelings is deep, but narrow; the
range of his understanding is lofty and aspiring rather
than discursive. The force, the originality, the absolute truth and identity with which he feels some things,
makes him indifferent to so many others. The simplicity
and enthusiasm of his feelings, with respect to nature,
renders him bigotted and intolerant in his judgments of
men and things. But it happens to him, as to others, that
his strength lies in his weakness; and perhaps we have no
right to complain. We might get rid of the cynic and the
egotist, and find in his stead a commonplace man. We
should ;take the good the Gods provide us': a fine and
original vein of poetry is not one of their most contempt~
ible gifts, and the rest is scarcely worth thinking of,
except as it may be a mortification to those who expect
perfection from human nature; or who have been idle
enough at some period of their lives, to deify men of
genius as possessing claims above it. But this is a chord
that jars, and we shall not dwell upon it.
(xi, 94)
2 2 Elsewhere in this same essay (viii, 50-59) Hazlitt
sees Cobbett's 11 egotism 11 as "delightful." But he also criticizes him because he "sees through the medium of heat and
passion, not with reference to any general principles." Because of his "want of all rule and method" and because "his
notions are free and unencumbered" he writes with "outrageous
inconsistency" and "headstrong fickleness." A few sentences
later, however, Hazlitt finds much value in what he has just
criticized:
"His shifting his point of view from time to time
not merely adds variety and greater compass to his topics •
but it gives a greater zest and liveliness to his manner of
treating them." This and the ensuing remarks might just as
well be applied to Hazlitt himself; the essay on Cobbett shows
several shifts of his own viewpoint around his customary concerns.
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This cord

11

jars,

11

of course, precisely because Hazlitt recog-

nizes himself as one of those "idle" critics who had sometimes
.
. t e d t oo s t rong 1 y on on 1 y one s t an d ar d o f per f ec t.ion. 23
1ns1s
The combined particulars of The Spirit of the Age, though,
show a more mature judgment and balanced perspective.

While

Hazlitt stresses openness to nature throughout the book, he
advocates this perspective only as a corrective to, rather
than a replacement for, perspectives of narrowed, filtered,
and structured vision, which he sees as necessary to balance
openness.

The final mixture of perspectives, then, produces

a range and depth of satisfaction which could not be attained
by any one perspective alone.

Hazlitt's greatest production, then, mirrors the. patterns that characterize his work as a whole.

The dual streams

of imagination, selfless and selfish, which flow out of his
earliest work in 1805, have, by 1825, swollen into wider and
deeper rivers that bring life to vast tracts of thought and
experience in his writings as a whole.

And no matter which

direction Hazlitt's imagination takes, all of his writings,
critical and personal, are touched by passion and feeling-23 see also Chapter II, above, pp. 29-30, for an analysis of another relevant and important passage from The Spirit
of. the Age. Cf., too, the passage quoted at the top of p. 35,
also from Spirit.
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his essays.spring as much from his heart as from his intellect, and they have an unmistakeable depth and resonance as
a result.

The wise tranquility of openness to nature is

something that we ourselves feel in his writing, be it in a
description of Shakespeare's fated lovers, or in a memory of
the unbounded prospects of youth, or in a roadside reverie
on an April morning in Wales.

So, too, the excited individ-

ualism that sprang from a tradition of Dissent, mellowing into
a relish for every possible form of intense individuality, is
brought home to us in a lively disquistion on the joys of
pedantry, or in an incomparable portrait of Elia haunting the
nooks and crannies of Romantic London, or in rapt appreciations
of any unmatchable skill from Burke's oratory to Cavanagh's
handball-playing.

Hazlitt himself exemplified gusto as well

as any artist he wrote of.

His 'total immersion in life is

perhaps his outstanding characteristic, for he experienced
life, his subject, and recreated it in his writings with the
combined qualities of poet, painter, critic, and philosopher,
always trying to maximize the possibilities of human satisfaction in the everyday world that all men must face.

He was

one of the great humanists of his age; and for range, variety,
and depth of telling insight into the condition of man _there
are few experiences in the scope of English literature comparable to the reading of Hazlitt's collected Works.
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